consistent statement exception in California

2021(See Hajek, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1229 ; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) We are not persuaded by Talkington’s suggestion that it would have been futile to 5 Talkington’s failure to request such an instruction was excusable in light of the trial court’s apparent admission of the testimony for its truth under the prior consistent statement exception. 21 request a limiting instruction in light of the trial court’s prior ruling admitting Detective Knutson’s testimony for its truth under the prior consistent statement hearsay exception.

2021(See Hajek, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1229 ; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) We are not persuaded by Talkington’s suggestion that it would have been futile to 5 Talkington’s failure to request such an instruction was excusable in light of the trial court’s apparent admission of the testimony for its truth under the prior consistent statement exception. 21 request a limiting instruction in light of the trial court’s prior ruling admitting Detective Knutson’s testimony for its truth under the prior consistent statement hearsay exception.

2021(See Hajek, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1229 ; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) We are not persuaded by Talkington’s suggestion that it would have been futile to 5 Talkington’s failure to request such an instruction was excusable in light of the trial court’s apparent admission of the testimony for its truth under the prior consistent statement exception. 21 request a limiting instruction in light of the trial court’s prior ruling admitting Detective Knutson’s testimony for its truth under the prior consistent statement hearsay exception.

2016Defendant now contends (1) the trial court erred in admitting a witness’s pretrial statements under the prior consistent statement exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court failed to inquire whether defendant’s trial counsel had a conflict of interest in continuing to represent defendant on his new trial motion; and (3) defendant’s sentence violates the principles articulated in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. __ [ 183 L.Ed.2d 407 ] (Miller), even though he was over the age of 18 when he killed Sanchez. 1 We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether defendant forfei

2015(Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680 .) Alleged Abuse of Discretion—Admission of Mendoza’s Prior Consistent Statements Ortiz argues that the court erroneously allowed the prosecutor to admit Mendoza’s statements from the preliminary hearing under the prior consistent statement exception to the hearsay rule.

2003(Evid.Code, §§ 1236, 791.) In evaluating the admissibility of prior consistent statements, the focus is on "the specific agreement or other inducement suggested by cross-examination as supporting the witness's improper motive." ( People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 630 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 842 P.2d 1160 .) In his opening brief, defendant relies essentially on his attack on Elander's credibility during cross-examination in light of Elander's immunity agreement with the prosecution.

2003(Evid.Code, §§ 1236, 791.) In evaluating the admissibility of prior consistent statements, the focus is on "the specific agreement or other inducement suggested by cross-examination as supporting the witness's improper motive." ( People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 630 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 842 P.2d 1160 .) In his opening brief, defendant relies essentially on his attack on Elander's credibility during cross-examination in light of Elander's immunity agreement with the prosecution.

1992The People, seizing on the specific nature of the questions concerning a motive to fabricate his testimony asked Abram on cross-examination, rely on our statements in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 583 , 776 P.2d 285 ], and People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189 , that "`[t]he mere asking of questions [by the defense] may raise an implied charge of improper motive ...'" ( 49 Cal.3d at p. 210 , quoting 45 Cal.3d at p. 1209), thus invoking the exception of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b).

1992The People, seizing on the specific nature of the questions concerning a motive to fabricate his testimony asked Abram on cross-examination, rely on our statements in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 583 , 776 P.2d 285 ], and People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189 , that “ ‘[t]he mere asking of questions [by the defense] may raise an implied charge of improper motive . . .’ ” ( 49 Cal.3d at p. 210 , quoting 45 Cal.3d at p. 1209), thus invoking the exception of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b).

1992The People, seizing on the specific nature of the questions concerning a motive to fabricate his testimony asked Abram on cross-examination, rely on our statements in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 583 , 776 P.2d 285 ], and People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189 , that "`[t]he mere asking of questions [by the defense] may raise an implied charge of improper motive ...'" ( 49 Cal.3d at p. 210 , quoting 45 Cal.3d at p. 1209), thus invoking the exception of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b).

1992The People, seizing on the specific nature of the questions concerning a motive to fabricate his testimony asked Abram on cross-examination, rely on our statements in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 583 , 776 P.2d 285 ], and People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189 , that "`[t]he mere asking of questions [by the defense] may raise an implied charge of improper motive ...'" ( 49 Cal.3d at p. 210 , quoting 45 Cal.3d at p. 1209), thus invoking the exception of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b).

1992Code (1966 ed.) § 791, p. 373.) Defendant relies on People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ], a capital case in which we held it was error to admit, under the prior consistent statement exception, hearsay declarations made by a crime partner of the accused to his wife and father.

1992Code (1966 ed.) § 791, p. 373.) Defendant relies on People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 , 459 P.2d 248 ], a capital case in which we held it was error to admit, under the prior consistent statement exception, hearsay declarations made by a crime partner of the accused to his wife and father.