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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wharton v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no 2011Proc., § 631, subd. (e); Johnson-Stovall v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 808, 810 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ]; Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1698, 1703-1704 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 128 ].) In exercising such discretion, courts are mindful of the requirement “to resolve doubts in interpreting the waiver provisions of section 631 in favor of a litigant’s right to jury trial. [Citations.]” (Grafton Partners v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 956.) Accordingly, “[w]here the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party | 2 | 3 |
Johnson-Stovall v. SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE CTY.green2 sentences2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no 2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no | 2 | 2 |
Cowlin v. Pringlegreen1 sentence2024(Cowlin v. Pringle (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 472, 476 (Cowlin), citing Conneau v. Geis, supra, 73 Cal. at p. 177 ; accord, Cloud v. Market Street Ry. | 1 | 1 |
Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2019(See Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944, 958 [“because our state Constitution identifies the right to jury trial as ‘inviolate’ [citation], any ambiguity or doubt concerning the waiver provisions of section 631 must be ‘resolved in favor of according to a litigant a jury trial’”]; Tesoro, at p. 638 [same]; Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1470 [courts “are to resolve doubts in interpreting the waiver provisions of such a statute [allowing a waiver] in favor of a party’s right to a jury trial”].) In a motion for relief from waiver of a jury trial, t | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2019(See Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944, 958 [“because our state Constitution identifies the right to jury trial as ‘inviolate’ [citation], any ambiguity or doubt concerning the waiver provisions of section 631 must be ‘resolved in favor of according to a litigant a jury trial’”]; Tesoro, at p. 638 [same]; Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1470 [courts “are to resolve doubts in interpreting the waiver provisions of such a statute [allowing a waiver] in favor of a party’s right to a jury trial”].) In a motion for relief from waiver of a jury trial, t | 1 | 1 |
Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc.green2 sentences2011Proc., § 631, subd. (e); Johnson-Stovall v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 808, 810 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ]; Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1698, 1703-1704 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 128 ].) In exercising such discretion, courts are mindful of the requirement “to resolve doubts in interpreting the waiver provisions of section 631 in favor of a litigant’s right to jury trial. [Citations.]” (Grafton Partners v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 956.) Accordingly, “[w]here the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party 2011Proc., § 631, subd. (e); Johnson-Stovall v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 808, 810 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ]; Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1698, 1703-1704 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 128 ].) In exercising such discretion, courts are mindful of the requirement “to resolve doubts in interpreting the waiver provisions of section 631 in favor of a litigant’s right to jury trial. [Citations.]” (Grafton Partners v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 956.) Accordingly, “[w]here the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Conneau v. Geis
green
1 sentence2024(Cowlin v. Pringle (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 472, 476 (Cowlin), citing Conneau v. Geis, supra, 73 Cal. at p. 177 ; accord, Cloud v. Market Street Ry. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Massie v. AAR Western Skyways, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no 2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no 2019(Tesoro, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 638 ; see Johnson-Stovall, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [“it is well established in cases involving failure to make a request or post fees that there must be prejudice to the party opposing jury trial”]; Wharton v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“Where the right to jury is threatened, the crucial focus is whether any prejudice will be suffered by any party or the court if a motion for relief from waiver is granted.”].) “‘The prejudice which must be shown from granting relief from the waiver is prejudice from the granting of relief and no | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Winston v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1992More significantly, neither real party nor the court established that any prejudice would result by allowing a jury.” (Id. atp. 104.) 6 In Winston v. Superior Court, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 600 , the appellate court stated: “Counsel’s mistake as to the time for depositing jury fees resulted from the existence of two conflicting statutes.” (Id. at p. 602.) We note rule 1.12’s time for depositing jury fees differs from section 631’s time requirement. * See footnote 1, ante, page 405. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
March v. Pettis
green
2 sentences1981Respondent, citing March v. Pettis (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 473 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 3 ], argued , that “a change of mind” was not a sufficient ground for relieving appellant of her two previous jury waivers. 1981Respondent, citing March v. Pettis (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 473 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 3 ], argued , that “a change of mind” was not a sufficient ground for relieving appellant of her two previous jury waivers. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1971As we held in People v. Bailey, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 186 , “where it is established that a defendant’s abandonment of a request to appeal is based on a misapprehension as to the effect of filing an appeal, the waiver of the request is not knowingly and intelligently made, and relief under rule 31(a), absent an effective waiver or estoppel, should be available. ...” Petitioner did not lose his right to obtain relief by failing to file a notice of appeal or a motion for relief under rule 31(a) immediately after his discovery of counsel’s error. 1971As we held in People v. Bailey, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 186 , "where it is established that a defendant's abandonment of a request to appeal is based on a misapprehension as to the effect of filing an appeal, the waiver of the request is not knowingly and intelligently made, and relief under rule 31(a), absent an effective waiver or estoppel, should be available. . . ." Petitioner did not lose his right to obtain relief by failing to file a notice of appeal or a motion for relief under rule 31(a) immediately after his discovery of counsel's error. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.