Howey test (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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Howey test in Arizona

7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2001 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc.green
arizctapp · 1986 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1987–2001
2 sentences

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

12
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners, Incorporated and Brian D. Pardogreen
cadc · 1996 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Under the Howey test, as here, the pre-sale activities were sufficient to classify the transaction as an investment contract. *104 ¶ 33 We disagree with the statement in Life Partners that investors’ profits from viatical settlements “depend[ ] entirely upon the mortality of the insured,” 87 F.3d at 548 , and, that in such a situation, a potential investor’s “need for federal securities regulation is greatly diminished.” Id. at 547 .

2001Under the Howey test, as here, the pre-sale activities were sufficient to classify the transaction as an investment contract. *104 ¶ 33 We disagree with the statement in Life Partners that investors’ profits from viatical settlements “depend[ ] entirely upon the mortality of the insured,” 87 F.3d at 548 , and, that in such a situation, a potential investor’s “need for federal securities regulation is greatly diminished.” Id. at 547 .

11
Rose v. Dobrasgreen
arizctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

11
Nutek Information Systems, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commissiongreen
arizctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

11
Sullivan v. Metro Productions, Inc.green
arizctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

11
Mordaunt v. Incomcogreen
ca9 · 1982 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986See, Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (1982).

1986See, Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (1982).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,748 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. green
ca9 · 1973
2 sentences

1986The Ninth Circuit, in Turner Enterprises, supra, noted that the word “solely” in the Howey test is not to be read as a literal limitation on the definition.

1986The Ninth Circuit, in Turner Enterprises, supra, noted that the word “solely” in the Howey test is not to be read as a literal limitation on the definition.

21981–1986
Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co. green
scotus · 1946
2 sentences

2001Life Partners falls squarely within this category. ¶ 29 Life Partners disregards the premise underlying the Howey test — that is, that the statutory definition of “security” “embodies a . flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 , 66 S.Ct. 1100 .

2001Life Partners falls squarely within this category. ¶ 29 Life Partners disregards the premise underlying the Howey test — that is, that the statutory definition of “security” “embodies a . flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 , 66 S.Ct. 1100 .

12001–2001
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

2001Turner Enterprises and United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 2051 , 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975), is more consistent with the view that pre-investment entrepreneurial or managerial activities may satisfy the third prong of the Howey test under appropriate circumstances.

2001Turner Enterprises and United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 2051 , 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975), is more consistent with the view that pre-investment entrepreneurial or managerial activities may satisfy the third prong of the Howey test under appropriate circumstances.

12001–2001
Vairo v. Clayden green
arizctapp · 1987
2 sentences

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

2001See, e.g., id.; Vairo, 153 Ariz. at 17-18 , 734 P.2d at 114-15 ; Daggett v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 152 Ariz. 559, 565-68 , 733 P.2d 1142, 1148-51 (App.1986); Sullivan v. Metro Prods., Inc., 150 Ariz. 573, 576-77 , 724 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (App.1986); Rose, 128 Ariz. at 212 , 624 P.2d at 890 . ¶20 Substance controls over form when determining whether a financial arrangement constitutes an investment contract because “the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who s

12001–2001
John D. Williamson, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross v. Gordon G. Tucker, Defendants-Appellees-Cross green
ca5 · 1981
2 sentences

1998Id. at 422-23 .

1998Id. at 422-23 .

11998–1998
Reves v. Ernst & Young green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

1996Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. at 64 , 110 S.Ct. at 950 .

1996Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. at 64 , 110 S.Ct. at 950 .

11996–1996
Lavelle v. United States green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

1981Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 821 , 94 S.Ct. 117 , 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973), the court interpreted the third prong of the Howey test in a flexible and remedial fashion.

1981Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 821 , 94 S.Ct. 117 , 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973), the court interpreted the third prong of the Howey test in a flexible and remedial fashion.

11981–1981
State v. Seigler green
· 1913
2 sentences

1981Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 821 , 94 S.Ct. 117 , 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973), the court interpreted the third prong of the Howey test in a flexible and remedial fashion.

1981Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 821 , 94 S.Ct. 117 , 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973), the court interpreted the third prong of the Howey test in a flexible and remedial fashion.

11981–1981

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1801 (5) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2314 (4) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2301 (3) AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1841 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CO 12 (1975–2022) TX 11 (1970–2015) NY 10 (1986–2023) CA 9 (1980–2024) WA 9 (1979–2025) OR 9 (1971–2014) AZ 7 (1981–2001) GA 6 (1974–2013) FL 6 (1980–2025) AK 4 (1983–1990) KS 4 (1982–1998) IN 4 (1996–2004) NC 4 (2013–2020) MD 3 (1990–2013) MI 3 (1979–1988) IA 3 (1989–2004) AL 3 (1979–1980) IL 3 (2002–2021) UT 3 (1983–2010) AR 2 (1989–2026) TN 2 (1996–2002) MT 2 (1979–2012) NM 2 (1991–1994) MN 2 (1976–1988) PA 2 (1989–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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