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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnny G.green2 sentences1995(People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624; see also People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for informant testimony]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for immunized witness testimony].) We note, however, that in a decision predating the cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court concluded that “the drafters o 1995(People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624; see also People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for informant testimony]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for immunized witness testimony].) We note, however, that in a decision predating the cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court concluded that “the drafters o | 1 | 2 |
COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY v. Universal Paragon Corp.green1 sentence2022(See Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 [“We review the trial court’s ruling de novo, but defer to the factual . . . findings made by the arbitrator.”].) As Tenet does not explain why this appellate claim nonetheless concerns a mistake of law or legal reasoning, we do not address it further. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garceaugreen2 sentences1995(People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624; see also People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for informant testimony]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for immunized witness testimony].) We note, however, that in a decision predating the cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court concluded that “the drafters o 1995(People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624; see also People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for informant testimony]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for immunized witness testimony].) We note, however, that in a decision predating the cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court concluded that “the drafters o | 1 | 1 |
People v. Huntergreen2 sentences1995(People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624; see also People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for informant testimony]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for immunized witness testimony].) We note, however, that in a decision predating the cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court concluded that “the drafters o 1995(People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624; see also People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 , 862 P.2d 664 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for informant testimony]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ] [post-Gould; relying on Evidence Code section 411 to reject proposed cautionary instruction for immunized witness testimony].) We note, however, that in a decision predating the cases cited in the preceding paragraph, this court concluded that “the drafters o | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Amsouth Bank, N.A.green2 sentences1992(Ala. 1991) 589 So.2d 715, 722 [recognizing the Gould exception “provided that the law firm did not play a role originally in creating the conflict of interest”].) As heretofore discussed, at the time Crosby accepted representation of Truck against FFIC, the firm knew that it was representing FFIC in the wrongful termination litigation. 1992(Ala. 1991) 589 So.2d 715, 722 [recognizing the Gould exception “provided that the law firm did not play a role originally in creating the conflict of interest”].) As heretofore discussed, at the time Crosby accepted representation of Truck against FFIC, the firm knew that it was representing FFIC in the wrongful termination litigation. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1988The repudiated identification may form the basis for conviction if it was “reiterated by the witness under oath at a preliminary examination or other judicial proceed ing, and there was evidence from which the factfinder could credit the witness’ prior testimony over his or her failure to confirm the extrajudicial statements at trial.” (In re Miguel L., supra, citing People v. Ford (1981) 30 Cal.3d 209, 214-215 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 635 P.2d 1176 ]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334 364 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 605 P.2d 401 ].) 17 As we explained in Miguel L., where “no evidence” incriminates 1988The repudiated identification may form the basis for conviction if it was “reiterated by the witness under oath at a preliminary examination or other judicial proceed ing, and there was evidence from which the factfinder could credit the witness’ prior testimony over his or her failure to confirm the extrajudicial statements at trial.” (In re Miguel L., supra, citing People v. Ford (1981) 30 Cal.3d 209, 214-215 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 635 P.2d 1176 ]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334 364 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 605 P.2d 401 ].) 17 As we explained in Miguel L., where “no evidence” incriminates | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fordgreen2 sentences1988The repudiated identification may form the basis for conviction if it was “reiterated by the witness under oath at a preliminary examination or other judicial proceed ing, and there was evidence from which the factfinder could credit the witness’ prior testimony over his or her failure to confirm the extrajudicial statements at trial.” (In re Miguel L., supra, citing People v. Ford (1981) 30 Cal.3d 209, 214-215 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 635 P.2d 1176 ]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334 364 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 605 P.2d 401 ].) 17 As we explained in Miguel L., where “no evidence” incriminates 1988The repudiated identification may form the basis for conviction if it was “reiterated by the witness under oath at a preliminary examination or other judicial proceed ing, and there was evidence from which the factfinder could credit the witness’ prior testimony over his or her failure to confirm the extrajudicial statements at trial.” (In re Miguel L., supra, citing People v. Ford (1981) 30 Cal.3d 209, 214-215 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 635 P.2d 1176 ]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334 364 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 605 P.2d 401 ].) 17 As we explained in Miguel L., where “no evidence” incriminates | 1 | 1 |
People v. Miguel L.green2 sentences1988In People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ], Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that “[a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.” (P. 631.) The Gould rule requires reversal “when [the conviction] is based solely on an extrajudicial statement not confirmed by the witness at trial.” (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 106 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 120 , 649 P.2d 703 ], italics added.) We have s 1988In People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ], Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that “[a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.” (P. 631.) The Gould rule requires reversal “when [the conviction] is based solely on an extrajudicial statement not confirmed by the witness at trial.” (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 106 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 120 , 649 P.2d 703 ], italics added.) We have s | 1 | 1 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences1981(See, e.g., People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 991 [ 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 , 479 P.2d 998 ].) [5] (1b) Defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on count III is therefore untenable. 1981(See, e.g., People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 991 [ 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 , 479 P.2d 998 ].) [5] (1b) Defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on count III is therefore untenable. | 1 | 1 |
