7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2004–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fellgreen2 sentences2004See State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶¶ 9, 13 , 52 P.3d 218, 220-22 (App.2002). ¶ 35 Second, Bridgestone cites no authority, nor have we found any, for the proposition that a conflict of interest between indem-nitor and indemnitee invalidates the latter’s tender of defense or otherwise renders it “improper.” Restatement § 57(2) states that a conflict of interest might prevent the in-demnitor from “properly ... assum[ing] the defense of the indemnitee.” But that section does not suggest that the tender of defense itself is improper. ¶ 36 Third, as A.P.S. remarked at oral argument, if Bridgestone’s 2004See State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, ¶¶ 9, 13 , 52 P.3d 218, 220-22 (App.2002). ¶ 35 Second, Bridgestone cites no authority, nor have we found any, for the proposition that a conflict of interest between indem-nitor and indemnitee invalidates the latter’s tender of defense or otherwise renders it “improper.” Restatement § 57(2) states that a conflict of interest might prevent the in-demnitor from “properly ... assum[ing] the defense of the indemnitee.” But that section does not suggest that the tender of defense itself is improper. ¶ 36 Third, as A.P.S. remarked at oral argument, if Bridgestone’s | 2 | 2 |
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Service, Ltd.green2 sentences2004If Bridgestone ‘“was of the view that it could defend the case better with its own lawyers, it had full opportunity to do so but declined.” ’ Litton Sys., Inc. v. Shaw’s Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, 14 , 579 P.2d 48, 52 (App.1978), quoting Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. 2004If Bridgestone ‘“was of the view that it could defend the case better with its own lawyers, it had full opportunity to do so but declined.” ’ Litton Sys., Inc. v. Shaw’s Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, 14 , 579 P.2d 48, 52 (App.1978), quoting Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. | 2 | 2 |
Damron v. Sledgegreen2 sentences2015See Damron v. Sledge, 105 Ariz. 151 , 460 P.2d 997 (1969). 2015See Damron v. Sledge, 105 Ariz. 151 , 460 P.2d 997 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 505498green1 sentence2004See Restatement § 57(1)(b), (2), cmt. a (indemnitor only precluded from relitigating issues “determined” in underlying action against indemnitee whether or not parties had conflict of interest); see also SCAC Transport (USA) Inc. v. SS Danaos, 845 F.2d 1157 , 1162 (2d Cir. 1988) (preclusive effect of underlying judgment on a properly “vouched-in” indemnitor does not extend to issues not actually determined in the first proceeding); Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 189 Ariz. 387, 397 , 943 P.2d 747, 757 (App. 1996); Dixon, 509 P.2d at 91 (“Neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel nor the vo | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd.green2 sentences2004See Restatement § 57(1)(b), (2), cmt. a (indemnitor only precluded from relitigating issues “determined” in underlying action against indemnitee whether or not parties had conflict of interest); see also SCAC Transport (USA) Inc. v. SS Danaos, 845 F.2d 1157 , 1162 (2d Cir. 1988) (preclusive effect of underlying judgment on a properly “vouched-in” indemnitor does not extend to issues not actually determined in the first proceeding); Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 189 Ariz. 387, 397 , 943 P.2d 747, 757 (App. 1996); Dixon, 509 P.2d at 91 (“Neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel nor the vo 2004See Restatement § 57(1)(b), (2), cmt. a (indemnitor only precluded from relitigating issues “determined” in underlying action against indemnitee whether or not parties had conflict of interest); see also SCAC Transport (USA) Inc. v. SS Danaos, 845 F.2d 1157 , 1162 (2d Cir. 1988) (preclusive effect of underlying judgment on a properly “vouched-in” indemnitor does not extend to issues not actually determined in the first proceeding); Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 189 Ariz. 387, 397 , 943 P.2d 747, 757 (App. 1996); Dixon, 509 P.2d at 91 (“Neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel nor the vo | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc.green1 sentence2004See Restatement § 57(1)(b), (2), cmt. a (indemnitor only precluded from relitigating issues “determined” in underlying action against indemnitee whether or not parties had conflict of interest); see also SCAC Transport (USA) Inc. v. SS Danaos, 845 F.2d 1157 , 1162 (2d Cir. 1988) (preclusive effect of underlying judgment on a properly “vouched-in” indemnitor does not extend to issues not actually determined in the first proceeding); Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 189 Ariz. 387, 397 , 943 P.2d 747, 757 (App. 1996); Dixon, 509 P.2d at 91 (“Neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel nor the vo | 1 | 1 |
McIntyre Refrigeration, Inc. v. Mepco Electragreen2 sentences2004That scenario, however, would have precluded Bridgestone’s indemnity liability under § 12-684(A) because that statute premises any indemnity obligation on the manufacturer’s “refus[al] to accept a tender of defense.” Thus, had Bridgestone accepted the tender, A.P.S. would not have had any right to statutory indemnity under § 12-684(A), regardless of the resulting verdict and judgment in the Naranjo case and regardless of any factual determinations made in that case. ¶39 Although A.P.S. still might have pursued a common law claim for indemnity, Bridgestone would have been entitled to raise any 2004That scenario, however, would have precluded Bridgestone’s indemnity liability under § 12-684(A) because that statute premises any indemnity obligation on the manufacturer’s “refus[al] to accept a tender of defense.” Thus, had Bridgestone accepted the tender, A.P.S. would not have had any right to statutory indemnity under § 12-684(A), regardless of the resulting verdict and judgment in the Naranjo case and regardless of any factual determinations made in that case. ¶39 Although A.P.S. still might have pursued a common law claim for indemnity, Bridgestone would have been entitled to raise any | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006No Arizona law suggests that selling an item to an unknown third party is sufficient to meet the tender requirement. ¶39 The Trust also argues it should be permitted to obtain KPNQwest shares and tender those “substitute shares [to] fulfill[] the tender requirement.” The Trust relies primarily on Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125 , 192 N.E. 591 (1934), and Whittier v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 Mich. 247 , 224 N.W. 447 (1929). 6 The court in Birch stated: “The plaintiff having sold some of the securities sold to her by the defendants without knowledge or reason to know of the 2006No Arizona law suggests that selling an item to an unknown third party is sufficient to meet the tender requirement. ¶39 The Trust also argues it should be permitted to obtain KPNQwest shares and tender those “substitute shares [to] fulfill[] the tender requirement.” The Trust relies primarily on Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125 , 192 N.E. 591 (1934), and Whittier v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 Mich. 247 , 224 N.W. 447 (1929). 6 The court in Birch stated: “The plaintiff having sold some of the securities sold to her by the defendants without knowledge or reason to know of the | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Whittier v. Elec. Refrigeration Corp.
