appellate court noted rule in California

2024(E.g., People v. Lopez (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 484 , 489, 501–503; People v. Phillips (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1309–1310.) In Lopez, the appellate court noted defense counsel “had an extensive opportunity to inquire into any bias a juror may have had and to elicit additional information that could have revealed the juror’s withholding of relevant facts.” (Lopez, at p. 502.) Defendant contends the seating mistake impaired his ability to exercise informed peremptory challenges.

2021You do not all need to agree on the same theory, but you must unanimously agree whether the murder is in the first or second degree.” (Id. at p. 906.) The appellate court noted the instruction expressly stated unanimity was required as to “degree” but found there was some ambiguity because the instruction also referred to malice aforethought and felony murder as different “theories.” (Webb, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 907 .) Here, as in Webb, the instruction explicitly stated, “you must agree unanimously as to whether he is guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree or

2015(People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 174 ; People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 831 ; id. at p. 847 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) In Johnson, the appellate court noted the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi), grounded in federal due process and the Sixth Amendment, that any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2015(People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 174 ; People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 831 ; id. at p. 847 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) In Johnson, the appellate court noted the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi), grounded in federal due process and the Sixth Amendment, that any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2015(People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 174 ; People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 831 ; id. at p. 847 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) In Johnson, the appellate court noted the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi), grounded in federal due process and the Sixth Amendment, that any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2015(People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 174 ; People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 831 ; id. at p. 847 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) In Johnson, the appellate court noted the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi), grounded in federal due process and the Sixth Amendment, that any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2015(Ibid.) Finally, in Swanson, supra, 943 F.2d 1070 , defense counsel conceded that the government had met its burden of proof.

2014(Young, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171, fn. 7 .) The other case cited by defendant is People v. Ardoin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 102 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].

2014(Young, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171, fn. 7 .) The other case cited by defendant is People v. Ardoin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 102 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].

1996Also, when a statute requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, to follow a particular procedure, or to act subject to certain limitations, an act beyond those limits is in excess of its jurisdiction. ( 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1294 .) It was true the statute provided that if the clerk failed to mail the notice of forfeiture within 30 days to the bail agent, the surety would be released from the bond. (227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1294-1295.) However, in this case, because the bail agent had actual notice, strict construction of the statute would result in an absurdity.

1995(Barney, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 974 .) From this rule the court derived its statement that the insurer had a duty not to use its discretionary claim settlement power in a way that it knew would injure the insured’s rights.