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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant 2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sprygreen2 sentences2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant 2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2002(See People v. Sanchez (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 74, 77 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 275 ] [reasonable trial counsel might choose not to request CALJIC No. 2.92, specific factors in evaluating eyewitness testimony, because it might favor the prosecution more than the defendant].) In any event, the strength of the prosecution evidence that appellant possessed the gun and deliberately hid it between the seats negates any reasonable probability that the outcome would have been more favorable to appellant had counsel requested a pinpoint instruction. 2002(See People v. Sanchez (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 74, 77 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 275 ] [reasonable trial counsel might choose not to request CALJIC No. 2.92, specific factors in evaluating eyewitness testimony, because it might favor the prosecution more than the defendant].) In any event, the strength of the prosecution evidence that appellant possessed the gun and deliberately hid it between the seats negates any reasonable probability that the outcome would have been more favorable to appellant had counsel requested a pinpoint instruction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sonleitnergreen2 sentences2002(People v. Sonleitner (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 364, 370 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 96 ] [as deputies entered residence, defendant ran to bathroom to flush narcotics; “[i]n running to the bathroom at the approach of the sheriffs, his purpose was obviously the destruction of evidence, which Mijares emphasizes is not within its rationale”; trial court was not required to instruct sua sponte on a Mijares defense].) Appellant’s trial counsel could reasonably conclude as a tactical matter that it was better to leave the instructions general and to argue, as he did, a commonsense rather than legalistic interpretat 2002(People v. Sonleitner (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 364, 370 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 96 ] [as deputies entered residence, defendant ran to bathroom to flush narcotics; “[i]n running to the bathroom at the approach of the sheriffs, his purpose was obviously the destruction of evidence, which Mijares emphasizes is not within its rationale”; trial court was not required to instruct sua sponte on a Mijares defense].) Appellant’s trial counsel could reasonably conclude as a tactical matter that it was better to leave the instructions general and to argue, as he did, a commonsense rather than legalistic interpretat | 1 | 1 |
People v. Condleygreen2 sentences1997As such, it is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Bolden, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1601 ; see also People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008-1010 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant exercised control over the narcotics, he or she knew of its nature and presence, and possessed a usable amount. 1997As such, it is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Bolden, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1601 ; see also People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008-1010 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant exercised control over the narcotics, he or she knew of its nature and presence, and possessed a usable amount. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Martin
green
2 sentences2015(Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1191 .) On the other hand, a “momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal” (ibid.) is not necessarily inconsistent with “the right to exercise control over the controlled substance.” As explained in Martin, a defendant who is relying on the Mijares defense “ ‘essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics,’ ” including the fact that he or she “ ‘exercised control over the narcotics.’ ” (Ibid.) A defendant may have the right to exercise control over an item during the brief period in which he o 2015(Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1191 .) On the other hand, a “momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal” (ibid.) is not necessarily inconsistent with “the right to exercise control over the controlled substance.” As explained in Martin, a defendant who is relying on the Mijares defense “ ‘essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics,’ ” including the fact that he or she “ ‘exercised control over the narcotics.’ ” (Ibid.) A defendant may have the right to exercise control over an item during the brief period in which he o | 3 | 2013–2015 |
People v. Cole
green
2 sentences2001(Sullivan, at p. 1452.) Sullivan therefore sought to invoke the holding of Cole, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1439 , which, he urged, held that “fleeting possession” was not a necessary prerequisite for the Mijares instruction. 2001(Sullivan, at p. 1452.) Sullivan therefore sought to invoke the holding of Cole, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1439 , which, he urged, held that “fleeting possession” was not a necessary prerequisite for the Mijares instruction. | 2 | 1989–2001 |
People v. Bolden
green
2 sentences1997As such, it is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Bolden, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1601 ; see also People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008-1010 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant exercised control over the narcotics, he or she knew of its nature and presence, and possessed a usable amount. 1997As such, it is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Bolden, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1601 ; see also People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008-1010 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant exercised control over the narcotics, he or she knew of its nature and presence, and possessed a usable amount. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Lemus
green
2 sentences1989(See People v. Lemus, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 477 .) We do agree with the trial court’s determination the Mijares instruction was not warranted because the facts here do not show a fleeting handling of contraband for the purpose of destroying or abandoning it. 1989(See People v. Lemus, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 477 .) We do agree with the trial court’s determination the Mijares instruction was not warranted because the facts here do not show a fleeting handling of contraband for the purpose of destroying or abandoning it. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.