NGI plea in California

2026(Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1166 .) The court recognized that although many NGI defendants lack the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of their right to a jury trial, there are also many who can understand the nature of legal proceedings and determine their own best interest.

2026The trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the prosecuting attorney.” (Id., at subd. (b)(4).) Analysis Our Supreme Court in People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 (Tran) addressed the same issue raised by appellant challenging the trial court’s failure to obtain a personal 4. waiver of the right to a jury trial from the NGI defendant on a petition to extend the commitment.

2024(See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); cf., e.g., People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655 , 663–664 [NGI defendant suffered from same delusion he had when he committed underlying offense “and consistently maintained that he would do the same thing in the same circumstances”]; Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1166–1167 [NGI defendant repeatedly acted on delusions and paranoia in inappropriate ways “so as to impose a danger to others,” “such as . . . taking steps to escape from the hospital for fear that workmen would return to harm him, or aggressively insisting on money he believed he was owed”

2023DISCUSSION “Section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that an NGI defendant committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty of an offense by reason of insanity pursuant to section 1026 ‘may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment.’ (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), an NGI defendant may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) if he or she ‘has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony and,’ after a trial, the trier of fact finds that he or she ‘by reason of mental disease, defect, or

2024(Cf., e.g., People v. Kendrid (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370 [substantial evidence to support NGI defendant’s commitment where it was undisputed that defendant had “ ‘absolutely no insight into his behaviors that lead to violence’ ”].) 14 The trial court also erroneously relied on an isolated comment Dr. Abrams made that his “line” as an addiction psychiatrist “is everyone relapses at some point[,]” even though he said just before that comment, and shortly after, that it was only “a possibility” Carranza might relapse.

2020(Compare, e.g., People v. Kendrid (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370 [substantial evidence supported court’s order extending NGI defendant’s commitment 24 where it was undisputed that defendant had “ ‘absolutely no insight into his behaviors that lead to . . . violence’ ”].) Finally, even if the evidence supported a finding that appellant would represent a substantial danger of physical harm were he to discontinue his medications upon his release, the court specifically found, based on the evidence presented, that appellant would continue to take his medications and, as already discussed, the e

2022(People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 (Tran) [“The trial court must advise the NGI defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision.”]; Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1120-1122 [MDO statute requires both an advisement of a defendant’s right to a jury trial and a personal waiver of that right by the d

2015(See Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1125 [“If the Legislature had intended to allow counsel to waive a jury trial notwithstanding the defendant’s wishes, it would not have needed to require the trial court to expressly advise the defendant.”].) We are mindful that an NGI commitment extension proceeding necessarily involves a defendant alleged to represent “a substantial danger of physical harm to others” “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) We presume the Legislature was aware that many NGI defendants lack the capacity to make a knowing and volunt

2023(Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 397 .) In Henning, the court granted the defendant’s first Marsden motion where one of the grounds was “his dissatisfaction with defense counsel’s refusal to allow him to enter an NGI plea.” (Id. at pp. 394-395.) At a second Marsden hearing, the defendant stated that counsel “ ‘does not want to go along with my plea,’ ” and answered in the affirmative to the court’s question, “ ‘is it your position that you were insane at the time of the incident?’ ” (Id. at p. 395.) Even assuming that defendant unequivocally requested to enter an NGI plea, we must assess

2023In People v. Loya (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 932 , the court held: “A trial court should substitute new counsel upon learning in a Marsden hearing that defense counsel refuses to allow a defendant to exercise his or her right to enter an NGI plea.” (Id. at p. 945, citing Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 .) The court in Loya, however, held that denial of a Marsden motion is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where, as here, the defendant’s behavior established that he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong and knew or understood the nature of his actions.

2014Department argues that NGI’s are not similarly situated to MDO’s because they have been recognized as belonging to a “separate, distinct class.” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1, 27, fn. 6 [ in dicta quoting Stats. 1985, ch. 1419, 2.75, p. 5018]; see Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 370 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 694 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 ] [commitment beyond maximum prison term for NGI’s permissible because “insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment”]; People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 813 P.2d

2014Department argues that NGI’s are not similarly situated to MDO’s because they have been recognized as belonging to a “separate, distinct class.” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1, 27, fn. 6 [ in dicta quoting Stats. 1985, ch. 1419, 2.75, p. 5018]; see Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 370 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 694 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 ] [commitment beyond maximum prison term for NGI’s permissible because “insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment”]; People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 813 P.2d

1991A petition for a rehearing was denied December 12, 1991, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 19, 1992. 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 McFarland did not believe Geddes’s wife and daughter were living with him at the time of the incident. 3 Both McFarland and his wife characterized Geddes’s behavior as “bizarre.” Neither McFarland nor Gott smelled alcohol on Geddes’s breath. 4 We are similarly unpersuaded by Geddes’s suggestion that the advisement requirements of People v. Redmond (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 931, 9

