corresponding federal rule in Arizona

2024Cir. 1989) (holding statements made during plea negotiations are inadmissible under Federal Rule 410 unless waived); Hernandez v. State, 203 Ariz. 196 , 198 ¶ 10 (2002) (“In interpreting Arizona’s evidentiary rules, we look to federal law when our rule is identical to the corresponding federal rule.”).

2019Cf. Hernandez v. State , 203 Ariz. 196 , ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 765 , 767 (2002) ("In interpreting Arizona's evidentiary rules, we look to federal law when our rule is identical to the corresponding federal rule"); but see State v. Green , 200 Ariz. 496 , ¶ 10, 29 P.3d 271 , 273-274 (2001) ("When interpreting an evidentiary rule that predominantly echoes its federal counterpart, we often look to the latter for guidance.").

2019Cf. Hernandez v. State , 203 Ariz. 196 , ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 765 , 767 (2002) ("In interpreting Arizona's evidentiary rules, we look to federal law when our rule is identical to the corresponding federal rule"); but see State v. Green , 200 Ariz. 496 , ¶ 10, 29 P.3d 271 , 273-274 (2001) ("When interpreting an evidentiary rule that predominantly echoes its federal counterpart, we often look to the latter for guidance.").

2019Cf. Hernandez v. State , 203 Ariz. 196 , ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 765 , 767 (2002) ("In interpreting Arizona's evidentiary rules, we look to federal law when our rule is identical to the corresponding federal rule"); but see State v. Green , 200 Ariz. 496 , ¶ 10, 29 P.3d 271 , 273-274 (2001) ("When interpreting an evidentiary rule that predominantly echoes its federal counterpart, we often look to the latter for guidance.").

2009And, because Arizona essentially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, “‘in the absence of Arizona precedent as a guide to interpretation of our rules, we will look to the federal courts which have interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence.’” State v. Haight-Gyuro, 218 Ariz. 356, n.3 , 186 P.3d 33 , 36 n.3 (App. 2008), quoting State v. Johnson, 132 Ariz. 5, 8 , 643 P.2d 708, 711 (App. 1981).

2009And, because Arizona essentially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, “‘in the absence of Arizona precedent as a guide to interpretation of our rules, we will look to the federal courts which have interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence.’” State v. Haight-Gyuro, 218 Ariz. 356, n.3 , 186 P.3d 33 , 36 n.3 (App. 2008), quoting State v. Johnson, 132 Ariz. 5, 8 , 643 P.2d 708, 711 (App. 1981).

2008Leahy v. Ryan, 20 Ariz.App. 110 , 112 n. 1, 510 P.2d 421 , 428 n. 1 (1973) (“Rule 60(c) has the exact working [sic] as [former] Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore construction of the federal rule is persuasive authority.”); see also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 304 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1990) (noting that “uniformity in interpretation of our rules and the federal rules is highly desirable”). ¶ 7 Were we to do so here, we would readily conclude that the six-month limitation for seeking relief from final judgments pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1) is inapplicable to

2008Leahy v. Ryan, 20 Ariz.App. 110 , 112 n. 1, 510 P.2d 421 , 428 n. 1 (1973) (“Rule 60(c) has the exact working [sic] as [former] Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore construction of the federal rule is persuasive authority.”); see also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 304 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1990) (noting that “uniformity in interpretation of our rules and the federal rules is highly desirable”). ¶ 7 Were we to do so here, we would readily conclude that the six-month limitation for seeking relief from final judgments pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1) is inapplicable to

2008Leahy v. Ryan, 20 Ariz.App. 110 , 112 n. 1, 510 P.2d 421 , 428 n. 1 (1973) (“Rule 60(c) has the exact working [sic] as [former] Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore construction of the federal rule is persuasive authority.”); see also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 304 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1990) (noting that “uniformity in interpretation of our rules and the federal rules is highly desirable”). ¶ 7 Were we to do so here, we would readily conclude that the six-month limitation for seeking relief from final judgments pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1) is inapplicable to

2008Leahy v. Ryan, 20 Ariz.App. 110 , 112 n. 1, 510 P.2d 421 , 428 n. 1 (1973) (“Rule 60(c) has the exact working [sic] as [former] Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore construction of the federal rule is persuasive authority.”); see also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 304 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1990) (noting that “uniformity in interpretation of our rules and the federal rules is highly desirable”). ¶ 7 Were we to do so here, we would readily conclude that the six-month limitation for seeking relief from final judgments pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1) is inapplicable to

2003Compare Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108 , 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984), declining in the circumstances presented to apply to the state clause the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding federal clause, with State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 5 , 994 P.2d 395, 397 (2000), suggesting, without analysis, that the protections offered by the two clauses are coterminous. [5] The majority claims this characterization is inaccurate.

2003Compare Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108 , 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984), declining in the circumstances presented to apply to the state clause the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding federal clause, with State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 5 , 994 P.2d 395, 397 (2000), suggesting, without analysis, that the protections offered by the two clauses are coterminous. [5] The majority claims this characterization is inaccurate.

2003Compare Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108 , 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984), declining in the circumstances presented to apply to the state clause the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding federal clause, with State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 5 , 994 P.2d 395, 397 (2000), suggesting, without analysis, that the protections offered by the two clauses are coterminous. [5] The majority claims this characterization is inaccurate.

2003Compare Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108 , 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984), declining in the circumstances presented to apply to the state clause the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding federal clause, with State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 5 , 994 P.2d 395, 397 (2000), suggesting, without analysis, that the protections offered by the two clauses are coterminous. [5] The majority claims this characterization is inaccurate.

2002For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admission of an indemnity agreement made during compromise negotiations for purposes of attacking the credibility of witnesses, *768 notwithstanding Rule 408, because that purpose is "distinct from proving liability." Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (9th Cir.1985).

2002For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the admission of an indemnity agreement made during compromise negotiations for purposes of attacking the credibility of wit nesses, notwithstanding Rule 408, because that purpose is “distinct from proving liability.” Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (9th Cir.1985).