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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2014Code, § 293.5.) We follow this convention. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 2 did not argue in the trial court that he had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights: instead, he argued that the statements should be ruled inadmissible because the Miranda warning was improperly translated into Spanish and because the statement was involuntary due to implied threats. “[U]nless a defendant asserts in the trial court a specific ground for suppression of his or her statements to police unde 1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Tahlgreen2 sentences1985(See In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 132 .) In the instant case the two constitutional rights at issue were clearly delineated on the record by the trial court, the waiver was found to be knowing and intelligent by the court, and minor was a sophisticated juvenile offender represented by counsel. 1981(See discussion of retroactivity issue in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865-866 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133-135 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. (1970) 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ].) The second two criteria even more clearly dictate that our new rule should not be given retroactive effect. | 1 | 2 |
Haley v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1966In Haley v. Ohio, supra, 332 U.S. 596, 601 [ 68 S.Ct. 302, 304 , 92 L.Ed. 224 , 229], the following language was utilized in requiring an intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights before the commencement of interrogation of youthful suspects: "But we are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights before he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless confessed. 1966In Haley v. Ohio, supra, 332 US. 596, 601 [ 68 S.Ct. 302, 304 , 92 L.Ed. 224 , 229], the following language was utilized in requiring an intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights before the commencement of interrogation of youthful suspects: “But we are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights before he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless confessed. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cobbgreen1 sentence2022Indeed, it would be to blink at the reality disclosed by this record to conclude other than that the [appellant’s] decision to have his fate determined by [the trial court], rather than by a jury, was a tactical decision entered into by [appellant] after consultation with and advice from experienced and capable defense counsel.”2 (State v. Cobb (1999) 251 Conn. 285, 373 (Cobb); see also People v. Doyle (2016) 19 Cal.App.5th 946, 953 [waiver of jury trial valid because “defendant’s counsel advised the trial court she had discussed defendant’s waiver of a jury trial with him on two occasions” an | 1 | 1 |
People v. Acostagreen1 sentence2022Indeed, it would be to blink at the reality disclosed by this record to conclude other than that the [appellant’s] decision to have his fate determined by [the trial court], rather than by a jury, was a tactical decision entered into by [appellant] after consultation with and advice from experienced and capable defense counsel.”2 (State v. Cobb (1999) 251 Conn. 285, 373 (Cobb); see also People v. Doyle (2016) 19 Cal.App.5th 946, 953 [waiver of jury trial valid because “defendant’s counsel advised the trial court she had discussed defendant’s waiver of a jury trial with him on two occasions” an | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wrestgreen1 sentence2022Indeed, it would be to blink at the reality disclosed by this record to conclude other than that the [appellant’s] decision to have his fate determined by [the trial court], rather than by a jury, was a tactical decision entered into by [appellant] after consultation with and advice from experienced and capable defense counsel.”2 (State v. Cobb (1999) 251 Conn. 285, 373 (Cobb); see also People v. Doyle (2016) 19 Cal.App.5th 946, 953 [waiver of jury trial valid because “defendant’s counsel advised the trial court she had discussed defendant’s waiver of a jury trial with him on two occasions” an | 1 | 1 |
People v. Doylegreen1 sentence2022Indeed, it would be to blink at the reality disclosed by this record to conclude other than that the [appellant’s] decision to have his fate determined by [the trial court], rather than by a jury, was a tactical decision entered into by [appellant] after consultation with and advice from experienced and capable defense counsel.”2 (State v. Cobb (1999) 251 Conn. 285, 373 (Cobb); see also People v. Doyle (2016) 19 Cal.App.5th 946, 953 [waiver of jury trial valid because “defendant’s counsel advised the trial court she had discussed defendant’s waiver of a jury trial with him on two occasions” an | 1 | 1 |
People v. Doolingreen1 sentence2014Code, § 293.5.) We follow this convention. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 2 did not argue in the trial court that he had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights: instead, he argued that the statements should be ruled inadmissible because the Miranda warning was improperly translated into Spanish and because the statement was involuntary due to implied threats. “[U]nless a defendant asserts in the trial court a specific ground for suppression of his or her statements to police unde | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rundlegreen1 sentence2014Code, § 293.5.) We follow this convention. