larger framework in Alaska

2007We have likewise emphasized that "[when a statute or regulation is part of a larger framework or regulatory scheme, even a seemingly unambiguous statute must be interpreted in light of the other portions of the regulatory whole." FDIC, 21 P.3d at 351 (quoting Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App.1992)) (alteration in original). 17 .

2000Millman v. State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App.1992).

2025Ass’n, 279 P.3d 589, 595 (Alaska 2012)). -15- 7778 overcome that plain meaning.”53 “When a statute or regulation is part of a larger framework or regulatory scheme,” we “interpret each part or section of [the] statute with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.”54 We first turn to AS 25.23.140(b)’s text, which does not expressly define “an appeal.” To determine its meaning, we consider “an appeal” “in light of the other portions of the regulatory whole.”55 Subsection (b) follows subsection (a)’s authorization to appeal a final order or decree entered “under this chapt

2025Dev., 414 P.3d 630, 636 (Alaska 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 73 See AS 16.20.500-.690. 74 Compatible, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d coll. ed. 1980); see also Compatible, FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD DESK DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1977) (defining compatible as “[c]apable of existing together; congruous; congenial”). 75 See AS 16.05.251(a)(7), .255(a)(7). 76 See AS 16.05.020. 77 See Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 912 (Alaska 1971). -21- 7788 Inletkeeper’s argument includes an inference that we should read “compatibility” as foreclosing uses that have any adve

2025Dev., 414 P.3d 630, 636 (Alaska 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 73 See AS 16.20.500-.690. 74 Compatible, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d coll. ed. 1980); see also Compatible, FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD DESK DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1977) (defining compatible as “[c]apable of existing together; congruous; congenial”). 75 See AS 16.05.251(a)(7), .255(a)(7). 76 See AS 16.05.020. 77 See Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 912 (Alaska 1971). -21- 7788 Inletkeeper’s argument includes an inference that we should read “compatibility” as foreclosing uses that have any adve

2025After one year has passed from an adoption decree’s entry, the decree cannot be challenged “by any person . . . in any manner upon any ground . . . .”58 If there were any doubt as to the sweep of its prohibition, the statute lists a number of defects that would ordinarily justify reversal of a judgment but that cannot be raised to attack the decree: fraud, misrepresentation, failure to provide notice, and lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. 59 The 53 Basey, 462 P.3d at 535 (alteration in original) (quoting Mat-Su Valley Med.

2018It does not 3 See City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 167 (Alaska 1977) (holding that police officers could not be liable for trespass because they “had a reasonable belief as to the existence of an emergency which justified their unauthorized entry”). 4 See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (holding that “the invasion of privacy principle cannot shield a person from [an] investigation[] by the police unless the investigation is carried out in an offensive manner”). 5 207 P.3d 541, 547-49 (Alaska 2009); see id. at 548 (“[R]elevant information known to a police dispatcher

2018It does not 3 See City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 167 (Alaska 1977) (holding that police officers could not be liable for trespass because they “had a reasonable belief as to the existence of an emergency which justified their unauthorized entry”). 4 See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (holding that “the invasion of privacy principle cannot shield a person from [an] investigation[] by the police unless the investigation is carried out in an offensive manner”). 5 207 P.3d 541, 547-49 (Alaska 2009); see id. at 548 (“[R]elevant information known to a police dispatcher

2018It does not 3 See City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 167 (Alaska 1977) (holding that police officers could not be liable for trespass because they “had a reasonable belief as to the existence of an emergency which justified their unauthorized entry”). 4 See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (holding that “the invasion of privacy principle cannot shield a person from [an] investigation[] by the police unless the investigation is carried out in an offensive manner”). 5 207 P.3d 541, 547-49 (Alaska 2009); see id. at 548 (“[R]elevant information known to a police dispatcher

2018It does not 3 See City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 167 (Alaska 1977) (holding that police officers could not be liable for trespass because they “had a reasonable belief as to the existence of an emergency which justified their unauthorized entry”). 4 See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (holding that “the invasion of privacy principle cannot shield a person from [an] investigation[] by the police unless the investigation is carried out in an offensive manner”). 5 207 P.3d 541, 547-49 (Alaska 2009); see id. at 548 (“[R]elevant information known to a police dispatcher

2018It does not 3 See City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162, 167 (Alaska 1977) (holding that police officers could not be liable for trespass because they “had a reasonable belief as to the existence of an emergency which justified their unauthorized entry”). 4 See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1245 (Alaska 2007) (holding that “the invasion of privacy principle cannot shield a person from [an] investigation[] by the police unless the investigation is carried out in an offensive manner”). 5 207 P.3d 541, 547-49 (Alaska 2009); see id. at 548 (“[R]elevant information known to a police dispatcher

1992Lake v. Construction Machinery, Inc., 787 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Alaska 1990); Hafling v. Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pacific, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978); Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Construction Camp Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942 (Alaska 1976).