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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Peters v. Kiffgreen2 sentences1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o 1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o | 1 | 2 |
Castaneda v. Partidagreen2 sentences1999(Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261, 264 [ 106 S.Ct. 617, 622, 623-624 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 ] [Black defendant’s challenge to grand jury on which no Black had ever served]; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-552, fn. 4, 556, 559 [ 99 S.Ct. 2993, 2997-2998, 3000, 3001-3002 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 ] [assumed without deciding that a conviction of Negro defendants indicted by grand jury from which Negroes excluded as forepersons must be set aside].) To establish a prima facie showing of such discrimination defendant relied upon, and the superior court used, the test set out in Castaneda v. Pa 1999(Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261, 264 [ 106 S.Ct. 617, 622, 623-624 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 ] [Black defendant’s challenge to grand jury on which no Black had ever served]; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-552, fn. 4, 556, 559 [ 99 S.Ct. 2993, 2997-2998, 3000, 3001-3002 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 ] [assumed without deciding that a conviction of Negro defendants indicted by grand jury from which Negroes excluded as forepersons must be set aside].) To establish a prima facie showing of such discrimination defendant relied upon, and the superior court used, the test set out in Castaneda v. Pa | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1999(Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261, 264 [ 106 S.Ct. 617, 622, 623-624 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 ] [Black defendant’s challenge to grand jury on which no Black had ever served]; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-552, fn. 4, 556, 559 [ 99 S.Ct. 2993, 2997-2998, 3000, 3001-3002 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 ] [assumed without deciding that a conviction of Negro defendants indicted by grand jury from which Negroes excluded as forepersons must be set aside].) To establish a prima facie showing of such discrimination defendant relied upon, and the superior court used, the test set out in Castaneda v. Pa 1999(Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261, 264 [ 106 S.Ct. 617, 622, 623-624 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 ] [Black defendant’s challenge to grand jury on which no Black had ever served]; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-552, fn. 4, 556, 559 [ 99 S.Ct. 2993, 2997-2998, 3000, 3001-3002 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 ] [assumed without deciding that a conviction of Negro defendants indicted by grand jury from which Negroes excluded as forepersons must be set aside].) To establish a prima facie showing of such discrimination defendant relied upon, and the superior court used, the test set out in Castaneda v. Pa | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Hillerygreen2 sentences1999(Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261, 264 [ 106 S.Ct. 617, 622, 623-624 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 ] [Black defendant’s challenge to grand jury on which no Black had ever served]; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-552, fn. 4, 556, 559 [ 99 S.Ct. 2993, 2997-2998, 3000, 3001-3002 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 ] [assumed without deciding that a conviction of Negro defendants indicted by grand jury from which Negroes excluded as forepersons must be set aside].) To establish a prima facie showing of such discrimination defendant relied upon, and the superior court used, the test set out in Castaneda v. Pa 1999(Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 261, 264 [ 106 S.Ct. 617, 622, 623-624 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 ] [Black defendant’s challenge to grand jury on which no Black had ever served]; Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-552, fn. 4, 556, 559 [ 99 S.Ct. 2993, 2997-2998, 3000, 3001-3002 , 61 L.Ed.2d 739 ] [assumed without deciding that a conviction of Negro defendants indicted by grand jury from which Negroes excluded as forepersons must be set aside].) To establish a prima facie showing of such discrimination defendant relied upon, and the superior court used, the test set out in Castaneda v. Pa | 1 | 1 |
In Re Murchison.green2 sentences1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o 1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o | 1 | 1 |
Swain v. Alabamared2 sentences1974Penal Code section 1060 clearly provides: “A challenge to the panel must be taken before a juror is sworn . . . .” (Italics added.) As to the trial jury, the case of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 763 , 85 S.Ct. 824 ] states unambiguously that “a Negro defendant is not entitled to a jury containing members of his race . . . 1974Penal Code section 1060 clearly provides: “A challenge to the panel must be taken before a juror is sworn . . . .” (Italics added.) As to the trial jury, the case of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 763 , 85 S.Ct. 824 ] states unambiguously that “a Negro defendant is not entitled to a jury containing members of his race . . . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o 1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
