first instance without hearing in California

2000As a reviewing court, the appellate division was presented with three options in disposing of the petition for writ of mandate: “either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma . . . ; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.” 1 (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ]; see also Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239 (Lewis); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3

2000As a reviewing court, the appellate division was presented with three options in disposing of the petition for writ of mandate: “either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma . . . ; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.” 1 (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ]; see also Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239 (Lewis); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3

1999In explaining why this finality provision was inapplicable under the circumstances, we noted that the Court of Appeal has three options when considering a petition for writ of mandate: "(1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ]...; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.

1999In explaining why this finality provision was inapplicable under the circumstances, we noted that the Court of Appeal has three options when considering a petition for writ of mandate: "(1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ]...; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.

1995In Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ], our Supreme Court held: “The statutory provisions governing petitions for extraordinary writ of mandate contemplate that when a Court of Appeal considers such a petition, the court will either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ]; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits b

1995In Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ], our Supreme Court held: “The statutory provisions governing petitions for extraordinary writ of mandate contemplate that when a Court of Appeal considers such a petition, the court will either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 681 P.2d 893 ]; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits b

2015Destroying evidence can also increase the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or both.’ [Citation.] While there is no tort cause of action for the intentional destruction of evidence after litigation has commenced, it is a misuse of the discovery process that is subject to a broad range of punishment, including monetary, issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions. [Citations.] A terminating sanction is appropriate in the first instance without a violation of prior court orde

2015Destroying evidence can also increase the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or both.’ [Citation.] While there is no tort cause of action for the intentional destruction of evidence after litigation has commenced, it is a misuse of the discovery process that is subject to a broad range of punishment, including monetary, issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions. [Citations.] A terminating sanction is appropriate in the first instance without a violation of prior court orde

2000As a reviewing court, the appellate division was presented with three options in disposing of the petition for writ of mandate: “either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma . . . ; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.” 1 (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ]; see also Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239 (Lewis); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3

2000As the exception to the rule, the procedure may only be used in the limited situation where “ 1 “entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1241 , citing Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 , 859 P.2d 96 ] (Alexander), quoting Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 , 840 P.2d 961 ] (Ng).) Moreover, on those rare occasions that a reviewing court resorts to use of a peremptory writ in the first instance, it is c

2000As a reviewing court, the appellate division was presented with three options in disposing of the petition for writ of mandate: “either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma . . . ; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.” 1 (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ]; see also Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239 (Lewis); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3

2000As a reviewing court, the appellate division was presented with three options in disposing of the petition for writ of mandate: “either (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance without a hearing, after compliance with the procedure set forth in Palma . . . ; or (3) grant a hearing on the merits by issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause.” 1 (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ]; see also Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239 (Lewis); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3

2000As the exception to the rule, the procedure may only be used in the limited situation where “ 1 “entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1241 , citing Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 , 859 P.2d 96 ] (Alexander), quoting Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 , 840 P.2d 961 ] (Ng).) Moreover, on those rare occasions that a reviewing court resorts to use of a peremptory writ in the first instance, it is c

2000As the exception to the rule, the procedure may only be used in the limited situation where “ 1 “entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1241 , citing Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 , 859 P.2d 96 ] (Alexander), quoting Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 , 840 P.2d 961 ] (Ng).) Moreover, on those rare occasions that a reviewing court resorts to use of a peremptory writ in the first instance, it is c

2000As the exception to the rule, the procedure may only be used in the limited situation where “ 1 “entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1241 , citing Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 , 859 P.2d 96 ] (Alexander), quoting Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 , 840 P.2d 961 ] (Ng).) Moreover, on those rare occasions that a reviewing court resorts to use of a peremptory writ in the first instance, it is c

2000As the exception to the rule, the procedure may only be used in the limited situation where “ 1 “entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1241 , citing Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 , 859 P.2d 96 ] (Alexander), quoting Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856 , 840 P.2d 961 ] (Ng).) Moreover, on those rare occasions that a reviewing court resorts to use of a peremptory writ in the first instance, it is c

1999For example, in Friends of Assembly-woman La Follette v. Superior Court (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 832, 840 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 856 , the court stated: "Because of the urgency presented by the imminence of the ... election, and because the parties have fully briefed the issues before this court and the process of issuing an alternative writ and placing the matter on calendar for argument would significantly delay our resolution of this matter until shortly before the election, this is an appropriate case for issuance of the peremptory writ in the first instance as authorized by section 1088 of the Code

