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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 2013–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'NEIL v. Crane Co.green2 sentences2016(Id. at p. 1152.) We agree with the Second Appellate District and conclude O’Neil does not require evidence of exclusive use, but rather requires a showing of “ ‘inevitable use.’ ” (Sherman, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 .) O’Neil does not use the term exclusive use; it mentions inevitable use: “Where the intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable to expect the manufacturer to give warnings.” (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 361 , italics added.) The O’Neil court mentioned the concept of a “sole purpose” when distinguishing Tellez-Cordova. 2016(Ibid.) We agree with the Second District and conclude that O’Neil does not require “exclusive use,” but rather requires “inevitable use.” (See Sherman, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 .) O’Neil does not use the term exclusive use; it mentions inevitable use: “Where the intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable to expect the manufacturer to give warnings.” (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 361 , italics added.) The O’Neil court mentioned the concept of a “sole purpose” when distinguishing Tellez-Cordova. | 1 | 7 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sherman v. Hennessy Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016(Id. at p. 1152.) We agree with the Second Appellate District and conclude O’Neil does not require evidence of exclusive use, but rather requires a showing of “ ‘inevitable use.’ ” (Sherman, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 .) O’Neil does not use the term exclusive use; it mentions inevitable use: “Where the intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable to expect the manufacturer to give warnings.” (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 361 , italics added.) The O’Neil court mentioned the concept of a “sole purpose” when distinguishing Tellez-Cordova. 2016(Ibid.) We agree with the Second District and conclude that O’Neil does not require “exclusive use,” but rather requires “inevitable use.” (See Sherman, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 .) O’Neil does not use the term exclusive use; it mentions inevitable use: “Where the intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable to expect the manufacturer to give warnings.” (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 361 , italics added.) The O’Neil court mentioned the concept of a “sole purpose” when distinguishing Tellez-Cordova. | 4 | 2016–2016 |
Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Co.
green
2 sentences2013Such a duty would impose an excessive and unrealistic burden on manufacturers. [Citations.] Perversely, such an expanded duty could also undermine consumer safety by inundating users with excessive warnings. ‘To warn of all potential dangers would warn of nothing.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 363.) To this general rule, the court recognized an exception: “Where the - intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable to expect the manufacturer to give warnings.” (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 361 .) For example, in Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzg 2013Such a duty would impose an excessive and unrealistic burden on manufacturers. [Citations.] Perversely, such an expanded duty could also undermine consumer safety by inundating users with excessive warnings. ‘To warn of all potential dangers would warn of nothing.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 363.) To this general rule, the court recognized an exception: “Where the - intended use of a product inevitably creates a hazardous situation, it is reasonable to expect the manufacturer to give warnings.” (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 361 .) For example, in Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzg | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.