just and the unjust claim in California

2020(See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [statutes of limitations “do[] not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay”].) So the Legislature’s adoption of the statute of limitations in section 11523 may very well have reflected a goal that petitions for a writ of administrative mandate be filed within 30 days — but it does not, by itself, give rise to the inference that the Legislature sought to foreclose equitable tolling.

2014It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not have merit and also those that do. [Citation.] That it may bar meritorious causes of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the “price of the orderly and timely processing of litigation” [citation]—a price that may be high, but one that must nevertheless be paid.’ (Norgart, supra, at p. 410 , fn. omitted; see generally Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [ 89 L.Ed. 1628 , 65 S.Ct. 1137 ] [operation of statute of limitations ‘does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim’].)” (Stockto

2014(Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 27 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 ]; see also, e.g., Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 774-775 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 , 94 P.3d 538 ].) The limitations periods set forth in CEQA adhere to this pattern; indeed, as the CEQA Guidelines themselves assert, ‘CEQA provides unusually short statutes of limitations on filing court challenges to the approval of projects under the act.’ (...

2014(Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 27 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 ]; see also, e.g., Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 774-775 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 , 94 P.3d 538 ].) The limitations periods set forth in CEQA adhere to this pattern; indeed, as the CEQA Guidelines themselves assert, ‘CEQA provides unusually short statutes of limitations on filing court challenges to the approval of projects under the act.’ (...

2014(Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 27 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 ]; see also, e.g., Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 774-775 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 , 94 P.3d 538 ].) The limitations periods set forth in CEQA adhere to this pattern; indeed, as the CEQA Guidelines themselves assert, ‘CEQA provides unusually short statutes of limitations on filing court challenges to the approval of projects under the act.’ (...

2014(Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 27 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 ]; see also, e.g., Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 774-775 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 , 94 P.3d 538 ].) The limitations periods set forth in CEQA adhere to this pattern; indeed, as the CEQA Guidelines themselves assert, ‘CEQA provides unusually short statutes of limitations on filing court challenges to the approval of projects under the act.’ (...

2024(See Sanford v. Garamendi (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1125 [“Our preference for literalism is compelled by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers”].) We note that civil limitations periods “ ‘are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim.’ ” (Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161 .) Again, case law clearly establishes that transporting a patient via ambulance constitutes the “rendering of professional services.” Thus, plaintiffs are on notice to not sleep on their rights f

2014It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not have merit and also those that do. [Citation.] That it may bar meritorious causes of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the “price of the orderly and timely processing of litigation” [citation]—a price that may be high, but one that must nevertheless be paid.’ (Norgart, supra, at p. 410 , fn. omitted; see generally Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [ 89 L.Ed. 1628 , 65 S.Ct. 1137 ] [operation of statute of limitations ‘does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim’].)” (Stockto

2014It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not have merit and also those that do. [Citation.] That it may bar meritorious causes of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the “price of the orderly and timely processing of litigation” [citation]—a price that may be high, but one that must nevertheless be paid.’ (Norgart, supra, at p. 410 , fn. omitted; see generally Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [ 89 L.Ed. 1628 , 65 S.Ct. 1137 ] [operation of statute of limitations ‘does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim’].)” (Stockto

2014It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not have merit and also those that do. [Citation.] That it may bar meritorious causes of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the “price of the orderly and timely processing of litigation” [citation]—a price that may be high, but one that must nevertheless be paid.’ (Norgart, supra, at p. 410 , fn. omitted; see generally Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [ 89 L.Ed. 1628 , 65 S.Ct. 1137 ] [operation of statute of limitations ‘does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim’].)” (Stockto

2014It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not have merit and also those that do. [Citation.] That it may bar meritorious causes of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the “price of the orderly and timely processing of litigation” [citation]—a price that may be high, but one that must nevertheless be paid.’ (Norgart, supra, at p. 410 , fn. omitted; see generally Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [ 89 L.Ed. 1628 , 65 S.Ct. 1137 ] [operation of statute of limitations ‘does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim’].)” (Stockto

2005Their shelter has never been regarded as ... a ‘fundamental’ right ... the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative *1162 control.” (Fns. omitted.) In Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 831-834 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 574 ], the court held that the Legislature had the power to revive lapsed common law claims based on childhood sexual abuse under an earlier version of section 340.1.

2005Their shelter has never been regarded as ... a ‘fundamental’ right ... the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative *1162 control.” (Fns. omitted.) In Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 831-834 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 574 ], the court held that the Legislature had the power to revive lapsed common law claims based on childhood sexual abuse under an earlier version of section 340.1.

1989Their shelter has never been regarded as ... a ‘fundamental’ right. . . the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.” ( 325 U.S. at p. 314 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1635-1636].) California law is “unsettled.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 332, p. 362.) It is clear that in contrast to criminal cases, statutes of limitations in civil matters are procedural, not substantive. (3 Witkin, op. cit., § 308, p. 337.) “Limitations periods represent a public policy about the privileg

1989Their shelter has never been regarded as ... a ‘fundamental’ right. . . the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.” ( 325 U.S. at p. 314 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1635-1636].) California law is “unsettled.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 332, p. 362.) It is clear that in contrast to criminal cases, statutes of limitations in civil matters are procedural, not substantive. (3 Witkin, op. cit., § 308, p. 337.) “Limitations periods represent a public policy about the privileg