tender defense in Illinois

2016“Where the insurer relies on a provision that it contends excludes coverage to reject a tender of defense, we review the applicability of the provision to ensure it is clear and free from doubt that the policy’s exclusion prevents coverage.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill.

2015"Where the insurer relies on a provision that it contends excludes coverage to reject a tender of defense, we review the applicability of the provision to ensure it is clear and free from doubt that the policy's exclusion prevents coverage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill.

1997In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 282 Ill.App.3d 716, 726 , 218 Ill.Dec. 143 , 668 N.E.2d 627 (1996), we held that an insurer's duty to defend claims potentially falling within the terms of a policy is triggered when the insurer has actual notice of the lawsuit, regardless *95 of whether there has been an actual tender of defense by the insured.

1997In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 282 Ill.App.3d 716, 726 , 218 Ill.Dec. 143 , 668 N.E.2d 627 (1996), we held that an insurer's duty to defend claims potentially falling within the terms of a policy is triggered when the insurer has actual notice of the lawsuit, regardless *95 of whether there has been an actual tender of defense by the insured.

1998See Long v. Great Central Insurance Co. , 190 Ill.

1998See Long v. Great Central Insurance Co., 190 Ill.

2008See Home Insurance, 658 N.W.2d at 533 .

2007See Home Insurance, 658 N.W.2d at 533 .

2002See Illinois Founders Insurance Co. v. Barnett, 304 Ill.

2002See Illinois Founders Insurance Co. v. Barnett , 304 Ill.

1998The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the court, holding that “an insurer's duty to defend claims potentially falling within the terms of a policy is triggered when the insurer has actual notice of the lawsuit, regardless of whether there has been an actual tender of defense by the insured.” 287 Ill.

1998The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the court, holding that “an insurer’s duty to defend claims potentially falling within the terms of a policy is triggered when the insurer has actual notice of the lawsuit, regardless of whether there has been an actual tender of defense by the insured.” 287 Ill.

1998See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Gulf Insurance Co., 837 F.2d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 1988) (Hartford II).

1998See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Gulf Insurance Co., 837 F.2d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 1988) (Hartford II).

2013App. 3d 552, 560 (2000) (quoting Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Fulkerson, 212 Ill.

2009App. 3d 552, 560 , 734 N.E.2d 50 (2000), quoting Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Fulkerson, 212 Ill.

2024In support of this contention, Arrow cites to cases which hold that “when an insurer has a duty to defend against one claim in a suit, it has a duty to defend against all claims, even if some of the claims standing alone would be beyond the scope of the policy.” Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 132350, ¶ 44 ; see also Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 210267, ¶ 24 (“If the underlying complaint alleged facts within, or potentially within the policy’s coverage, the insurer’s duty to defend is triggered even if the allega

2021See People v. Walton, 378 Ill.App.3d 580, 589 (2007) (noting that the tender of an instruction on a lesser-included offense gives the jury the option to convict the defendant of the uncharged lesser-included offense). ¶ 38 Finally, defendant argues that we should vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing because an aggregate 50-year sentence (comprised of consecutive sentences of 35 years for first-degree murder and 15 years for attempt first-degree murder) is an unconstitutional de facto life sentence pursuant to People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 .

2021See People v. Walton, 378 Ill.App.3d 580, 589 (2007) (noting that the tender of an instruction on a lesser-included offense gives the jury the option to convict the defendant of the uncharged lesser-included offense). ¶ 38 Finally, defendant argues that we should vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing because an aggregate 50-year sentence (comprised of consecutive sentences of 35 years for first-degree murder and 15 years for attempt first-degree murder) is an unconstitutional de facto life sentence pursuant to People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 .

2016See Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d at 279 . ¶ 25 Defendant’s admission of guilt to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in this case appears to have been nothing more than what turned out to be an effective trial strategy.

2013Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 455 (2010). ¶ 13 Where the insurer rejects a tender of defense based on a provision that it contends excludes coverage, we review the applicability of that provision to ensure it is “ ‘ “clear and free from doubt” that the policy’s exclusion prevents coverage.’ ” Pekin Insurance Co. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 111529, ¶ 14 (quoting Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill.

2013Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 455 (2010). ¶ 13 Where the insurer rejects a tender of defense based on a provision that it contends excludes coverage, we review the applicability of that provision to ensure it is “ ‘ “clear and free from doubt” that the policy’s exclusion prevents coverage.’ ” Pekin Insurance Co. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 111529, ¶ 14 (quoting Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill.

2011App. 3d 173, 181 , 941 N.E.2d 291 , 299- 300 (2010) (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 198-99 , 355 N.E.2d 24, 31 (1976)). ¶ 22 A reservation of rights must adequately inform the insured of the rights the insurer -5- intends to reserve, because it is only when the insured is adequately informed of the potential policy defense that the insured can intelligently determine whether to retain his or her own counsel or accept the tender of defense counsel from the insurer.

2011App. 3d 173, 181 , 941 N.E.2d 291 , 299- 300 (2010) (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 198-99 , 355 N.E.2d 24, 31 (1976)). ¶ 22 A reservation of rights must adequately inform the insured of the rights the insurer -5- intends to reserve, because it is only when the insured is adequately informed of the potential policy defense that the insured can intelligently determine whether to retain his or her own counsel or accept the tender of defense counsel from the insurer.