Cabell v. Eugene M.green2 sentences1981(See also In re Johnny G. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 543 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 180 , 601 P.2d 196 ]; In re Eugene M. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 650, 657-659 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 851 ].) The Attorney General, in turn, relies on Chavez . 1981(See also In re Johnny G. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 543 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 180 , 601 P.2d 196 ]; In re Eugene M. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 650, 657-659 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 851 ].) The Attorney General, in turn, relies on Chavez . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022(See Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277 25 [“ ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.’ ”].) Lastly, Tenet insists that “Kaiser[’s] . . . methodology cannot possibly incorporate the second, third or fourth Gould factors” because the used in the formula “ regardless of their nature (inpatient, outpatient, emergency, etc.), context (contracted, non-contracted) or geography . . . .” The panel acknowledged that Tenet had raised this argument during the arbitral proceedings, but nonetheless concluded that Kaiser presented evidence that both of its methodology “consider e | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Children's Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of California
green
1 sentence2021On May 1, 2017 the panel issued a partial final award on the reasonable value phase.11 According to the panel, the parties agreed Children’s Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of California (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1260 (Children’s Hospital) “provides the legal framework for the analysis of reasonable value.” The panel stated, “As relevant here, the Court of Appeal in Children’s Hospital held that the six Gould factors set forth in [regulation] 1300.71(a)(3)(B) are not the exclusive measure of valuing the services provided by a non-contracted provider who provided post-stabilization emerg | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Building & Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017In so doing, the State is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to State regulation ." ( Id . at p. 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 .) The Supreme Court in Boston Harbor distinguished Gould , supra , 475 U.S. 282 , 106 S.Ct. 1057 , explaining that the Gould rule addressed a state agency's attempt, through limitations on state expenditures, to compel NLRA compliance on the part of a private employer -a matter "unrelated to the employer's performance of contractual obligations to the State" but rather demonstrating an intent to deter NLRA violations. ( Boston Harbo 2017In so doing, the State is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to State regulation ." ( Id . at p. 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 .) The Supreme Court in Boston Harbor distinguished Gould , supra , 475 U.S. 282 , 106 S.Ct. 1057 , explaining that the Gould rule addressed a state agency's attempt, through limitations on state expenditures, to compel NLRA compliance on the part of a private employer -a matter "unrelated to the employer's performance of contractual obligations to the State" but rather demonstrating an intent to deter NLRA violations. ( Boston Harbo | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc.
green
2 sentences2017In so doing, the State is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to State regulation ." ( Id . at p. 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 .) The Supreme Court in Boston Harbor distinguished Gould , supra , 475 U.S. 282 , 106 S.Ct. 1057 , explaining that the Gould rule addressed a state agency's attempt, through limitations on state expenditures, to compel NLRA compliance on the part of a private employer -a matter "unrelated to the employer's performance of contractual obligations to the State" but rather demonstrating an intent to deter NLRA violations. ( Boston Harbo 2017In so doing, the State is not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to State regulation ." ( Id . at p. 227, 113 S.Ct. 1190 .) The Supreme Court in Boston Harbor distinguished Gould , supra , 475 U.S. 282 , 106 S.Ct. 1057 , explaining that the Gould rule addressed a state agency's attempt, through limitations on state expenditures, to compel NLRA compliance on the part of a private employer -a matter "unrelated to the employer's performance of contractual obligations to the State" but rather demonstrating an intent to deter NLRA violations. ( Boston Harbo | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co.
green
2 sentences1992(See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Min. & Smelting Co., supra, 738 F.Supp. at p. 1127 ; see also Florida Ins. 1992(See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Min. & Smelting Co., supra, 738 F.Supp. at p. 1127 ; see also Florida Ins. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Gould
green
2 sentences1988In People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ], Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that “[a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.” (P. 631.) The Gould rule requires reversal “when [the conviction] is based solely on an extrajudicial statement not confirmed by the witness at trial.” (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 106 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 120 , 649 P.2d 703 ], italics added.) We have s 1988In People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ], Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that “[a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.” (P. 631.) The Gould rule requires reversal “when [the conviction] is based solely on an extrajudicial statement not confirmed by the witness at trial.” (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 106 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 120 , 649 P.2d 703 ], italics added.) We have s | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Gould
green
2 sentences1988In People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ], Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that “[a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.” (P. 631.) The Gould rule requires reversal “when [the conviction] is based solely on an extrajudicial statement not confirmed by the witness at trial.” (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 106 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 120 , 649 P.2d 703 ], italics added.) We have s 1988In People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ], Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that “[a]n extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.” (P. 631.) The Gould rule requires reversal “when [the conviction] is based solely on an extrajudicial statement not confirmed by the witness at trial.” (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 106 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 120 , 649 P.2d 703 ], italics added.) We have s | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.