neutral
2 sentences2006No Arizona law suggests that selling an item to an unknown third party is sufficient to meet the tender requirement. ¶39 The Trust also argues it should be permitted to obtain KPNQwest shares and tender those “substitute shares [to] fulfill[] the tender requirement.” The Trust relies primarily on Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125 , 192 N.E. 591 (1934), and Whittier v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 Mich. 247 , 224 N.W. 447 (1929). 6 The court in Birch stated: “The plaintiff having sold some of the securities sold to her by the defendants without knowledge or reason to know of the 2006The court in Whittier reached a similar result, holding a plaintiff who tendered shares “equivalent of all he had received” had met the tender requirement for rescission. 224 N.W. at 447 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez
green
1 sentence2019And, “[i]f application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶11 This requires us to review the application of A.R.S. § 12-684(A), which states the following: In any product liability action where the manufacturer refuses to accept a tender of defense from the seller, the manufacturer shall indemnify the seller for any judgment rendered against the seller and shall also reimburse the seller for reasonable 4 OKLAND v. ZURN, et al. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hill v. Favour
green
2 sentences2014He contends that his note was never transferred to Mellon, and because the note and deed of trust are inseparable, citing Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 569 , 84 P.2d 575 (1938), the beneficial interest under the deed of trust was never transferred to Mellon. 2014He contends that his note was never transferred to Mellon, and because the note and deed of trust are inseparable, citing Hill v. Favour, 52 Ariz. 561, 569 , 84 P.2d 575 (1938), the beneficial interest under the deed of trust was never transferred to Mellon. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Whittier v. Electric Refrigeration Corp.
neutral
1 sentence2006No Arizona law suggests that selling an item to an unknown third party is sufficient to meet the tender requirement. ¶39 The Trust also argues it should be permitted to obtain KPNQwest shares and tender those “substitute shares [to] fulfill[] the tender requirement.” The Trust relies primarily on Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125 , 192 N.E. 591 (1934), and Whittier v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 Mich. 247 , 224 N.W. 447 (1929). 6 The court in Birch stated: “The plaintiff having sold some of the securities sold to her by the defendants without knowledge or reason to know of the | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hellebrandt v. Kelley Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2004That scenario, however, would have precluded Bridgestone’s indemnity liability under § 12-684(A) because that statute premises any indemnity obligation on the manufacturer’s “refus[al] to accept a tender of defense.” Thus, had Bridgestone accepted the tender, A.P.S. would not have had any right to statutory indemnity under § 12-684(A), regardless of the resulting verdict and judgment in the Naranjo case and regardless of any factual determinations made in that case. ¶39 Although A.P.S. still might have pursued a common law claim for indemnity, Bridgestone would have been entitled to raise any 2004That scenario, however, would have precluded Bridgestone’s indemnity liability under § 12-684(A) because that statute premises any indemnity obligation on the manufacturer’s “refus[al] to accept a tender of defense.” Thus, had Bridgestone accepted the tender, A.P.S. would not have had any right to statutory indemnity under § 12-684(A), regardless of the resulting verdict and judgment in the Naranjo case and regardless of any factual determinations made in that case. ¶39 Although A.P.S. still might have pursued a common law claim for indemnity, Bridgestone would have been entitled to raise any | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Falcon v. Beverly Hills Mortgage Corp.
green
2 sentences2004In support of that proposition, Bridgestone relies on Restatement § 57(2)(b), Cunningham , and Falcon v. Beverly Hills Mortgage Corp., 168 Ariz. 527 , 815 P.2d 896 (1991). 2004In support of that proposition, Bridgestone relies on Restatement § 57(2)(b), Cunningham , and Falcon v. Beverly Hills Mortgage Corp., 168 Ariz. 527 , 815 P.2d 896 (1991). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.