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7 California opinions name it 3 courts 1961–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.green2 sentences2016(Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1121 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 ].) Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 314 ] is an example of the limited application of this exception. 2016(Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1121 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 ].) Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 314 ] is an example of the limited application of this exception. | 1 | 2 |
Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lackgreen2 sentences2016(Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1121 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 ].) Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 314 ] is an example of the limited application of this exception. 2016(Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1121 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 ].) Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 314 ] is an example of the limited application of this exception. | 1 | 1 |
Louis Eugene Russell v. Tom Rolfs, Superintendentgreen1 sentence2008(See In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 155-156 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 106 P.3d 931 ] [“fundamental fairness does not permit the People, without a good faith justification, to attribute to two defendants, in separate trials, a criminal act only one defendant could have committed”]; see also Russell v. Rolfs (9th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 1033, 1037-1039 [the People were estopped from advocating that a federal habeas corpus remedy be procedurally barred because of the existence of a state remedy and then, when defendant sought the benefit of the state remedy, arguing that defendant was procedurall | 1 | 1 |
In Re Sakariasgreen2 sentences2008(See In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 155-156 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 106 P.3d 931 ] [“fundamental fairness does not permit the People, without a good faith justification, to attribute to two defendants, in separate trials, a criminal act only one defendant could have committed”]; see also Russell v. Rolfs (9th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 1033, 1037-1039 [the People were estopped from advocating that a federal habeas corpus remedy be procedurally barred because of the existence of a state remedy and then, when defendant sought the benefit of the state remedy, arguing that defendant was procedurall 2008(See In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 155-156 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 106 P.3d 931 ] [“fundamental fairness does not permit the People, without a good faith justification, to attribute to two defendants, in separate trials, a criminal act only one defendant could have committed”]; see also Russell v. Rolfs (9th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 1033, 1037-1039 [the People were estopped from advocating that a federal habeas corpus remedy be procedurally barred because of the existence of a state remedy and then, when defendant sought the benefit of the state remedy, arguing that defendant was procedurall | 1 | 1 |
Central Manufacturing District, Inc. v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences1984The provisions of this section do not authorize the reviewing court to review any decision or order from which an appeal might have been taken. ” (Italics added; see also, Central Manufacturing District, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1960) 176 Cal.App.2d 850, 857 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 733 ] [“This new matter seems to be a codification of the existing rule established by court decisions; they recognize that a respondent may assert a legal theory which, if found to be sound, should result in affirmance notwithstanding appellant’s contentions.”]; Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711, 728- 1984The provisions of this section do not authorize the reviewing court to review any decision or order from which an appeal might have been taken. ” (Italics added; see also, Central Manufacturing District, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1960) 176 Cal.App.2d 850, 857 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 733 ] [“This new matter seems to be a codification of the existing rule established by court decisions; they recognize that a respondent may assert a legal theory which, if found to be sound, should result in affirmance notwithstanding appellant’s contentions.”]; Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711, 728- | 1 | 1 |
MacIsaac v. Pozzogreen2 sentences1967(Gen. see Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 107 [ 280 P.2d 1 ]; MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal.2d 809, 815 [ 161 P.2d 449 ].) Plaintiff contends the limited application of the doctrine of estoppel to public agencies forecloses an estoppel in this case. 1967(Gen. see Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 107 [ 280 P.2d 1 ]; MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal.2d 809, 815 [ 161 P.2d 449 ].) Plaintiff contends the limited application of the doctrine of estoppel to public agencies forecloses an estoppel in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Worksgreen2 sentences1967(Gen. see Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 107 [ 280 P.2d 1 ]; MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal.2d 809, 815 [ 161 P.2d 449 ].) Plaintiff contends the limited application of the doctrine of estoppel to public agencies forecloses an estoppel in this case. 1967(Gen. see Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 107 [ 280 P.2d 1 ]; MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal.2d 809, 815 [ 161 P.2d 449 ].) Plaintiff contends the limited application of the doctrine of estoppel to public agencies forecloses an estoppel in this case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Osakigreen2 sentences1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p 1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p | 1 | 1 |
People v. Quarezgreen2 sentences1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p 1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corporation
green
2 sentences1977For a limited application of the rule to business employment, see Restatement Second of Agency section 433, and McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corporation (1955) 99 N.H. 492 [ 116 A.2d 489 ] (advertising manager of newspaper not allowed to work). 1977For a limited application of the rule to business employment, see Restatement Second of Agency section 433, and McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corporation (1955) 99 N.H. 492 [ 116 A.2d 489 ] (advertising manager of newspaper not allowed to work). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences1961Appellant’s constitutional argument, although derived from the general statements in People v. Rodriguez (1943), 58 Cal. App.2d 415 [ 136 P.2d 626 ], succumbs to the limited application of the doctrine announced in Milium. 1961Appellant’s constitutional argument, although derived from the general statements in People v. Rodriguez (1943), 58 Cal. App.2d 415 [ 136 P.2d 626 ], succumbs to the limited application of the doctrine announced in Milium. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.