5 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2017As our Supreme Court has noted, remoteness in time does not render 404(b) evidence per se inadmissible; “[r]ather, the timing and similarity of the incidents are factors in the larger inquiry into whether the incidents were relevant to a matter in issue.” Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997) (finding no error in the admission of evidence at the defendant’s murder trial that he had beaten the victim more than three years earlier). 2015Both “the timing and similarity of the incidents are factors in the larger inquiry into whether the incidents were relevant to a matter in issue.” Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 222 . [42] Here, the evidence elicited by the State related to the Cullens shooting included that Angela Allen saw Bishop on the evening of August 31, 2012, the night before Shabazz was discovered shot at his home, and that Bishop gave her $300 and stated that “he was going to, uh, go find Will or talk to Will,” whom she knew through Bishop. | 1 | 2 |
Harold Bishop v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2025Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphases added), trans. denied. [43] Jones argues that the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies was not admissible under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception because there was nothing about the manner in which any of the instant robberies occurred that rose to the level of a “signature crime.” See Appellant’s Br. at 36-40. | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Stategreen2 sentences2020We now proceed to the merits of Wadle’s claim. 33For several years after its ratification and adoption, Indiana’s appellate courts consistently declined to exercise their article 7 authority, expressing the “view that this power appears to go beyond that power which [we had] always possessed.” See Parker v. State, 265 Ind. 595, 604 , 358 N.E.2d 110, 114 (1976). 2020We now proceed to the merits of Wadle’s claim. 33For several years after its ratification and adoption, Indiana’s appellate courts consistently declined to exercise their article 7 authority, expressing the “view that this power appears to go beyond that power which [we had] always possessed.” See Parker v. State, 265 Ind. 595, 604 , 358 N.E.2d 110, 114 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pointon v. State
green
1 sentence1982Pointon v. State, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1255 ; Holliday v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 85 , 257 N.E.2d 679 ; Sankey v. State, (1973) 157 Ind. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Holliday v. State
green
2 sentences1982Pointon v. State, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1255 ; Holliday v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 85 , 257 N.E.2d 679 ; Sankey v. State, (1973) 157 Ind. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . 1982Pointon v. State, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1255 ; Holliday v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 85 , 257 N.E.2d 679 ; Sankey v. State, (1973) 157 Ind. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sankey v. State
green
1 sentence1982Pointon v. State, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1255 ; Holliday v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 85 , 257 N.E.2d 679 ; Sankey v. State, (1973) 157 Ind. 627 , 301 N.E.2d 235 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.