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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2025Counsel articulated why Velez should not preclude the requested instruction and also referred to the facts of a second relevant involuntary intoxication case, People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823 . 2013(See, e.g., People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-833 [involuntary intoxication resulting from unknowingly drinking hallucinogen-containing punch negated criminal intent to unlawfully take another’s vehicle under mistake of fact theory].) Defendant, quoting from People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712—an inapposite case involving an attorney found to have a conflict of interest based on multiple representations—argues Baltodano did worse than “ ‘pull[] [her] punches’ ” (id. at p. 725) by failing to present an involuntary intoxication defense. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mayfieldgreen2 sentences2020In analyzing whether a jury instruction is ambiguous, “the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777 (Mayfield), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 .) “When considering a challenge to a jury instruction, we do not view the instruction in artificial isolation but rather in the context of the overall charge.” ( Mayfield, supra, at p. 777 .) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the involuntary intoxication instructi 2020In analyzing whether a jury instruction is ambiguous, “the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777 (Mayfield), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 .) “When considering a challenge to a jury instruction, we do not view the instruction in artificial isolation but rather in the context of the overall charge.” ( Mayfield, supra, at p. 777 .) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the involuntary intoxication instructi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2020In analyzing whether a jury instruction is ambiguous, “the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777 (Mayfield), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 .) “When considering a challenge to a jury instruction, we do not view the instruction in artificial isolation but rather in the context of the overall charge.” ( Mayfield, supra, at p. 777 .) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the involuntary intoxication instructi 2020In analyzing whether a jury instruction is ambiguous, “the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777 (Mayfield), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2 .) “When considering a challenge to a jury instruction, we do not view the instruction in artificial isolation but rather in the context of the overall charge.” ( Mayfield, supra, at p. 777 .) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the involuntary intoxication instructi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Costongreen1 sentence2014(People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; accord People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 23, 40 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no “ineluctable” rule that a defendant’s inability to remember or hazy recollection supplies an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness].) We also conclude that the court properly refused to give an involuntary intoxication instruction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morenogreen1 sentence2014(People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; accord People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 23, 40 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no “ineluctable” rule that a defendant’s inability to remember or hazy recollection supplies an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness].) We also conclude that the court properly refused to give an involuntary intoxication instruction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Velezgreen2 sentences1990(People v. Velez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 795-797 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 631 ], *184 and cases cited [involuntary intoxication not established when defendant knowingly ingests unlawful substance not realizing it contains another, different illegal drug].) We conclude the record contains insufficient testimony from which reasonable jurors could have concluded defendant was involuntarily intoxicated. 1990(People v. Velez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 795-797 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 631 ], *184 and cases cited [involuntary intoxication not established when defendant knowingly ingests unlawful substance not realizing it contains another, different illegal drug].) We conclude the record contains insufficient testimony from which reasonable jurors could have concluded defendant was involuntarily intoxicated. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2025(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 .)5 II. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Daveggio & Michaud
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Daveggio And Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821 .) Taken as a whole, the instructions made clear that the jury should consider the involuntary intoxication evidence but only for those specified purposes set forth in the involuntary intoxication instruction. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Larsen
green
1 sentence2015The court in People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 explained that [t]he omission of CALCRIM No. 3428[13] [which is a pinpoint instruction similar to the involuntary intoxication instruction in CALCRIM No. 3426] could not have misled 13 CALCRIM No. 3428 provides: “You have heard evidence that the defendant may have suffered from a mental (disease[,]/ [or] defect[,]/ [or] disorder). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 888 ; accord People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 23, 40 ; see People v. Heffington (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [no “ineluctable” rule that a defendant’s inability to remember or hazy recollection supplies an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness].) We also conclude that the court properly refused to give an involuntary intoxication instruction. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Marsden
green
1 sentence2013He filed five motions pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) that were denied, and retained private counsel and represented himself briefly before Baltodano represented him at trial. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Lucky
green
1 sentence2013“Tactical disagreements between defendant and his attorney do not themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ” (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 728-729.) Nor does a disagreement between defendant and appointed counsel concerning trial tactics necessarily compel the appointment of another attorney.” (People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 282 .) As we have discussed, defendant does not show that his involuntary intoxication defense theory had any merit, nor does he show that Baltodano did not provide him with professionally competent representation based on the available evi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Welch
green
1 sentence2013“Tactical disagreements between defendant and his attorney do not themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ” (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 728-729.) Nor does a disagreement between defendant and appointed counsel concerning trial tactics necessarily compel the appointment of another attorney.” (People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 282 .) As we have discussed, defendant does not show that his involuntary intoxication defense theory had any merit, nor does he show that Baltodano did not provide him with professionally competent representation based on the available evi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Easley
green
1 sentence2013(See, e.g., People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 831-833 [involuntary intoxication resulting from unknowingly drinking hallucinogen-containing punch negated criminal intent to unlawfully take another’s vehicle under mistake of fact theory].) Defendant, quoting from People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712—an inapposite case involving an attorney found to have a conflict of interest based on multiple representations—argues Baltodano did worse than “ ‘pull[] [her] punches’ ” (id. at p. 725) by failing to present an involuntary intoxication defense. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Cravens
green
1 sentence2013He also argues, in the alternative, that reversal is required because the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon.4 4 We note that defendant’s opening brief is almost indecipherable as he spends an inordinate amount of the briefing discussing voluntary intoxication, but then admits that the California Supreme Court has stated it is not generally a defense, and further, that he was not entitled to an involuntary intoxication defense based on the facts of the case. 8 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence “Our task is clear. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.