1991A petition for a rehearing was denied December 12, 1991, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 19, 1992. 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 McFarland did not believe Geddes’s wife and daughter were living with him at the time of the incident. 3 Both McFarland and his wife characterized Geddes’s behavior as “bizarre.” Neither McFarland nor Gott smelled alcohol on Geddes’s breath. 4 We are similarly unpersuaded by Geddes’s suggestion that the advisement requirements of People v. Redmond (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 931, 9

2026Substantial Evidence Supports J.B.’s Future Dangerousness and Inadequate Proof of His Medication Defense Establishing that an NGI defendant poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others “requires proof that the person has serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.” (People v. Williams (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 861, 872 (Williams).) The factors required for an extended 23 commitment must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2022DISCUSSION A. General Legal Principles A defendant who is found NGI may be confined to a state psychiatric hospital for a period as long as the maximum amount of time for which the defendant could have been imprisoned if he or she had been found guilty of the charged offense(s). (§§ 1026, 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, the district 14 attorney may petition the superior court to extend the commitment of a patient if the patient represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others because of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(2).) Establishing that an NGI defendant

2024(See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); cf., e.g., People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655 , 663–664 [NGI defendant suffered from same delusion he had when he committed underlying offense “and consistently maintained that he would do the same thing in the same circumstances”]; Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1166–1167 [NGI defendant repeatedly acted on delusions and paranoia in inappropriate ways “so as to impose a danger to others,” “such as . . . taking steps to escape from the hospital for fear that workmen would return to harm him, or aggressively insisting on money he believed he was owed”

2020He goes to his meals and takes his medications.” (Compare, e.g., People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655 , 663–664 [NGI defendant suffered from same delusion that was in effect when he committed arson offense that led to his institutionalization “and consistently maintained that he would do the same thing in the same circumstances”]; Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1166–1167 [NGI defendant had repeatedly acted on his delusions and paranoia in inappropriate ways “so as to impose a danger to 22 others,” “such as taping alarm sensors needed for medical emergencies because he believed he

2024(Cf. People v. Alvarez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1274 [“Nothing in Cirino [supra,] supports the right of a defendant committed pursuant to an NGI plea to conduct freestanding discovery unrelated to a pending motion, petition or other proceeding.”].)13 13 Gray’s reliance on People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216 (Lara) is similarly inapt.

2024(Cf. People v. Alvarez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1274 [“Nothing in Cirino [supra,] supports the right of a defendant committed pursuant to an NGI plea to conduct freestanding discovery unrelated to a pending motion, petition or other proceeding.”].)13 13 Gray’s reliance on People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216 (Lara) is similarly inapt.

2023DISCUSSION “Section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that an NGI defendant committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty of an offense by reason of insanity pursuant to section 1026 ‘may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment.’ (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), an NGI defendant may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) if he or she ‘has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony and,’ after a trial, the trier of fact finds that he or she ‘by reason of mental disease, defect, or

2023DISCUSSION “Section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that an NGI defendant committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty of an offense by reason of insanity pursuant to section 1026 ‘may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment.’ (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), an NGI defendant may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) if he or she ‘has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony and,’ after a trial, the trier of fact finds that he or she ‘by reason of mental disease, defect, or

2020To establish this defense, [the NGI defendant] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: “1. [He] no longer poses a substantial danger of physical harm to other because [he] is now taking medicine that controls [his] medical condition; “AND “2. [He] will continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised environment.” (CALCRIM No. 3453.) 18 probative facts, cannot constitute substantial evidence.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Anthony C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1504 (Anthony C.).) In the present case, appellant argues that the evidence adduced at trial “did not support the conclusion th

2020Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Commitment Extension A. Section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that an NGI defendant committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty of an offense by reason of insanity pursuant to section 1026 “may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), an NGI defendant may be committed beyond the term prescribed by subdivision (a) if he or she “has been committed under Section 1026 for a felony and,” after a trial, the trier of fact finds

2014Department argues that NGI’s are not similarly situated to MDO’s because they have been recognized as belonging to a “separate, distinct class.” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1, 27, fn. 6 [ in dicta quoting Stats. 1985, ch. 1419, 2.75, p. 5018]; see Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 370 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 694 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 ] [commitment beyond maximum prison term for NGI’s permissible because “insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment”]; People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 813 P.2d

2014Department argues that NGI’s are not similarly situated to MDO’s because they have been recognized as belonging to a “separate, distinct class.” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1, 27, fn. 6 [ in dicta quoting Stats. 1985, ch. 1419, 2.75, p. 5018]; see Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 370 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 694 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 ] [commitment beyond maximum prison term for NGI’s permissible because “insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment”]; People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 288 , 813 P.2d

2024(Cf. People v. Alvarez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1274 [“Nothing in Cirino [supra,] supports the right of a defendant committed pursuant to an NGI plea to conduct freestanding discovery unrelated to a pending motion, petition or other proceeding.”].)13 13 Gray’s reliance on People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216 (Lara) is similarly inapt.

