noncoercive Miranda violation in California

2013As the Elstad court stated in summarizing Tucker, ‘Since there 15. was no actual infringement of the suspect’s constitutional rights, the case was not controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation must be suppressed ….’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 308 .) Thus, while the high court has not actually decided a case involving physical evidence seized as a result of a Miranda violation, it has decided the premise from which it necessarily follows that physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation is not excludable u

2002For example, according to the Elstad court, Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 445 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 , had held that "neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence" would be served by suppressing the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of a suspect's statement in custody which, though elicited without Miranda warnings, was otherwise uncoerced. ( Elstad supra, 470 U.S. 298, 308 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) "We believe that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleg

2021“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as the result of a noncoercive Miranda violation.” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 598 ; People v. Brewer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 442 , 454–455; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947 , 955–957.) Appellant argues that a Miranda violation renders an interrogation inherently coercive, but courts have repeatedly held that a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda does not mean a statement was coerced.

2013(Id. at p. 612, fn. 4 (plur. opn. of Souter, J.) [“Elstad rejected the Wong Sun fruits doctrine for analyzing the admissibility of subsequent warned confession following ‘an initial failure … to administer the warnings required by Miranda’”]; id. at p. 623 (dis. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [“the plurality appropriately follows Elstad in concluding that Seibert’s statement cannot be held inadmissible under a ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ theory”].) In People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947 , this court had occasion to analyze the Elstad and Michigan v. Tucker decisions in determining whether t

2021In Patane, the United States Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that “the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self- Incrimination Clause,” and “is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.” (Patane, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 636 .) In Davis, the California Supreme Court held that “[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation.” (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 598 .) Because we determine the gun inevitably would ha

2009The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation (United States v. Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 637-638, 645 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 ]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 552 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ]; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 ]), and a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda/Edwards does not automatically mean that any ensuing confession was coerced.

2021(E.g., Davis at p. 598; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 1039–1040.) Even if we assume the photograph and text message should have been excluded, their admission was patently harmless.

2009(See People v. *599 Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039-1040 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ] [continued interrogation after a Miranda/Edwards violation does not “inherently constitute coercion” without evidence of actual coercion or other circumstances bearing on the suspect’s free will].) Under the totality of the circumstances here, defendant’s December 4, 1993, confession to Petaluma Police Sergeant Meese over the telephone was not the product of coercion.

2009The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation (United States v. Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 637-638, 645 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 ]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 552 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ]; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 ]), and a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda/Edwards does not automatically mean that any ensuing confession was coerced.

2009The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation (United States v. Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 637-638, 645 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 ]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 552 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ]; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 ]), and a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda/Edwards does not automatically mean that any ensuing confession was coerced.

2002For example, according to the Elstad court, Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 445 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 , had held that "neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence" would be served by suppressing the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of a suspect's statement in custody which, though elicited without Miranda warnings, was otherwise uncoerced. ( Elstad supra, 470 U.S. 298, 308 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) "We believe that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleg

2002For example, according to the Elstad court, Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 445 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 , had held that "neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence" would be served by suppressing the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of a suspect's statement in custody which, though elicited without Miranda warnings, was otherwise uncoerced. ( Elstad supra, 470 U.S. 298, 308 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 .) "We believe that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleg

1996(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]; People v. Rooney (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 634, 644 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] [Court of Appeal bound by California Supreme Court holdings on Fourth Amendment issue although lower federal courts hold to the contrary; “[T]hose decisions are not binding on this court since the United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on the issue.”].) We disagree.

1996(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]; People v. Rooney (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 634, 644 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] [Court of Appeal bound by California Supreme Court holdings on Fourth Amendment issue although lower federal courts hold to the contrary; “[T]hose decisions are not binding on this court since the United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on the issue.”].) We disagree.

1996Where there is no evidence of coercion or a denial of due process in elicitation of the statements, the object of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule—assuring trustworthiness of evidence introduced at trial—is not served by barring admission of the derivatively obtained evidence or statements.” (U.S. v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, supra, 894 F.2d at p. 1048 .) We can discern no basis for distinguishing physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercieve Miranda violation from such “derivatively obtained evidence or statements.” (U.S. v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, supra, 894 F.2d at p. 1048 .) “Stated anot

1996Where there is no evidence of coercion or a denial of due process in elicitation of the statements, the object of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule—assuring trustworthiness of evidence introduced at trial—is not served by barring admission of the derivatively obtained evidence or statements.” (U.S. v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, supra, 894 F.2d at p. 1048 .) We can discern no basis for distinguishing physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercieve Miranda violation from such “derivatively obtained evidence or statements.” (U.S. v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, supra, 894 F.2d at p. 1048 .) “Stated anot

1996(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]; People v. Rooney (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 634, 644 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] [Court of Appeal bound by California Supreme Court holdings on Fourth Amendment issue although lower federal courts hold to the contrary; “[T]hose decisions are not binding on this court since the United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on the issue.”].) We disagree.

1996(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]; People v. Rooney (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 634, 644 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 49 ] [Court of Appeal bound by California Supreme Court holdings on Fourth Amendment issue although lower federal courts hold to the contrary; “[T]hose decisions are not binding on this court since the United States Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on the issue.”].) We disagree.