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 2 did not argue in the trial court that he had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights: instead, he argued that the statements should be ruled inadmissible because the Miranda warning was improperly translated into Spanish and because the statement was involuntary due to implied threats. “[U]nless a defendant asserts in the trial court a specific ground for suppression of his or her statements to police unde | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mroczkogreen2 sentences1985(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; In re Stocker (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 613, 619 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 240 ].) It has long been held that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ].) “[W]aivers of constitutional rights must, of course, be ‘knowi 1985(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; In re Stocker (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 613, 619 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 240 ].) It has long been held that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ].) “[W]aivers of constitutional rights must, of course, be ‘knowi | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences1985(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; In re Stocker (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 613, 619 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 240 ].) It has long been held that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ].) “[W]aivers of constitutional rights must, of course, be ‘knowi 1985(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; In re Stocker (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 613, 619 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 240 ].) It has long been held that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ].) “[W]aivers of constitutional rights must, of course, be ‘knowi | 1 | 1 |
In Re Stockergreen2 sentences1985(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; In re Stocker (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 613, 619 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 240 ].) It has long been held that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ].) “[W]aivers of constitutional rights must, of course, be ‘knowi 1985(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 465 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 146 A.L.R. 357 ]; In re Stocker (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 613, 619 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 240 ].) It has long been held that the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” (Italics added.) (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ].) “[W]aivers of constitutional rights must, of course, be ‘knowi | 1 | 1 |
In Re Yurkogreen2 sentences1981(See discussion of retroactivity issue in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865-866 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133-135 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. (1970) 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ].) The second two criteria even more clearly dictate that our new rule should not be given retroactive effect. 1981(See discussion of retroactivity issue in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865-866 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133-135 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. (1970) 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ].) The second two criteria even more clearly dictate that our new rule should not be given retroactive effect. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences1981(See discussion of retroactivity issue in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865-866 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133-135 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. (1970) 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ].) The second two criteria even more clearly dictate that our new rule should not be given retroactive effect. 1981(See discussion of retroactivity issue in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865-866 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133-135 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. (1970) 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ].) The second two criteria even more clearly dictate that our new rule should not be given retroactive effect. | 1 | 1 |
Blackburn v. Alabamagreen2 sentences1970(See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 242, 247 , 80 S.Ct. 274 ]; People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 825-826 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ].) In making the assessment all relevant circumstances in the entire record must be received. 1970(See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 242, 247 , 80 S.Ct. 274 ]; People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 825-826 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ].) In making the assessment all relevant circumstances in the entire record must be received. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences1970(See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 242, 247 , 80 S.Ct. 274 ]; People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 825-826 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ].) In making the assessment all relevant circumstances in the entire record must be received. 1970(See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 242, 247 , 80 S.Ct. 274 ]; People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 825-826 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ].) In making the assessment all relevant circumstances in the entire record must be received. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences1970(People v. Davis, 66 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 424 P.2d 682 ].) The court mentioned the accused’s lack of experience with the police, his physical and mental state, his youth, and the shabbiness of the warning (244 Cal.App.2d at p. 431) and came to the conclusion that there had not been an intelligent and knowing waiver. 1970(People v. Davis, 66 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 424 P.2d 682 ].) The court mentioned the accused’s lack of experience with the police, his physical and mental state, his youth, and the shabbiness of the warning (244 Cal.App.2d at p. 431) and came to the conclusion that there had not been an intelligent and knowing waiver. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. 1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Laragreen2 sentences1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. 1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lilliockgreen2 sentences1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. 1970(People v. Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571, 581 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 400 P.2d 97 ]; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 622 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 699 , 401 P.2d 4 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 475 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 ].) In People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 432 P.2d 202 ], the Supreme Court, in discussing the issue of an intelligent and knowing waiver by a minor, observed that race, age, experience with police, educa *268 tion, mental and physical condition at the time of questioning, and level of intelligence were all factors to be considered in assessing waiver. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hildabrandtgreen1 sentence1970(People v. Davis, 66 Cal.2d 175, 181 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 424 P.2d 682 ].) The court mentioned the accused’s lack of experience with the police, his physical and mental state, his youth, and the shabbiness of the warning (244 Cal.App.2d at p. 431) and came to the conclusion that there had not been an intelligent and knowing waiver. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Smileygreen1 sentence1969(In re Smiley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 621.) The courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against the waiver; it will not be presumed from a silent record; a plea of guilty is not the equivalent of an intelligent and knowing waiver. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sivongxxay
