conclusiveness presumption (California) · Go Syfert
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conclusiveness presumption in California

7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2014 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Lisa R.green
cal · 1975 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–2014
2 sentences

2014Thus, the cases have consistently held that where the state does not have a legitimate interest in enforcing the conclusiveness of the presumption, an interested party may, notwithstanding the presumption, present evidence which establishes that a husband is not the biological father of his wife’s child. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘As Justice Scalia noted in Michael H. [v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 ], irrebutable presumption cases ultimately call into question not the adequacy of the procedures but “the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classification and the policy that the classification ser

1996(In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 647-649 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; County of Orange v. Leslie B. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 976, 980 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ].) *1447 In particular, the courts have found that where a husband leaves the marriage before the birth of the child and never assumes parental responsibility, the presumption cannot be used to exclude evidence that would establish the identity of the child’s biological father.

22
Stanley v. Illinoisgreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975
2 sentences

1975(See Stanley v. Illinois, supra, 405 U.S. 645, 652-653, 654-655 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551,559-561 ].) Nor does the state’s interest in relieving a child of the stigma of illegitimacy (see Estate of Lund, supra, 26 Cal.2d 472 ) warrant the conclusiveness of the presumption.

1975(See Stanley v. Illinois, supra, 405 U.S. 645, 652-653, 654-655 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551,559-561 ].) Nor does the state’s interest in relieving a child of the stigma of illegitimacy (see Estate of Lund, supra, 26 Cal.2d 472 ) warrant the conclusiveness of the presumption.

22
In Re Kiana A.green
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Thus, the cases have consistently held that where the state does not have a legitimate interest in enforcing the conclusiveness of the presumption, an interested party may, notwithstanding the presumption, present evidence which establishes that a husband is not the biological father of his wife’s child. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘As Justice Scalia noted in Michael H. [v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 ], irrebutable presumption cases ultimately call into question not the adequacy of the procedures but “the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classification and the policy that the classification ser

11
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green
calctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999(People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 429-430 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 975 P.2d 1071 ]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute at most gives rise to “an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval [citations].” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 563 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Thus, unlike cases where lawmakers can be presumed to borrow from existing law to supply omitted meaning to later enactments, the pre

1999(People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 429-430 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 975 P.2d 1071 ]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute at most gives rise to “an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval [citations].” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 563 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Thus, unlike cases where lawmakers can be presumed to borrow from existing law to supply omitted meaning to later enactments, the pre

11
People v. Morantegreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999(People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 429-430 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 975 P.2d 1071 ]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute at most gives rise to “an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval [citations].” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 563 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Thus, unlike cases where lawmakers can be presumed to borrow from existing law to supply omitted meaning to later enactments, the pre

1999(People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 429-430 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 975 P.2d 1071 ]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute at most gives rise to “an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval [citations].” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 563 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Thus, unlike cases where lawmakers can be presumed to borrow from existing law to supply omitted meaning to later enactments, the pre

11
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIVgreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999(People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 429-430 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 975 P.2d 1071 ]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute at most gives rise to “an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval [citations].” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 563 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Thus, unlike cases where lawmakers can be presumed to borrow from existing law to supply omitted meaning to later enactments, the pre

1999(People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 429-430 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 975 P.2d 1071 ]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ].) Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute at most gives rise to “an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval [citations].” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 563 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Thus, unlike cases where lawmakers can be presumed to borrow from existing law to supply omitted meaning to later enactments, the pre

11
County of Orange v. LESLIE B.green
calctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996(In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 647-649 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; County of Orange v. Leslie B. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 976, 980 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ].) *1447 In particular, the courts have found that where a husband leaves the marriage before the birth of the child and never assumes parental responsibility, the presumption cannot be used to exclude evidence that would establish the identity of the child’s biological father.

1996(In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 647-649 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; County of Orange v. Leslie B. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 976, 980 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ].) *1447 In particular, the courts have found that where a husband leaves the marriage before the birth of the child and never assumes parental responsibility, the presumption cannot be used to exclude evidence that would establish the identity of the child’s biological father.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Estate of Lund green
cal · 1945
2 sentences

1975(See Stanley v. Illinois, supra, 405 U.S. 645, 652-653, 654-655 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551,559-561 ].) Nor does the state’s interest in relieving a child of the stigma of illegitimacy (see Estate of Lund, supra, 26 Cal.2d 472 ) warrant the conclusiveness of the presumption.

