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7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Danngreen2 sentences2026“Whether an accused has made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel is a question of fact.” State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160 (1977) (citation omitted). ¶13 “A prospective pro se litigant must understand (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, and (3) the possible punishment upon conviction.” State v. 4 STATE v. OLSON Decision of the Court Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 360, ¶ 24 (2009) (citing State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 323-24 (1994)). 2018See State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 358, 360, ¶¶ 10, 25 (2009) (“Whether an accused has made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel is a question of fact . . . based substantially on the trial judge’s observation of the defendant’s appearance and actions.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dossgreen2 sentences2026“Whether an accused has made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel is a question of fact.” State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160 (1977) (citation omitted). ¶13 “A prospective pro se litigant must understand (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, and (3) the possible punishment upon conviction.” State v. 4 STATE v. OLSON Decision of the Court Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 360, ¶ 24 (2009) (citing State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 323-24 (1994)). 2009“Whether an accused has made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel is a question of fact.” State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160 , 568 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1977). | 2 | 2 |
State v. McLemoregreen1 sentence2026“Although a court should warn of the dangers and disadvantages generally inherent in self-representation, . . . it is not reversible error to fail to warn of every possible strategic consideration.” Id. (quoting Cornell, 179 Ariz. at 324 ); see also State v. McLemore, 230 Ariz. 571, 578, ¶ 23 (App. 2012) (“Failing to engage in a particular colloquy with a defendant, failing to warn a defendant of ‘every possible strategic consideration’ of proceeding pro se, or failing to have the defendant sign the written waiver provided for by Rule 6 is not necessarily reversible error.”). ¶14 Even so, Olso | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cornellgreen2 sentences2026“Whether an accused has made an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel is a question of fact.” State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160 (1977) (citation omitted). ¶13 “A prospective pro se litigant must understand (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, and (3) the possible punishment upon conviction.” State v. 4 STATE v. OLSON Decision of the Court Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 360, ¶ 24 (2009) (citing State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 323-24 (1994)). 2026“Although a court should warn of the dangers and disadvantages generally inherent in self-representation, . . . it is not reversible error to fail to warn of every possible strategic consideration.” Id. (quoting Cornell, 179 Ariz. at 324 ); see also State v. McLemore, 230 Ariz. 571, 578, ¶ 23 (App. 2012) (“Failing to engage in a particular colloquy with a defendant, failing to warn a defendant of ‘every possible strategic consideration’ of proceeding pro se, or failing to have the defendant sign the written waiver provided for by Rule 6 is not necessarily reversible error.”). ¶14 Even so, Olso | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Jesseegreen1 sentence2007“The very nature of the hearing, respondent’s confusion and respondent’s actions during the hearing should have made the court question whether respondent had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel.” Id. 143 Ill.Dec. 559 , 554 N.E.2d at 500 ; see also In re Jessee, 744 S.W.2d at 516-17 (reversing finding of incapacitation where court failed to ascertain whether subject’s absence was an intelligent and knowing waiver of right to be present); cf. In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484 , 731 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1998) (reversing permanent child custody order against mother who was “borderline m | 1 | 1 |
In Re Ettergreen2 sentences2007“The very nature of the hearing, respondent’s confusion and respondent’s actions during the hearing should have made the court question whether respondent had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel.” Id. 143 Ill.Dec. 559 , 554 N.E.2d at 500 ; see also In re Jessee, 744 S.W.2d at 516-17 (reversing finding of incapacitation where court failed to ascertain whether subject’s absence was an intelligent and knowing waiver of right to be present); cf. In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484 , 731 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1998) (reversing permanent child custody order against mother who was “borderline m 2007“The very nature of the hearing, respondent’s confusion and respondent’s actions during the hearing should have made the court question whether respondent had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel.” Id. 143 Ill.Dec. 559 , 554 N.E.2d at 500 ; see also In re Jessee, 744 S.W.2d at 516-17 (reversing finding of incapacitation where court failed to ascertain whether subject’s absence was an intelligent and knowing waiver of right to be present); cf. In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484 , 731 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1998) (reversing permanent child custody order against mother who was “borderline m | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mottgreen2 sentences1992As was made clear in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , and again in State v. Mott, 162 Ariz. 452, 457-58 , 784 P.2d 278, 284-85 (App.1989), while the trial court may consider a defendant’s background, experience, and his understanding of his rights and the role of counsel, a defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to an assessment of whether there is an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel. 1992As was made clear in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , and again in State v. Mott, 162 Ariz. 452, 457-58 , 784 P.2d 278, 284-85 (App.1989), while the trial court may consider a defendant’s background, experience, and his understanding of his rights and the role of counsel, a defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to an assessment of whether there is an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Matthew Winters v. Thomas D. Cook, Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiarygreen1 sentence1980We refuse to enlarge the attorney’s duty to include the responsibility to inform the defendant of every possible constitutional claim. * * * ” Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Click
green
2 sentences2007“The very nature of the hearing, respondent’s confusion and respondent’s actions during the hearing should have made the court question whether respondent had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel.” Id. 143 Ill.Dec. 559 , 554 N.E.2d at 500 ; see also In re Jessee, 744 S.W.2d at 516-17 (reversing finding of incapacitation where court failed to ascertain whether subject’s absence was an intelligent and knowing waiver of right to be present); cf. In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484 , 731 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1998) (reversing permanent child custody order against mother who was “borderline m 2007“The very nature of the hearing, respondent’s confusion and respondent’s actions during the hearing should have made the court question whether respondent had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel.” Id. 143 Ill.Dec. 559 , 554 N.E.2d at 500 ; see also In re Jessee, 744 S.W.2d at 516-17 (reversing finding of incapacitation where court failed to ascertain whether subject’s absence was an intelligent and knowing waiver of right to be present); cf. In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484 , 731 N.E.2d 694, 698 (1998) (reversing permanent child custody order against mother who was “borderline m | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1992As was made clear in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , and again in State v. Mott, 162 Ariz. 452, 457-58 , 784 P.2d 278, 284-85 (App.1989), while the trial court may consider a defendant’s background, experience, and his understanding of his rights and the role of counsel, a defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to an assessment of whether there is an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel. 1992As was made clear in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , and again in State v. Mott, 162 Ariz. 452, 457-58 , 784 P.2d 278, 284-85 (App.1989), while the trial court may consider a defendant’s background, experience, and his understanding of his rights and the role of counsel, a defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to an assessment of whether there is an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Henry v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1980The implication of this last statement - hat some strategic decisions which entail the waiver of a constitutional right may be made by counsel without consultation with the accused - was made express in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 , 85 S.Ct. 564 , 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965). * * * Henry requires inferior federal courts to determine whether the circumstances of a particular case are in the exceptional category from which the bar of waiver, created by the good faith actions of a criminal defendant’s attorney, has been lifted. “ * * * To require an explanation of only the most important rights 1980The implication of this last statement - hat some strategic decisions which entail the waiver of a constitutional right may be made by counsel without consultation with the accused - was made express in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 , 85 S.Ct. 564 , 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965). * * * Henry requires inferior federal courts to determine whether the circumstances of a particular case are in the exceptional category from which the bar of waiver, created by the good faith actions of a criminal defendant’s attorney, has been lifted. “ * * * To require an explanation of only the most important rights | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Hallowell v. United States
green
1 sentence1977Hallowell v. United States, 197 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1952). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.