1999For example, in Friends of Assembly-woman La Follette v. Superior Court (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 832, 840 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 856 , the court stated: "Because of the urgency presented by the imminence of the ... election, and because the parties have fully briefed the issues before this court and the process of issuing an alternative writ and placing the matter on calendar for argument would significantly delay our resolution of this matter until shortly before the election, this is an appropriate case for issuance of the peremptory writ in the first instance as authorized by section 1088 of the Code

1999An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the full presentation already made." ( San Diego Wholesale Credit Men's Assn. v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 458, 464-465 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 657 ; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 165 .) Courts of Appeal also have issued peremptory writs in the first instance without hearing oral argument where placing the matter on calendar would have delayed resolution of a case requiring an immediate decision.

1999An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the full presentation already made." ( San Diego Wholesale Credit Men's Assn. v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 458, 464-465 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 657 ; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 165 .) Courts of Appeal also have issued peremptory writs in the first instance without hearing oral argument where placing the matter on calendar would have delayed resolution of a case requiring an immediate decision.

1999An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the full presentation already made." ( San Diego Wholesale Credit Men's Assn. v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 458, 464-465 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 657 ; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 165 .) Courts of Appeal also have issued peremptory writs in the first instance without hearing oral argument where placing the matter on calendar would have delayed resolution of a case requiring an immediate decision.

1999An alternative writ or order to show cause would add nothing to the full presentation already made." ( San Diego Wholesale Credit Men's Assn. v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 458, 464-465 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 657 ; Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697 , 96 Cal.Rptr. 165 .) Courts of Appeal also have issued peremptory writs in the first instance without hearing oral argument where placing the matter on calendar would have delayed resolution of a case requiring an immediate decision.

1999For example, in Friends of Assembly-woman La Follette v. Superior Court (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 832, 840 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 856 , the court stated: "Because of the urgency presented by the imminence of the ... election, and because the parties have fully briefed the issues before this court and the process of issuing an alternative writ and placing the matter on calendar for argument would significantly delay our resolution of this matter until shortly before the election, this is an appropriate case for issuance of the peremptory writ in the first instance as authorized by section 1088 of the Code

1999For example, in Friends of Assembly-woman La Follette v. Superior Court (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 832, 840 , 184 Cal.Rptr. 856 , the court stated: "Because of the urgency presented by the imminence of the ... election, and because the parties have fully briefed the issues before this court and the process of issuing an alternative writ and placing the matter on calendar for argument would significantly delay our resolution of this matter until shortly before the election, this is an appropriate case for issuance of the peremptory writ in the first instance as authorized by section 1088 of the Code

1997According to Hensler , an “owner ‘may not . . . elect to sue in inverse condemnation’ ” instead of by mandamus “ ‘and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid.’ ” (Hensler v. City of Glendale, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 14 .) An owner that uses inverse condemnation actions to “bypass the remedies the state has made available to avoid the taking” may be deemed to “have waived the ‘taking’ claim.” (Id. at p. 19; Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ]; Knicker

1997According to Hensler , an “owner ‘may not . . . elect to sue in inverse condemnation’ ” instead of by mandamus “ ‘and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid.’ ” (Hensler v. City of Glendale, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 14 .) An owner that uses inverse condemnation actions to “bypass the remedies the state has made available to avoid the taking” may be deemed to “have waived the ‘taking’ claim.” (Id. at p. 19; Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ]; Knicker

1997According to Hensler , an “owner ‘may not . . . elect to sue in inverse condemnation’ ” instead of by mandamus “ ‘and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid.’ ” (Hensler v. City of Glendale, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 14 .) An owner that uses inverse condemnation actions to “bypass the remedies the state has made available to avoid the taking” may be deemed to “have waived the ‘taking’ claim.” (Id. at p. 19; Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ]; Knicker

1997According to Hensler , an “owner ‘may not . . . elect to sue in inverse condemnation’ ” instead of by mandamus “ ‘and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid.’ ” (Hensler v. City of Glendale, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 14 .) An owner that uses inverse condemnation actions to “bypass the remedies the state has made available to avoid the taking” may be deemed to “have waived the ‘taking’ claim.” (Id. at p. 19; Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 ]; Knicker