potential procedural bar in California

2019Instead, he claims that Miller 's reasoning "cannot be squared with Waltreus or Lindley ." We fully agree with Miller 's explanation of why, even apart from federal law, these rules do not bar claims such as Taylor's, and we find it unnecessary to reiterate that reasoning here. ( Miller , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ; accord Ramirez , supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 , 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 .) The Attorney General also raises a potential procedural bar not considered in either Miller or Ramirez : that the petition is untimely because of Taylor's "[u]njustified *352 del

2019Instead, he claims that Miller 's reasoning "cannot be squared with Waltreus or Lindley ." We fully agree with Miller 's explanation of why, even apart from federal law, these rules do not bar claims such as Taylor's, and we find it unnecessary to reiterate that reasoning here. ( Miller , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ; accord Ramirez , supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 , 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 .) The Attorney General also raises a potential procedural bar not considered in either Miller or Ramirez : that the petition is untimely because of Taylor's "[u]njustified *352 del

2019Instead, he claims that Miller 's reasoning "cannot be squared with Waltreus or Lindley ." We fully agree with Miller 's explanation of why, even apart from federal law, these rules do not bar claims such as Taylor's, and we find it unnecessary to reiterate that reasoning here. ( Miller , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ; accord Ramirez , supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 , 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 .) The Attorney General also raises a potential procedural bar not considered in either Miller or Ramirez : that the petition is untimely because of Taylor's "[u]njustified *352 del

2019Instead, he claims that Miller 's reasoning "cannot be squared with Waltreus or Lindley ." We fully agree with Miller 's explanation of why, even apart from federal law, these rules do not bar claims such as Taylor's, and we find it unnecessary to reiterate that reasoning here. ( Miller , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 , 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ; accord Ramirez , supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 , 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 .) The Attorney General also raises a potential procedural bar not considered in either Miller or Ramirez : that the petition is untimely because of Taylor's "[u]njustified *352 del

2021DuFauchard v. U.S. Financial Management, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1502 , 1511‒1513 [following Mokler in Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1816 action]; Green v. City of Oceanside (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 212, 222 [“We think it would be grossly unfair to allow a defendant to ignore this potential procedural defense [of failure to exhaust administrative remedies] at a time when facts and memories were fresh and put a plaintiff to the time and expense of a full trial, knowing it could assert the failure to exhaust administrative remedies if it received an adv

2021DuFauchard v. U.S. Financial Management, Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1502 , 1511‒1513 [following Mokler in Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1816 action]; Green v. City of Oceanside (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 212, 222 [“We think it would be grossly unfair to allow a defendant to ignore this potential procedural defense [of failure to exhaust administrative remedies] at a time when facts and memories were fresh and put a plaintiff to the time and expense of a full trial, knowing it could assert the failure to exhaust administrative remedies if it received an adv

2019(Miller, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 ; accord Ramirez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 .) The Attorney General also raises a potential procedural bar not considered in either Miller or Ramirez: that the petition is untimely because of Taylor’s “[u]njustified delay” in bringing it.5 “A criminal defendant mounting a collateral attack on a final judgment of conviction must do so in a timely manner. ‘It has long been required that a petitioner explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief.’ ” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 459 .) In determining whether a petitio

2014(Keiffer, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 900 .) But “ ‘it would be grossly unfair to allow a defendant to ignore this potential procedural defense at a time when facts and memories were fresh and put a plaintiff to the time and expense of a full trial, knowing it could assert the failure to exhaust administrative remedies if it received an adverse [judgment].’ ” (Ibid..; see Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 136 [defendant waived exhaustion defense by “waiting to raise exhaustion until after a full trial on the merits”].) *1348 We therefore disagree with defendants’ underlying premise that exh

1997(Id. at pp. 219-223.) The court explained that the exhaustion doctrine “is ‘jurisdictional’ only in the sense that a court’s failure to apply the rule in a situation where the issue has been properly raised can be corrected by the issuance of a writ of prohibition.” (Id. at p. 222; see also Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1215-1216 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 447 ]; Wallis v. Farmers Group, Inc., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at pp. 735-736.) The Green court further stated: “We think it would be grossly unfair to allow a defendant to ignore this potent

1987The exhaustion doctrine is simply a “procedural prerequisite” (Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288 ) the City decided to forego.

1987The exhaustion *223 doctrine is simply a "procedural prerequisite" ( Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288 ) the City decided to forego.