O'GRADY v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2014In any event we emphatically reject Negro’s claim that his consent is vitiated by “judicial coercion.” That court-ordered consent would be effective to satisfy the Act was implicit in O’Grady, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at page 1446 . 2014In any event we emphatically reject Negro’s claim that his consent is vitiated by “judicial coercion.” That court-ordered consent would be effective to satisfy the Act was implicit in O'Grady, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at page 1446 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Williams v. Florida
green
2 sentences1974Peters v. Kiff, supra, 407 U.S. at pp. 502, 504 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 93-95]; In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133, 136 [ 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 , 75 S.Ct. 623 ]. 10 An example of the broad generalizations employed by the leading opinion in Peters v. Kiff en route to its relatively narrow holding is the following: “The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. [Citation.] Subsequently, in the exercise o 1973We concluded that it comprehends, inter alia, `a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.' 399 U.S., at 100 ." ( Id. at p. 500, fn. omitted [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) The court took pains to explain the significance of a representative jury: "The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a requirement of equal protection, in cases vindicating the right of a Negro defendant *550 to challenge the systematic exclusion of Negroes from his grand and petit juries. | 2 | 1973–1974 |
McCleskey v. Kemp
green
2 sentences1999The People maintain that Castaneda's model for statistical proof of an equal protection challenge is inappropriate in this case, relying upon McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279 [ 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 ], We cannot agree. 1999The People maintain that Castaneda's model for statistical proof of an equal protection challenge is inappropriate in this case, relying upon McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279 [ 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 ], We cannot agree. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Weiss v. Leaon
green
2 sentences1952Since the decisions in the Restrictive Covenant Cases, the question in the present case has arisen in Weiss v. Leaon (1949), 359 Mo. 1054 [ 225 S.W.2d 127 ], Roberts v. Curtis (1950, D.C.Dist.Col.), 93 F.Supp. 604 , Correll v. Earley (1951) ,—Okla.—[ 237 P.2d 1017 ], and Phillips v. Naff (1952), 332 Mich. 389 [ 52 N.W.2d 158 ]. 17 *545 Weiss v. Leaon 18 was an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant by injunction or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its breach. 1952Since the decisions in the Restrictive Covenant Cases, the question in the present case has arisen in Weiss v. Leaon (1949), 359 Mo. 1054 [ 225 S.W.2d 127 ], Roberts v. Curtis (1950, D.C.Dist.Col.), 93 F.Supp. 604 , Correll v. Earley (1951) ,—Okla.—[ 237 P.2d 1017 ], and Phillips v. Naff (1952), 332 Mich. 389 [ 52 N.W.2d 158 ]. 17 *545 Weiss v. Leaon 18 was an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant by injunction or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its breach. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Roberts v. Curtis
green
1 sentence1952Since the decisions in the Restrictive Covenant Cases, the question in the present case has arisen in Weiss v. Leaon (1949), 359 Mo. 1054 [ 225 S.W.2d 127 ], Roberts v. Curtis (1950, D.C.Dist.Col.), 93 F.Supp. 604 , Correll v. Earley (1951) ,—Okla.—[ 237 P.2d 1017 ], and Phillips v. Naff (1952), 332 Mich. 389 [ 52 N.W.2d 158 ]. 17 *545 Weiss v. Leaon 18 was an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant by injunction or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its breach. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Phillips v. Naff
green
2 sentences1952Since the decisions in the Restrictive Covenant Cases, the question in the present case has arisen in Weiss v. Leaon (1949), 359 Mo. 1054 [ 225 S.W.2d 127 ], Roberts v. Curtis (1950, D.C.Dist.Col.), 93 F.Supp. 604 , Correll v. Earley (1951) ,—Okla.—[ 237 P.2d 1017 ], and Phillips v. Naff (1952), 332 Mich. 389 [ 52 N.W.2d 158 ]. 17 *545 Weiss v. Leaon 18 was an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant by injunction or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its breach. 1952Since the decisions in the Restrictive Covenant Cases, the question in the present case has arisen in Weiss v. Leaon (1949), 359 Mo. 1054 [ 225 S.W.2d 127 ], Roberts v. Curtis (1950, D.C.Dist.Col.), 93 F.Supp. 604 , Correll v. Earley (1951) ,—Okla.—[ 237 P.2d 1017 ], and Phillips v. Naff (1952), 332 Mich. 389 [ 52 N.W.2d 158 ]. 17 *545 Weiss v. Leaon 18 was an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant by injunction or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its breach. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Correll v. Earley
green
1 sentence1952Since the decisions in the Restrictive Covenant Cases, the question in the present case has arisen in Weiss v. Leaon (1949), 359 Mo. 1054 [ 225 S.W.2d 127 ], Roberts v. Curtis (1950, D.C.Dist.Col.), 93 F.Supp. 604 , Correll v. Earley (1951) ,—Okla.—[ 237 P.2d 1017 ], and Phillips v. Naff (1952), 332 Mich. 389 [ 52 N.W.2d 158 ]. 17 *545 Weiss v. Leaon 18 was an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant by injunction or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its breach. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.