dual purpose doctrine in Missouri

2018Cases addressing the dual purpose doctrine in the context of the Workers' Compensation Act are "instructive in understanding the concept of dual purpose." Tuttle , 964 S.W.2d at 518 n. 1.

2018See Tuttle , 964 S.W.2d at 518-19 (setting forth no additional pleading requirement for the dual purpose doctrine to apply to a properly-pleaded claim of respondeat superior liability, but instead stating simply that "[f]or the dual purpose doctrine to apply, the travel must have been necessary even where a personal purpose is lacking").

2005Williams v. ServiceMaster, 907 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Mo. App. W.D.1995), Tuttle v. Muenks, 964 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Mo.App.

1998See, e.g., Williams v. ServiceMaster, 907 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Mo.App.1995).

2011The Missouri Supreme Court held that ”[t]he task assigned to [the employee] by his employer necessitated the trip to and from the company plant and, under the dual purpose doctrine, it is not a valid objection that the employee was concurrently serving a purpose of his own." Id. at 257 .

1969The dual purpose doctrine as explained by the Missouri Supreme Court in Corp v. Joplin Cement Company, Mo., 337 S.W.2d 252, 1 . c. 255, is that if the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel he is in the course of his employment, even though at the same time he is serving some purpose of his own.

2011Finding a dual purpose, however, is not the end of the issue in this case. “[F]or an accident to be compensable under the dual-purpose doctrine, an employee must be acting not only for his own purpose but for the purpose of his employer when the accident occurs.” Parsons v. Kay’s Home Cooking, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Mo.App.1992) (emphasis added).

1996Appellant is correct that the Parsons court held that the dual purpose doctrine does not apply when “an employee deviates from an employer’s business so that at the time of the accident he is serving only his own purpose.” Parsons, 830 S.W.2d at 48 .

2001The mutual benefit doctrine applies if an employee is injured while engaging in an act that benefits both the employer and the employee and “some advantage to the employer results from the employee’s conduct.” Id.

2001For the dual purpose doctrine to apply, the “trier of fact must be able to infer the employee would have made the journey even though the private purpose was absent.” Id.

2011“For the dual purpose doctrine to apply, the ‘trier of fact must be able to infer the employee would have made the journey even though the private purpose was absent.’” Otte, 66 S.W.3d at 70 (citation omitted).

2011“For the dual purpose doctrine to apply, the ‘trier of fact must be able to infer the employee would have made the journey even though the private purpose was absent.’” Otte, 66 S.W.3d at 70 (citation omitted).

1984Accidents and injuries sustained during travel to work, with certain exceptions such as the extended premises doctrine [Hunt v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 445 S.W.2d 400, 405-407 (Mo.App.1969)], or the dual purpose doctrine [Snowden v. Orscheln Brothers Truck Lines, 446 S.W.2d 494, 496-497 (Mo.App.1969)], which are not applicable here under the facts, are not compensable as they did not arise out of, or in the course of, employment. § 287.120.-1; 1 Delozier v. Munlake Const. Co., 657 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Mo.App.1983).

1984Accidents and injuries sustained during travel to work, with certain exceptions such as the extended premises doctrine [Hunt v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 445 S.W.2d 400, 405-407 (Mo.App.1969)], or the dual purpose doctrine [Snowden v. Orscheln Brothers Truck Lines, 446 S.W.2d 494, 496-497 (Mo.App.1969)], which are not applicable here under the facts, are not compensable as they did not arise out of, or in the course of, employment. § 287.120.-1; 1 Delozier v. Munlake Const. Co., 657 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Mo.App.1983).

1984Under the dual purpose doctrine *121 which is recognized in Missouri, Wolfe v. Harms, 413 S.W.2d 204, 216 (Mo.1967), a jury question was presented just as it was in Gilborges .

1984Accidents and injuries sustained during travel to work, with certain exceptions such as the extended premises doctrine [Hunt v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 445 S.W.2d 400, 405-407 (Mo.App.1969)], or the dual purpose doctrine [Snowden v. Orscheln Brothers Truck Lines, 446 S.W.2d 494, 496-497 (Mo.App.1969)], which are not applicable here under the facts, are not compensable as they did not arise out of, or in the course of, employment. § 287.120.-1; 1 Delozier v. Munlake Const. Co., 657 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Mo.App.1983).

1976The doctrine “simply requires that the service of the employer be a concurrent cause of the journey.” Gordon v. Puritan Chemical Company, 406 S.W.2d 822, 828 (Mo.App.1966).