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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. McCoygreen2 sentences1982After stating that, in light of the fact that defendant voluntarily admitted the officers into his room, compliance with Penal Code section 844 was not required (see People v. McCoy (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 854, 861-862 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 559 ]), the court in Evans recognized that “[s]imilar considerations underlie the arrest warrant requirement of People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d 263 , and it is fair to say that if the entry is sufficient to fulfill the Penal Code section 844 exceptions, it is also within the Ramey exceptions.” ( 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 196 .) Thus, since the entry in Evans was invite 1982After stating that, in light of the fact that defendant voluntarily admitted the officers into his room, compliance with Penal Code section 844 was not required (see People v. McCoy (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 854, 861-862 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 559 ]), the court in Evans recognized that “[s]imilar considerations underlie the arrest warrant requirement of People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d 263 , and it is fair to say that if the entry is sufficient to fulfill the Penal Code section 844 exceptions, it is also within the Ramey exceptions.” ( 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 196 .) Thus, since the entry in Evans was invite | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rameygreen2 sentences1982The magistrate conceded the information as to Cannon was “a little bit.stale.” The Supreme Court of California had previously adopted this arrest warrant requirement in People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 270-271 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 545 P.2d 1333 ], on the basis of both state and federal constitutional principles. 1982The magistrate conceded the information as to Cannon was “a little bit.stale.” The Supreme Court of California had previously adopted this arrest warrant requirement in People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 270-271 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 545 P.2d 1333 ], on the basis of both state and federal constitutional principles. | 1 | 4 |
Payton v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences1985(Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 590 [ 63 L.Ed.2d at p. 653 ]; People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 275 .) At the suppression hearing the parties focused on whether exigent circumstances justified the failure to obtain an arrest warrant. 1985(Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 590 [ 63 L.Ed.2d at p. 653 ]; People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 275 .) At the suppression hearing the parties focused on whether exigent circumstances justified the failure to obtain an arrest warrant. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen2 sentences1985Appellant may have honestly believed the police intended to forcibly enter his residence; but, “[t]he fact that [appellant] may have been under a subjective misapprehension as to the officers’ intent is immaterial.” (People v. Superior Court (Mace) (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 524, 529 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) But even assuming Payton and Ramey were applicable, the arrest warrant requirement is excused when exigent circumstances demand immediate police action. 1985Appellant may have honestly believed the police intended to forcibly enter his residence; but, “[t]he fact that [appellant] may have been under a subjective misapprehension as to the officers’ intent is immaterial.” (People v. Superior Court (Mace) (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 524, 529 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) But even assuming Payton and Ramey were applicable, the arrest warrant requirement is excused when exigent circumstances demand immediate police action. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Velozgreen2 sentences1980From the cases, it is clear once officers having probable cause are admitted inside a defendant’s home by use of a nonforceful strategy to gain entry, compliance with Penal Code section 844 is not required (People v. Veloz (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 499, 503 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; see also People v. McCoy (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 854, 861-862 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 559 ]). 1980From the cases, it is clear once officers having probable cause are admitted inside a defendant’s home by use of a nonforceful strategy to gain entry, compliance with Penal Code section 844 is not required (People v. Veloz (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 499, 503 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; see also People v. McCoy (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 854, 861-862 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 559 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Glenn-Powers
green
2 sentences2013(Glenn-Powers, supra, 823 N.W.2d at p. 133 ; Sherman, supra, 502 F.3d at pp. 883-884.) And the courts reason that when an arrest warrant is not constitutionally required at all, it follows that a state’s use of an unsworn warrant does not run afoul of the federal Constitution. 2013(Glenn-Powers, supra, 823 N.W.2d at p. 133 ; Sherman, supra, 502 F.3d at pp. 883-884.) And, the courts reason that when an arrest warrant is not constitutionally required at all, it follows that a state's use of an unsworn warrant does not run afoul of the federal Constitution. ( Glenn-Powers, supra, at p. 133 ; Sherman, supra, at pp. 883-884 .) In Glenn-Powers, the court cited Griffin's holding dispensing with the warrant requirement for the search of a probationer's home, and concluded: "If the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant to search a probationer's home, then it is not unreaso | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Griffin v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2013Moreover, the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, . . . and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create . . . .” (Griffin, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 876 , citation *1233 omitted.) The courts have applied the Griffin principle dispensing with the search warrant requirement for probationers to also dispense with the arrest warrant requirement for probationers or other supervised released offenders. 2013Moreover, the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, . . . and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create . . . ." (Griffin, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 876 .) The courts have applied the Griffin principle dispensing with the search warrant requirement for probationers to also dispense with the arrest warrant requirement for probationers or other supervised released offenders. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Palmer
green
1 sentence2016(See People v. Palmer (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 663 , 665–666.) Because there was no objective reason to suspect the arrest warrant for a PRCS violation was invalid, defendant would have no grounds to attack her drug possession conviction or suppress the evidence supporting that conviction. 6 parole in the future. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Evans
green
1 sentence1982After stating that, in light of the fact that defendant voluntarily admitted the officers into his room, compliance with Penal Code section 844 was not required (see People v. McCoy (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 854, 861-862 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 559 ]), the court in Evans recognized that “[s]imilar considerations underlie the arrest warrant requirement of People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d 263 , and it is fair to say that if the entry is sufficient to fulfill the Penal Code section 844 exceptions, it is also within the Ramey exceptions.” ( 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 196 .) Thus, since the entry in Evans was invite | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.