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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martinet v. Department of Fish & Gamegreen2 sentences2013We cannot say that these judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.” (Dukes, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 305 .) Similarly, in Martinet v. Department of Fish & Game (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 (Martinet), the Court of Appeal rejected an equal protection challenge to a state law that limited the number of shark and swordfish permits issued to new applicants but did not limit the number issued to prior permittees, so long as the prior permittees also 18 fulfilled other conditions not pertinent here. 2012We cannot say that these judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.” (Dukes, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 305.) Similarly, in Martinet v. Department of Fish & Game (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 7 ] (Martinet), the Court of Appeal rejected an equal protection challenge to a state law that limited the number of shark and swordfish permits issued to new applicants but did not limit the number issued to prior permittees, so long as the prior permittees also fulfilled other conditions not pertinent here. | 2 | 2 |
Katzenbach v. Morgangreen2 sentences2013The governing constitutional principle was stated in Katzenbach v. Morgan [(1966) 384 U.S. 641, 657 ]: „[W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone further than it did,” [citation], that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” [citation], and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,” [citation].‟ “The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial re 2012The governing constitutional principle was stated in Katzenbach v. Morgan [(1966) 384 U.S. 641, 657 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 828 , 86 S.Ct. 1717 ]]: ‘[W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a “statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,” [citation], that a legislature need not “strike at all evils at the same time,” [citation], and that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,” [citation].’ “The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were less like | 1 | 2 |
City of New Orleans v. Dukesgreen2 sentences2013We cannot say that these judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.” (Dukes, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 305 .) Similarly, in Martinet v. Department of Fish & Game (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 (Martinet), the Court of Appeal rejected an equal protection challenge to a state law that limited the number of shark and swordfish permits issued to new applicants but did not limit the number issued to prior permittees, so long as the prior permittees also 18 fulfilled other conditions not pertinent here. 2012We cannot say that these judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.” (Dukes, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 305.) Similarly, in Martinet v. Department of Fish & Game (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 791, 794 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 7 ] (Martinet), the Court of Appeal rejected an equal protection challenge to a state law that limited the number of shark and swordfish permits issued to new applicants but did not limit the number issued to prior permittees, so long as the prior permittees also fulfilled other conditions not pertinent here. | 1 | 2 |
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs for Port of New Orleansgreen2 sentences2002The decisive result to be drawn from the conclusion that the strictures of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533 , do not apply in these circumstances is that the governing constitutional test becomes whether the allocation of voting power in a manner that is proportional to the financial impact of the assessment is not “ ‘wholly irrelevant to achievement of the [provision’s] objectives.’ ” (Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 U.S. 719, 730 [ 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1231 , 35 L.Ed.2d 659 ] (Salyer), quoting *1000 Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs (1947) 330 U.S. 552, 556 [ 67 S.Ct. 910, 912 , 91 L 2002The decisive result to be drawn from the conclusion that the strictures of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533 , do not apply in these circumstances is that the governing constitutional test becomes whether the allocation of voting power in a manner that is proportional to the financial impact of the assessment is not “ ‘wholly irrelevant to achievement of the [provision’s] objectives.’ ” (Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 U.S. 719, 730 [ 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1231 , 35 L.Ed.2d 659 ] (Salyer), quoting *1000 Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs (1947) 330 U.S. 552, 556 [ 67 S.Ct. 910, 912 , 91 L | 1 | 1 |
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Districtgreen2 sentences2002The decisive result to be drawn from the conclusion that the strictures of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533 , do not apply in these circumstances is that the governing constitutional test becomes whether the allocation of voting power in a manner that is proportional to the financial impact of the assessment is not “ ‘wholly irrelevant to achievement of the [provision’s] objectives.’ ” (Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 U.S. 719, 730 [ 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1231 , 35 L.Ed.2d 659 ] (Salyer), quoting *1000 Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs (1947) 330 U.S. 552, 556 [ 67 S.Ct. 910, 912 , 91 L 2002The decisive result to be drawn from the conclusion that the strictures of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533 , do not apply in these circumstances is that the governing constitutional test becomes whether the allocation of voting power in a manner that is proportional to the financial impact of the assessment is not “ ‘wholly irrelevant to achievement of the [provision’s] objectives.’ ” (Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 U.S. 719, 730 [ 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1231 , 35 L.Ed.2d 659 ] (Salyer), quoting *1000 Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs (1947) 330 U.S. 552, 556 [ 67 S.Ct. 910, 912 , 91 L | 1 | 1 |
Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp.green1 sentence2002(Salyer, supra, at p. 732 [98 S.Ct. at p. 1231] [“in the type of special district we now have before us, the question ... is not whether ... we would have lumped [all potential voters] together had we been enacting the statute in question, but instead whether ‘if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify’ California’s decision to deny the franchise to lessees while granting it to landowners”].) That lenient standard is met here for reasons that are obvious. | 1 | 1 |
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Districtgreen2 sentences1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. 1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. 1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