2024(Cf. People v. Alvarez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1274 [“Nothing in Cirino [supra,] supports the right of a defendant committed pursuant to an NGI plea to conduct freestanding discovery unrelated to a pending motion, petition or other proceeding.”].)13 13 Gray’s reliance on People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216 (Lara) is similarly inapt.

2023(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 (Clark); Henning, at p. 397; People v. Clemons (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1251 (Clemons).) A competent defendant who makes an unequivocal request to enter an NGI plea has a statutory right to do so. (§ 1018; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 963 ; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 ; Henning, at pp. 397-398.) “[A] defendant . . . cannot be compelled by counsel to abandon [an insanity defense] merely because counsel disagrees with the tactics of that decision.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 900 .) We note that on June 9, 2021,

1991Recognizing that the decision to enter an NGI plea is a personal one for the competent defendant (People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 542 P.2d 1365 ]), the judge later spoke directly with Geddes.

2016(Ibid.) Tran summarized that "the trial court must elicit the waiver decision from the defendant in a court proceeding unless it finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case counsel controls the waiver decision," and disapproved People v. Powell (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158 , and People v. Givan (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 405, 410-411 , "to the extent they are inconsistent with this rule." (Tran, at p. 1169.) The Supreme Court further held that a trial court's acceptance of an invalid jury trial waiver requires an autom

2013Defendant’s jury trial interest thus is, in this case, ‘merely a matter of state procedural law’ and does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation].” (Id. at pp. 831-832, quoting Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346 (Hicks); cf. Powell, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159 [rejecting NGI’s claim that denial of jury trial violated constitutional right to due process].) Defendant cites In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 297 , People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338 , People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630 , and In re Hop (1981) 29 Cal.3d 82 for the proposition that due process guarantees th

2013Because these individuals faced indefinite commitment exceeding the maximum possible prison term had they been convicted, and the Legislature had enacted less onerous civil commitment procedures for similarly situated individuals in MDSO proceedings, the Supreme Court in In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457 (Moye) concluded indefinite commitment of NGI defendants violated equal protection.

2010As the Supreme Court directed in In re Moye, supra , 22 Cal.3d at page 467 when confronting unconstitutional statutory procedures for extending the confinement of NGI defendants beyond the maximum term of punishment for the underlying offense, "in the absence of further legislation on the subject," the trial courts should proceed "[t]o the extent practicable" by adopting the procedures specified in an analogous statutory scheme.

1989On appeal he urged that his NGI plea “should not have been accepted without the record showing that he was aware of the fact that a successful assertion of the plea could result in an indefinite commitment in a state hospital for a 90-day minimum and a lifetime maximum.” (Id., at p. 855.) The court stated that this “point has merit.” ( 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 855 .) Two supporting sources were relied upon.

1989The court noted “the principle of Yurko demands that any defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity be advised that he thereby runs a risk of a possible lifetime commitment.” ( 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 856 .) The following year our Supreme Court held that an NGI plea must be personally entered by a defendant, not by counsel, and that a court cannot compel an insanity defense.

2023(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 (Clark); Henning, at p. 397; People v. Clemons (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1251 (Clemons).) A competent defendant who makes an unequivocal request to enter an NGI plea has a statutory right to do so. (§ 1018; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 963 ; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 ; Henning, at pp. 397-398.) “[A] defendant . . . cannot be compelled by counsel to abandon [an insanity defense] merely because counsel disagrees with the tactics of that decision.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 900 .) We note that on June 9, 2021,

2022Defendant relies on People v. Clemons (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1243 (Clemons), but Clemons does not support his position.

2023(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 (Clark); Henning, at p. 397; People v. Clemons (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1251 (Clemons).) A competent defendant who makes an unequivocal request to enter an NGI plea has a statutory right to do so. (§ 1018; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 963 ; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 ; Henning, at pp. 397-398.) “[A] defendant . . . cannot be compelled by counsel to abandon [an insanity defense] merely because counsel disagrees with the tactics of that decision.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 900 .) We note that on June 9, 2021,

2022Failure to Allow NGI Plea The decision of whether to enter a plea of NGI “is a matter within the defendant’s, rather than counsel’s, ultimate control.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 .) “[A] defendant has the right to personally enter the plea of his choice regardless of what his counsel thinks of the merits of an NGI plea.” (People v. Henning (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 388, 394 (Henning).) However, the erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to enter his desired plea warrants reversal only if the defendant was prejudiced by the error.