1975(See Stanley v. Illinois, supra, 405 U.S. 645, 652-653, 654-655 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551,559-561 ].) Nor does the state’s interest in relieving a child of the stigma of illegitimacy (see Estate of Lund, supra, 26 Cal.2d 472 ) warrant the conclusiveness of the presumption.

21975–1975
Michael H. v. Gerald D. green
scotus · 1989
1 sentence

2014Thus, the cases have consistently held that where the state does not have a legitimate interest in enforcing the conclusiveness of the presumption, an interested party may, notwithstanding the presumption, present evidence which establishes that a husband is not the biological father of his wife’s child. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘As Justice Scalia noted in Michael H. [v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 ], irrebutable presumption cases ultimately call into question not the adequacy of the procedures but “the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classification and the policy that the classification ser

12014–2014
In Re Marriage of Freeman green
calctapp · 1996
1 sentence

2014Thus, the cases have consistently held that where the state does not have a legitimate interest in enforcing the conclusiveness of the presumption, an interested party may, notwithstanding the presumption, present evidence which establishes that a husband is not the biological father of his wife’s child. [Citations.] [¶] . . . ‘As Justice Scalia noted in Michael H. [v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 ], irrebutable presumption cases ultimately call into question not the adequacy of the procedures but “the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classification and the policy that the classification ser

12014–2014
Estate of Cornelious green
cal · 1984
1 sentence

2014The underlying policies of section 7540 are to “promote[] important social policies: preserv[e] . . . the integrity of the family, protect[] . . . the welfare of children by avoiding the stigma of illegitimacy and keep[] them off welfare rolls, and insur[e] . . . the stability of titles and inheritance.” (Estate of Cornelious (1984) 35 Cal.3d 461, 465 .) Here, E.C. was conceived during wedlock; at the time of her birth, husband and Mother were separated.

12014–2014
Sacramento County Welfare Department v. Victor R. green
cal · 1975
1 sentence

1996(In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 647-649 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ]; County of Orange v. Leslie B. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 976, 980 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 797 ].) *1447 In particular, the courts have found that where a husband leaves the marriage before the birth of the child and never assumes parental responsibility, the presumption cannot be used to exclude evidence that would establish the identity of the child’s biological father.

11996–1996
Demartini v. Marini green
calctapp · 1920
2 sentences

1960Appellant cites Demartini v. Marini (1920), 45 Cal.App. 418 [ 187 P. 985 ], as authority to the contrary, but in that case the plaintiff did not state a cause of action in the first count of her complaint and under the facts alleged could not.

1960Appellant cites Demartini v. Marini (1920), 45 Cal.App. 418 [ 187 P. 985 ], as authority to the contrary, but in that case the plaintiff did not state a cause of action in the first count of her complaint and under the facts alleged could not.

11960–1960
Seiders v. Merchants Life Ass'n of United States green
· 1900
2 sentences

1936The question was not involved in the ease; and the writer of the opinion immediately proceeds to cite another case in support of the point then being considered (Seiders v. Merchants’ Life Assn., 93 Tex. 194 [ 54 S. W. 753 ]) to the effect that the law of the place of performance must be followed “unless there be something in the circumstances that indicates that the parties contracted with reference to the place where the contract was made”.

1936The question was not involved in the ease; and the writer of the opinion immediately proceeds to cite another case in support of the point then being considered (Seiders v. Merchants’ Life Assn., 93 Tex. 194 [ 54 S. W. 753 ]) to the effect that the law of the place of performance must be followed “unless there be something in the circumstances that indicates that the parties contracted with reference to the place where the contract was made”.

11936–1936

Where else courts name it

CA 7 (1936–2014) IL 5 (1981–2026) FL 5 (1981–1996) NY 3 (1954–1986) NJ 3 (1881–1984) TX 3 (1885–1945) KY 2 (1957–1966) GA 2 (1963–1997) MO 2 (1929–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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