absence of any mitigating factors in California

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2025(See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666 [appellate courts “presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct”]) Regardless, even without an express finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, “a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) The trial court here considered everything the parties presented in making its decision, including the probation report outlining defendant’s crimina

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2008Thus, we have held that the trial court "was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances." ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 900, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 [discussing former CALJIC No. 8.84.2]; see People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) Further, "[t]he trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discreti

2007As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected this instruction on the ground, that under CALJIC No. 8.88, which was given here, “[n]o reasonable juror would assume he or she was required to impose death despite insubstantial aggravating circumstances, merely because no mitigating circumstances were found to exist.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) We adhere to this view.

2007As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected this instruction on the ground, that under CALJIC No. 8.88, which was given here, “[n]o reasonable juror would assume he or she was required to impose death despite insubstantial aggravating circumstances, merely because no mitigating circumstances were found to exist.” (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) We adhere to this view.

2006(People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 600, fn. 20; cf. People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 ] [jury may return such a verdict even in the complete absence of mitigating evidence].) The federal Constitution does not compel a trial court to instruct that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole actually signifies the defendant never will be paroled.

1993(People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401 [ 253 Cal.App.3d 397 ].) On the contrary, had it been aware of its reliance on improper considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that it would simply have realigned its statement of aggravating factors in order to use the proper circumstance to support its selection of the upper term on the enhancement.

1993(People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401 [ 253 Cal.App.3d 397 ].) On the contrary, had it been aware of its reliance on improper considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that it would simply have realigned its statement of aggravating factors in order to use the proper circumstance to support its selection of the upper term on the enhancement.

1993(People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401 [ 253 Cal.App.3d 397 ].) On the contrary, had it been aware of its reliance on improper considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that it would simply have realigned its statement of aggravating factors in order to use the proper circumstance to support its selection of the upper term on the enhancement.

1988(See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 542, fn. 13 ["Often a person in this situation will have a substantial history of criminal and antisocial behavior"].) Without mentioning these mitigating factors, the prosecutor remarked: "The defendant has stated just moments *885 ago he can offer nothing in mitigation of his defense." Viewed in context with the prosecutor's focus on the circumstances of the capital offenses and his focus on the absence of justification, this comment implied that a death verdict was virtually compelled by the absence of any mitigating factors and in particular the

1988(See People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 542, fn. 13 [“Often a person in this situation will have a substantial history of criminal and antisocial behavior”].) Without mentioning these mitigating factors, the prosecutor remarked: “The defendant has stated just moments ago he can offer nothing in mitigation of his defense.” Viewed in context with the prosecutor’s focus on the circumstances of the capital offenses and his focus on the absence of justification, this comment implied that a death verdict was virtually compelled by the absence of any mitigating factors and in particular the abse