green
2 sentences2022It asked, “[Counsel] indicates that you understand that right; is that true?” Appellant answered that he understood the right and “want[ed] to waive that right and have a judge make the decision.” In contrast to the waiver here, in Sivongxxay there was no evidence “that defendant had discussed the jury waiver with his counsel.” (Ibid.) It is arguable that, in view of counsel’s statement that he had discussed the jury waiver with appellant, evidence of an intelligent and knowing waiver is stronger here than in Sivongxxay. it would fall upon me to make the decision as to the appropriate punishme 2022The trial court was not, as appellant maintains, “‘merely a passive receiver of an attempted waiver.’” In contrast to the waiver here, in Sivongxxay there was no evidence “that defendant had discussed the jury waiver with his counsel.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167 .) It is arguable that, in view of counsel’s representation that he had discussed the jury waiver with appellant, evidence of an intelligent and knowing waiver is stronger here than in Sivongxxay. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re BMB
green
2 sentences2015(See, e.g., State v. Presha (2000) 163 N.J. 304 , 748 A.2d 1108 , 1117-1118 [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"]; Matter of B.M.B. (1998) 264 Kan. 417 , 955 P.2d 1302 , 1312-1313 [concluding that for children under 14 "the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes 2015(See, e.g., State v. Presha (2000) 163 N.J. 304 , 748 A.2d 1108 , 1117-1118 [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"]; Matter of B.M.B. (1998) 264 Kan. 417 , 955 P.2d 1302 , 1312-1313 [concluding that for children under 14 "the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Presha
green
2 sentences2015(See, e.g., State v. Presha (2000) 163 N.J. 304 , 748 A.2d 1108 , 1117-1118 [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"]; Matter of B.M.B. (1998) 264 Kan. 417 , 955 P.2d 1302 , 1312-1313 [concluding that for children under 14 "the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes 2015(See, e.g., State v. Presha (2000) 163 N.J. 304 , 748 A.2d 1108 , 1117-1118 [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"]; Matter of B.M.B. (1998) 264 Kan. 417 , 955 P.2d 1302 , 1312-1313 [concluding that for children under 14 "the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. a Juvenile
green
2 sentences2015(See, e.g., State v. Presha (2000) 163 N.J. 304 , 748 A.2d 1108 , 1117-1118 [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"]; Matter of B.M.B. (1998) 264 Kan. 417 , 955 P.2d 1302 , 1312-1313 [concluding that for children under 14 "the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes 2015(See, e.g., State v. Presha (2000) 163 N.J. 304 , 748 A.2d 1108 , 1117-1118 [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"]; Matter of B.M.B. (1998) 264 Kan. 417 , 955 P.2d 1302 , 1312-1313 [concluding that for children under 14 "the totality of the circumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Polk
green
1 sentence2014Code, § 293.5.) We follow this convention. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 2 did not argue in the trial court that he had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights: instead, he argued that the statements should be ruled inadmissible because the Miranda warning was improperly translated into Spanish and because the statement was involuntary due to implied threats. “[U]nless a defendant asserts in the trial court a specific ground for suppression of his or her statements to police unde | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Kaanehe
green
2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Alvas, supra , 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1465-1466 [rule that "ha[d] no bearing on the reliability of the fact-finding process, but instead assure[d] application of a procedural safeguard and aid[ed] appellate courts in determining whether the individual made an intelligent and knowing waiver of the right" to a jury trial did not apply retroactively]; Ruhl, supra , 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 317-318 [no retroactive application of rule regarding defendant's waiver of right to be sentenced by judge who takes plea bargain; rule was "collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence"]; C 2008(See, e.g., Alvas, supra , 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1465-1466 [rule that "ha[d] no bearing on the reliability of the fact-finding process, but instead assure[d] application of a procedural safeguard and aid[ed] appellate courts in determining whether the individual made an intelligent and knowing waiver of the right" to a jury trial did not apply retroactively]; Ruhl, supra , 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 317-318 [no retroactive application of rule regarding defendant's waiver of right to be sentenced by judge who takes plea bargain; rule was "collateral to a fair determination of guilt or innocence"]; C | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rutkowski v. United States
green
1 sentence1981(See discussion of retroactivity issue in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 865-866 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133-135 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], cert. den. (1970) 398 U.S. 911 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 72 , 90 S.Ct. 1708 ].) The second two criteria even more clearly dictate that our new rule should not be given retroactive effect. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.