larger principle in Pennsylvania

2023Majority Op. at 34-35 n.19-20; T.S.M, 71 A.3d at 269 . [J-79A-2022 and J-79B-2022] - 35 stability and all “intangible” factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of “primary” importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.

2023Majority Op. at 34-35 n.19-20; T.S.M, 71 A.3d at 269 . [J-79A-2022 and J-79B-2022] - 35 stability and all “intangible” factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of “primary” importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.

2015Instead, addressing this issue as part of a larger challenge to the various “deficiencies” raised by the Commonwealth,31 Appellant asserts that the PCRA court’s failure to give notice of its intention to dismiss as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 909 denied him the opportunity to respond to the dismissal and (Lcontinued) request; and the court did not address the new substantive contention in its opinion disposing of Appellant's PCRA claims, we found the claim waived, and further recognized that “waiver cannot be avoided solely by reference to Appellant's Concise Statement

2015Instead, addressing this issue as part of a larger challenge to the various “deficiencies” raised by the Commonwealth,31 Appellant asserts that the PCRA court’s failure to give notice of its intention to dismiss as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 909 denied him the opportunity to respond to the dismissal and (Lcontinued) request; and the court did not address the new substantive contention in its opinion disposing of Appellant's PCRA claims, we found the claim waived, and further recognized that “waiver cannot be avoided solely by reference to Appellant's Concise Statement

2015Instead, addressing this issue as part of a larger challenge to the various “deficiencies” raised by the Commonwealth,31 Appellant asserts that the PCRA court’s failure to give notice of its intention to dismiss as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 909 denied him the opportunity to respond to the dismissal and (Lcontinued) request; and the court did not address the new substantive contention in its opinion disposing of Appellant's PCRA claims, we found the claim waived, and further recognized that “waiver cannot be avoided solely by reference to Appellant's Concise Statement

1972The Court cited the New York injunctive procedure sustained in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 , 77 S. Ct. 1325 (1957), as a possible model which embodied the kind of procedural safeguards necessary to render the statute constitutional.

1972The Court cited the New York injunctive procedure sustained in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 , 77 S. Ct. 1325 (1957), as a possible model which embodied the kind of procedural safeguards necessary to render the statute constitutional.

1967Appellant’s present demand for jury trial must be *69 viewed as part of the larger controversy which is presently raging in the courts and in academic circles as a result of the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in In Re Gault, supra. We would be remiss in our duty if we did not consider appellant’s ar ■ gument within this larger framework.

1927The appellant says there can be no set-off because the debts are not mutual and that he is entitled to distribution from the funds of the Cosmopolitan Bank irrespective of the fact that Brown & Stevens owe it the larger sum; he relies largely upon Wooden v. Reese, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 162 , where it was properly held that one who receives money for a specific purpose, thereby becoming trustee, cannot appropriate the amount so received as a set-off against a greater indebtedness due him by the person who gave him the money after the latter has become bankrupt.