Fort v. Civil Service Commissiongreen2 sentences1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 625 , 392 P. 2d 385 ], we declared that “[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights” and- that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. 1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 625 , 392 P. 2d 385 ], we declared that “[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights” and- that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. | 1 | 1 |
Belshaw v. City of Berkeleygreen2 sentences1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. 1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commissiongreen2 sentences1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. 1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
Hollon v. Piercegreen2 sentences1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. 1971In Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334 [ 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 , 392 P.2d 385 ], we declared that "[I]t is settled that a person cannot properly be barred or removed from public employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional rights" and that statement of the governing constitutional rule has been continually reiterated in a host of subsequent decisions. ( Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 507 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 , 421 P.2d 409 ]; Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 437 [ 65 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Merlo
green
1 sentence2026As our Supreme Court declared over 50 years ago: “The governing constitutional test, again, is whether a statute’s classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate state interest; a classification which once was rational because of a given set of circumstances may lose its rationality if the relevant factual premise is totally altered.” (Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 869 .) Defendants sentenced to LWOP have committed special circumstance murders that are “ ‘more severe and more deserving 4 of lifetime punishment than nonspecial circumstance first degree murder.’ ” (Heard, supra, | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
1 sentence2002The decisive result to be drawn from the conclusion that the strictures of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533 , do not apply in these circumstances is that the governing constitutional test becomes whether the allocation of voting power in a manner that is proportional to the financial impact of the assessment is not “ ‘wholly irrelevant to achievement of the [provision’s] objectives.’ ” (Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 U.S. 719, 730 [ 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1231 , 35 L.Ed.2d 659 ] (Salyer), quoting *1000 Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs (1947) 330 U.S. 552, 556 [ 67 S.Ct. 910, 912 , 91 L | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Milnot Company v. Richardson
green
1 sentence1973The recent case of Milnot Co. v. Richardson (S.D.Ill. 1972) 350 F.Supp. 221 exemplifies the above proposition. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Peters v. Kiff
green
2 sentences1972He does ask that there be neither systematic exclusion nor under-representation of identifiable classes in the selection of the venire." *728 (2) The governing constitutional principle is that jury selection systems must draw jurors from a fair cross-section of the community. ( United States v. Butera (1st Cir.1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) [7] "While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community." ( Unit 1972He does ask that there be neither systematic exclusion nor under-representation of identifiable classes in the selection of the venire." *728 (2) The governing constitutional principle is that jury selection systems must draw jurors from a fair cross-section of the community. ( United States v. Butera (1st Cir.1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) [7] "While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community." ( Unit | 1 | 1972–1972 |
United States v. John Joseph Ditommaso, United States of America v. Charles Forest Waugaman
green
2 sentences1972(United States v. Butera (1st Cir, 1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) 7 “While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community.” (United States v. DiTommaso (4th Cir. 1968) 405 F.2d 385, 389 , cert. den. 394 U.S. 934 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 465 , 89 S.Ct. 1209 ].) The importance of adherence to the cross-sectional concept has been recently expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 1972He does ask that there be neither systematic exclusion nor under-representation of identifiable classes in the selection of the venire." *728 (2) The governing constitutional principle is that jury selection systems must draw jurors from a fair cross-section of the community. ( United States v. Butera (1st Cir.1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) [7] "While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community." ( Unit | 1 | 1972–1972 |
United States v. Benjamin J. Butera
green
2 sentences1972(United States v. Butera (1st Cir, 1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) 7 “While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community.” (United States v. DiTommaso (4th Cir. 1968) 405 F.2d 385, 389 , cert. den. 394 U.S. 934 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 465 , 89 S.Ct. 1209 ].) The importance of adherence to the cross-sectional concept has been recently expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 1972He does ask that there be neither systematic exclusion nor under-representation of identifiable classes in the selection of the venire." *728 (2) The governing constitutional principle is that jury selection systems must draw jurors from a fair cross-section of the community. ( United States v. Butera (1st Cir.1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) [7] "While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community." ( Unit | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Boyle v. United States
green
2 sentences1972(United States v. Butera (1st Cir, 1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) 7 “While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community.” (United States v. DiTommaso (4th Cir. 1968) 405 F.2d 385, 389 , cert. den. 394 U.S. 934 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 465 , 89 S.Ct. 1209 ].) The importance of adherence to the cross-sectional concept has been recently expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 1972He does ask that there be neither systematic exclusion nor under-representation of identifiable classes in the selection of the venire." *728 (2) The governing constitutional principle is that jury selection systems must draw jurors from a fair cross-section of the community. ( United States v. Butera (1st Cir.1970) 420 F.2d 564, 567 , citing, in footnote 3, pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.) [7] "While the cross-sectional concept is firmly imbedded in the law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community." ( Unit | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.