caveat doctrine (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

caveat doctrine in California

7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (17)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Satchellgreen
cal · 1971 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1982
2 sentences

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

22
People v. Washingtongreen
cal · 1965 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1982
2 sentences

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

22
People v. Kenneth J.green
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015(In re D.L., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244 ; see In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973 , 979–980.) But a caveat to this principle is that a minor may pursue a motion to suppress and accept DEJ after the suppression motion is denied.

11
In Re AIgreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015(In re Joshua S. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 670 , 680–681; In re A.I. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434 [“a minor may first litigate a suppression motion and then, after its denial, accept DEJ”].) Here, because the juvenile court held a combined hearing on the suppression and jurisdictional issues and announced its rulings on both issues at the same time, M.B. had no opportunity, after denial of her motion to suppress, to seek to be considered for DEJ.

11
People v. Smithgreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

11
People v. Wesleygreen
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

11
Boulas v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

11
Bucolo v. Adkinsgreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013A prosecutorial dismissal, “if entered before jeopardy attaches, neither operates as an acquittal nor prevents further prosecution of the offense.” (Bucolo v. Adkins (1976) 424 U.S. 641, 642 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 301, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 1086 ]; see 1 Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1993) Defenses, § 61, pp. 455-156.) One learned treatise would add a caveat to this rule: “Although jeopardy attaches in a jury trial only after jury selection is complete and the judge has sworn the entire jury . . . pre-jeopardy attempts to terminate the trial and start over may deny a defendant due process in egregio

2013A prosecutorial dismissal, “if entered before jeopardy attaches, neither operates as an acquittal nor prevents further prosecution of the offense.” (Bucolo v. Adkins (1976) 424 U.S. 641, 642 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 301, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 1086 ]; see 1 Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1993) Defenses, § 61, pp. 455-156.) One learned treatise would add a caveat to this rule: “Although jeopardy attaches in a jury trial only after jury selection is complete and the judge has sworn the entire jury . . . pre-jeopardy attempts to terminate the trial and start over may deny a defendant due process in egregio

11
People v. Pepparsgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

2013(See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1223-1227 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 80 P.3d 662 ] [declining to decide viability of doctrine]; People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1142 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 326 ] [California has “come very close” to applying the doctrine]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685-687 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 879 ]; see generally 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 102, pp. 442-444 (Witkin & Epstein) [describing the muddled case law].) If viable, the doctrine is short in reach: “When conduct on the part of the authorities is so outrageous

11
People v. Wilsonred
cal · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

11
People v. Atkinsgreen
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982Since felony child abuse, under the statutory definition, requires an intent to inflict or permit infliction of punishment or injury under conditions “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” 5 (People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 855 ]), appellant reasons that the same acts and intent which constitute the underlying felony here also constituted the homicide, thereby making the Ireland exception applicable.

1982Since felony child abuse, under the statutory definition, requires an intent to inflict or permit infliction of punishment or injury under conditions “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” 5 (People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 855 ]), appellant reasons that the same acts and intent which constitute the underlying felony here also constituted the homicide, thereby making the Ireland exception applicable.

11
People v. Calzadagreen
calctapp · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

11
People v. Carlsongreen
calctapp · 1974 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

1982(People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ]; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 ].) 4 Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability, the Supreme Court has declared the caveat that the doctrine “‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’” (Italics omitted; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 353 [ 112 C

11
People v. Phillipsgreen
cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
2 sentences

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

11
People v. Irelandgreen
cal · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
2 sentences

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

11
People v. Williamsgreen
cal · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
2 sentences

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

11
People v. Fordgreen
cal · 1964 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974
2 sentences

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
In Re Sheena K. green
cal · 2007
1 sentence

2016Correction on appeal of this type of facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation condition, similar to the correction of an unauthorized sentence on appeal, may ensue from a reviewing court’s unwillingness to ignore ‘correctable legal error.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887 , quoting People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236 .) The Attorney General relies upon a caveat to the rule articulated in Sheena K.

12016–2016
People v. Welch green
cal · 1993
1 sentence

2016Correction on appeal of this type of facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation condition, similar to the correction of an unauthorized sentence on appeal, may ensue from a reviewing court’s unwillingness to ignore ‘correctable legal error.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887 , quoting People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236 .) The Attorney General relies upon a caveat to the rule articulated in Sheena K.

12016–2016
People v. Joshua S. green
calctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2015(In re Joshua S. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 670 , 680–681; In re A.I. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434 [“a minor may first litigate a suppression motion and then, after its denial, accept DEJ”].) Here, because the juvenile court held a combined hearing on the suppression and jurisdictional issues and announced its rulings on both issues at the same time, M.B. had no opportunity, after denial of her motion to suppress, to seek to be considered for DEJ.

12015–2015
People v. D.L. green
calctapp · 2012
1 sentence

2015(In re D.L., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244 ; see In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973 , 979–980.) But a caveat to this principle is that a minor may pursue a motion to suppress and accept DEJ after the suppression motion is denied.

12015–2015
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. green
scotus · 2001
1 sentence

2014This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits.” ( Semtek, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 508 .) The Supreme Court, however, placed a caveat on this rule, stating that the “federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.” (Id. at p. 509.) Here, while the federal order dismissed both federal and state-law claims, the claims asserted in this action involve only state

12014–2014
Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. green
cal · 1982
2 sentences

1999Instead it approved those cases with the caveat the exception to the rule of imputed negligence “should be narrowly applied.” (Carroll, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 900 .) The narrow application called for in Carroll is achieved by requiring a “total failure on the part of counsel to represent the client” (Carroll, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 900 ) coupled with an absence of fault and due diligence on the part of the client ( Daley, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at pp. 392-395), absence of prejudice to the defendant ( Fleming, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 74-75), and a careful weighing of the public policies fav

1999Instead it approved those cases with the caveat the exception to the rule of imputed negligence “should be narrowly applied.” (Carroll, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 900 .) The narrow application called for in Carroll is achieved by requiring a “total failure on the part of counsel to represent the client” (Carroll, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 900 ) coupled with an absence of fault and due diligence on the part of the client ( Daley, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d at pp. 392-395), absence of prejudice to the defendant ( Fleming, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 74-75), and a careful weighing of the public policies fav

11999–1999
Stebbins v. United States green
scotus · 1964
1 sentence

1974(People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 39-40 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 , 50 A.L.R.3d 383 ]; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ]; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ]; People v. Williams, 63 Cal.2d 452, 457-458, fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 406 P.2d 647 ]; People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 388 P.2d 892 ] [cert, den., 377 U.S. 940 ] ( 12 L.Ed.2d 303 , 84 S.Ct. 1342 ).) Since the effect of the felony-murder doctrine is to erode the relation between criminal liability and moral culpa

11974–1974

Where else courts name it

GA 8 (1972–2022) IL 7 (1995–2025) CA 7 (1974–2016) MD 6 (1975–2013) PA 6 (1975–2025) OH 5 (1985–2016) CT 5 (1996–2022) FL 4 (1982–2002) LA 4 (1981–2022) TX 4 (2006–2024) VA 3 (2003–2018) IN 3 (1989–2018) OR 3 (1906–2016) NE 3 (1983–2017) MS 2 (2018–2023) KS 2 (2000–2000) CO 2 (1975–2019) NC 2 (2006–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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