7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carr v. Enoch Smith Co.green2 sentences2024See, e.g., Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that Utah courts consider “tender to be fruitless and thus excused where the lienor states that he or she does not intend to accept payment” (quotation simplified)); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the “familiar rule that the law does not require one to do a vain or useless thing excuses the making of a formal tender which would otherwise be required, where it is reasonably plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle ceremony and of no avail” (qu 1989Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah App.1989). 16 . | 2 | 2 |
Summerhaze Company v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationgreen2 sentences2023Exch., 701 P.2d 795 , 799–800 (Utah 1985). ¶75 The Court further stated that an insurer that receives a tender of defense but believes it is not liable for coverage has two options of how to proceed without risking breach of the duty to defend: (1) it “may either protect its interests through a declaratory judgment proceeding asking the court to determine coverage under an insurance policy” or (2) “it may defend the suit under a reservation of its right to seek repayment later.” Summerhaze, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 38 (quotation simplified). 2023See Summerhaze, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 37 (“[W]ithout a tender of defense, an insurer may challenge its liability for the judgment, contest the amount of damages, or set forth any other available defense that the insured neglected to make.”). | 2 | 2 |
Collard v. Nagle Construction, Inc.green2 sentences2013“In other words, a party must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put the other party in default.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT App 306, ¶ 19 , 57 P.3d 603 (concluding that a party is entitled to an equitable remedy under the tender doctrine only if it has “fully tendered, or stood ready to fully tender, [its] own performance under the contract”). ¶37 Here, CUWCD agreed to “remove and replace at its sole expense TCC’s existing diversion structure and replace it with a new radial gate and other appurtenant facilitie 2013“In other words, a party must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put the other party in default.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT App 306, ¶ 19 , 57 P.3d 603 (concluding that a party is entitled to an equitable remedy under the tender doctrine only if it has “fully tendered, or stood ready to fully tender, [its] own performance under the contract”). ¶37 Here, CUWCD agreed to “remove and replace at its sole expense TCC’s existing diversion structure and replace it with a new radial gate and other appurtenant facilitie | 2 | 2 |
Shields v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that Utah courts consider “tender to be fruitless and thus excused where the lienor states that he or she does not intend to accept payment” (quotation simplified)); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the “familiar rule that the law does not require one to do a vain or useless thing excuses the making of a formal tender which would otherwise be required, where it is reasonably plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle ceremony and of no avail” (qu | 1 | 1 |
Bank of America v. Adamsongreen2 sentences2017See Bank of Am. v. Adamson , 2017 UT 2 , ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196 (explaining that "an appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2017See Bank of Am. v. Adamson , 2017 UT 2 , ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196 (explaining that "an appellant who fails to adequately brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Simons v. Brashears Transfer and Storagegreen1 sentence1997Id. (quoting Simons v. Brashears, 344 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Okla.1959) (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp.
green
2 sentences2013“In other words, a party must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put the other party in default.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT App 306, ¶ 19 , 57 P.3d 603 (concluding that a party is entitled to an equitable remedy under the tender doctrine only if it has “fully tendered, or stood ready to fully tender, [its] own performance under the contract”). ¶37 Here, CUWCD agreed to “remove and replace at its sole expense TCC’s existing diversion structure and replace it with a new radial gate and other appurtenant facilitie 2013"In other words, a party must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put the other party in default." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collard v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2002 UT App 306, ¶ 19 , 57 P.3d 603 (concluding that a party is entitled to an equitable remedy under the tender doctrine only if it has "fully tendered, or stood ready to fully tender, [its] own performance under the contract"). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Harman v. 105 Partners
green
1 sentence2024If he meant to do so implicitly, we reject such arguments as being inadequately briefed. 20220076-CA 22 2024 UT App 109 Harman v. 105 Partners should have held that this failure was justified by futility, which is a recognized exception to the tender requirement. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Speros v. Fricke
green
2 sentences2023This includes “citing new authority or cases supporting an issue that was properly preserved.” Id. 20180699-CA 42 2023 UT App 136 Farm Bureau v. Weston that refuses a tender of defense by its insured takes the risk not only that it may eventually be forced to pay the insured’s legal expenses but also that it may end up having to pay for a loss that it did not insure against.”) (quotation simplified); Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 52 , 98 P.3d 28 (“As a general rule, when an insurer, whose policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against the insured and is allowed a 2023This includes “citing new authority or cases supporting an issue that was properly preserved.” Id. 20180699-CA 42 2023 UT App 136 Farm Bureau v. Weston that refuses a tender of defense by its insured takes the risk not only that it may eventually be forced to pay the insured’s legal expenses but also that it may end up having to pay for a loss that it did not insure against.”) (quotation simplified); Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 52 , 98 P.3d 28 (“As a general rule, when an insurer, whose policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against the insured and is allowed a | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2023This includes “citing new authority or cases supporting an issue that was properly preserved.” Id. 20180699-CA 42 2023 UT App 136 Farm Bureau v. Weston that refuses a tender of defense by its insured takes the risk not only that it may eventually be forced to pay the insured’s legal expenses but also that it may end up having to pay for a loss that it did not insure against.”) (quotation simplified); Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 52 , 98 P.3d 28 (“As a general rule, when an insurer, whose policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against the insured and is allowed a | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Gables & Villas at River Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Castlewood Builders, LLC
green
1 sentence2023The quotation from Summerhaze states simply that an insurer who does not receive a tender of defense from an insured “may challenge its liability for the judgment, contest the amount of damages, or set forth any other available defense that the insured neglected to make.” See Summerhaze, 2018 UT 28, ¶ 37 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Farm Bureau v. Weston
green
2 sentences2023This includes “citing new authority or cases supporting an issue that was properly preserved.” Id. 20180699-CA 42 2023 UT App 136 Farm Bureau v. Weston that refuses a tender of defense by its insured takes the risk not only that it may eventually be forced to pay the insured’s legal expenses but also that it may end up having to pay for a loss that it did not insure against.”) (quotation simplified); Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 52 , 98 P.3d 28 (“As a general rule, when an insurer, whose policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against the insured and is allowed a 2023Our interpretation is further supported by the Court’s later statement that “an insurer that refuses a tender of defense by its insured takes the risk not only that it may eventually be forced to pay the insured’s legal expenses but also that it may end up having to pay for a loss that it did not insure against.” Id. ¶ 38 (quotation simplified). 20180699-CA 44 2023 UT App 136 Farm Bureau v. Weston policy.”) (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2023Exch., 701 P.2d 795 , 799–800 (Utah 1985). ¶75 The Court further stated that an insurer that receives a tender of defense but believes it is not liable for coverage has two options of how to proceed without risking breach of the duty to defend: (1) it “may either protect its interests through a declaratory judgment proceeding asking the court to determine coverage under an insurance policy” or (2) “it may defend the suit under a reservation of its right to seek repayment later.” Summerhaze, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 38 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Id. (quoting Simons v. Brashears, 344 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Okla.1959) (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hansen v. Christensen
green
1 sentence1997Additionally, “[w]here the unreasonable conduct of the obligee would make an actual tender a fruitless gesture, an offer to comply with the terms of the contract by the obligor is sufficient.” Hansen, 545 P.2d at 1154 . *656 This case falls squarely within the recognized exceptions to the tender requirement. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.