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7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Robins Silk Manufacturing Co. v. Consolidated Piece Dye Worksgreen2 sentences2015The dual purpose doctrine is based on a test enunciated in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929), which our supreme court later adopted: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, [the employee] is in the course of [ ] employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own----If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undo 1972In Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937), and McKay v. Industrial Commission, supra, Arizona adopted the dual purpose rule enunciated in the case of Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929). | 1 | 3 |
Faul v. Jelco, Inc.green2 sentences2026The “dual purpose doctrine” is the dual purpose exception to the “going and coming rule.” Faul v. Jelco, Inc., 122 Ariz. 490, 492 (App. 1979); see also Gurtler v. Indus. 1991Id. 122 Ariz. at 492 , 595 P.2d at 1037 . | 1 | 2 |
Gurtler v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence2026Comm’n of Ariz., 237 Ariz. 537, 540, ¶ 11 (App. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Strauss v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2015See id. (noting that “[a]nother exception [to the going and coming rule] is whether transportation is furnished at the expense of the employer”). ¶ 16 Additionally, we do not read Connors as broadening the dual purpose doctrine. 2015See Delk, 74 Ariz. at 381 , 249 P.2d 943 (holding that employee’s death from car accident while traveling on an old road parallel to a new highway arose in the course of his employment as a livestock inspector because the nature of his duties “called for the decedent to travel on side roads and trails”); Strauss, 73 Ariz. at 290 , 240 P.2d 550 (finding employee was within course of employment when fatal accident occurred following a personal errand where employer provided transportation and required employee to “work both on and off the premises at any and all hours”). | 1 | 1 |
Delk v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2015See Delk, 74 Ariz. at 381 , 249 P.2d 943 (holding that employee’s death from car accident while traveling on an old road parallel to a new highway arose in the course of his employment as a livestock inspector because the nature of his duties “called for the decedent to travel on side roads and trails”); Strauss, 73 Ariz. at 290 , 240 P.2d 550 (finding employee was within course of employment when fatal accident occurred following a personal errand where employer provided transportation and required employee to “work both on and off the premises at any and all hours”). 2015See Delk, 74 Ariz. at 381 , 249 P.2d 943 (holding that employee’s death from car accident while traveling on an old road parallel to a new highway arose in the course of his employment as a livestock inspector because the nature of his duties “called for the decedent to travel on side roads and trails”); Strauss, 73 Ariz. at 290 , 240 P.2d 550 (finding employee was within course of employment when fatal accident occurred following a personal errand where employer provided transportation and required employee to “work both on and off the premises at any and all hours”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Claim of Dependents of Marks v. Gray
green
2 sentences2015The dual purpose doctrine is based on a test enunciated in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929), which our supreme court later adopted: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, [the employee] is in the course of [ ] employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own----If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undo 1972In Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937), and McKay v. Industrial Commission, supra, Arizona adopted the dual purpose rule enunciated in the case of Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929). | 3 | 1969–2015 |
Butler v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1972In Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937), and McKay v. Industrial Commission, supra, Arizona adopted the dual purpose rule enunciated in the case of Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929). 1972In Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937), and McKay v. Industrial Commission, supra, Arizona adopted the dual purpose rule enunciated in the case of Marks’ Dependents v. Gray et al., 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 (1929). | 2 | 1969–1972 |
Connors v. Parsons
green
2 sentences2015We therefore remanded for further proceedings, noting that “principles of employment law” could be determinative on remand, including the following: The dual purpose exception applies where the employee performs a concurrent business service for the employer while doing a personal commute____In order to consti- tute a concurrent service, the trip must have been necessary for the employer— i.e., sometime, someone would have to run this errand on the employer’s behalf even if the parties’ personal trip were canceled____The business trip need not have been taken by these same parties at the same 2015We therefore remanded for further proceedings, noting that “principles of employment law” could be determinative on remand, including the following: The dual purpose exception applies where the employee performs a concurrent business service for the employer while doing a personal commute____In order to consti- tute a concurrent service, the trip must have been necessary for the employer— i.e., sometime, someone would have to run this errand on the employer’s behalf even if the parties’ personal trip were canceled____The business trip need not have been taken by these same parties at the same | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kerr v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1990However, they argue that the special hazards exception to the coming and going rule recognized in Kerr v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 106 , 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), and the dual purpose exception to the rule discussed in Anderson and Faul apply in the present case. 1990However, they argue that the special hazards exception to the coming and going rule recognized in Kerr v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 106 , 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), and the dual purpose exception to the rule discussed in Anderson and Faul apply in the present case. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wilson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences1979Appellants rely on the dissent in Wilson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, Oakland Unified School District, 16 Cal.3d 181 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 545 P.2d 225 (1976), which argued that the dual purpose exception applied to a school teacher who, although not expressly or impliedly required to transport teaching materials from her home to school as a condition of employment, often transported such materials to fulfill her teaching responsibilities. 1979Appellants rely on the dissent in Wilson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, Oakland Unified School District, 16 Cal.3d 181 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 545 P.2d 225 (1976), which argued that the dual purpose exception applied to a school teacher who, although not expressly or impliedly required to transport teaching materials from her home to school as a condition of employment, often transported such materials to fulfill her teaching responsibilities. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Estate of Barrett v. Barrett
green
2 sentences1969In discussing the basic dual purpose rule which is cited with approval in Butler v. Industrial Comm., 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937) and application of Barrett, 78 Ariz. 219 , 278 P.2d 409 (1954), Judge Cardozo used the following language in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93 , 167 N.E. 181, 182-183 (1929): “* * * Unquestionably injury through collision is a risk of travel on a highway. 1969In discussing the basic dual purpose rule which is cited with approval in Butler v. Industrial Comm., 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703 (1937) and application of Barrett, 78 Ariz. 219 , 278 P.2d 409 (1954), Judge Cardozo used the following language in Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93 , 167 N.E. 181, 182-183 (1929): “* * * Unquestionably injury through collision is a risk of travel on a highway. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.