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7 California opinions name it 1 courts 2007–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kunkingreen2 sentences2017(See People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 ] (Garcia) [where jury was not instructed predicate offenses could be proved by “commission” of such offenses, but instead incorrectly instructed “conviction” was required, commission of a predicate offense “could not have been used by the jury ... to satisfy the predicate offense requirement”]; People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ] [appellate court “cannot look to legal theories not before the jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule”].) Th 2017(See People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 ] (Garcia) [where jury was not instructed predicate offenses could be proved by “commission” of such offenses, but instead incorrectly instructed “conviction” was required, commission of a predicate offense “could not have been used by the jury ... to satisfy the predicate offense requirement”]; People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ] [appellate court “cannot look to legal theories not before the jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule”].) Th | 3 | 3 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ] [“We, of course, cannot look to legal theories not before the jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule.”]; People v. Smith (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1145 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 196 ] [“It would deprive the defendant of his right to a jury trial if an appellate court could [affirm a conviction] on a theory not presented to the jury . . . .”].) The Attorney General also contends that defendant was “convicted” of shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner and that conviction qua 2014(People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ] [“We, of course, cannot look to legal theories not before the jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule.”]; People v. Smith (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1145 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 196 ] [“It would deprive the defendant of his right to a jury trial if an appellate court could [affirm a conviction] on a theory not presented to the jury . . . .”].) The Attorney General also contends that defendant was “convicted” of shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner and that conviction qua | 2 | 2 |
People v. Valenciagreen2 sentences2021(Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 827 .) The gang expert, however, had no personal knowledge of such facts; his knowledge “came from conversations with other officers and a review of police reports.” (Ibid.) The Valencia court discussed a distinction the court had drawn in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), between gang expert testimony concerning background information and testimony regarding “case-specific facts.” ( Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 830−831.) Background information includes facts that “are generally accepted by experts in their field of expertise” and “will 2021(Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 827 .) The gang expert, however, had no personal knowledge of such facts; his knowledge “came from conversations with other officers and a review of police reports.” (Ibid.) The Valencia court discussed a distinction the court had drawn in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), between gang expert testimony concerning background information and testimony regarding “case-specific facts.” ( Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 830−831.) Background information includes facts that “are generally accepted by experts in their field of expertise” and “will | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2021(Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 827 .) The gang expert, however, had no personal knowledge of such facts; his knowledge “came from conversations with other officers and a review of police reports.” (Ibid.) The Valencia court discussed a distinction the court had drawn in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), between gang expert testimony concerning background information and testimony regarding “case-specific facts.” ( Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 830−831.) Background information includes facts that “are generally accepted by experts in their field of expertise” and “will 2021(Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 827 .) The gang expert, however, had no personal knowledge of such facts; his knowledge “came from conversations with other officers and a review of police reports.” (Ibid.) The Valencia court discussed a distinction the court had drawn in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), between gang expert testimony concerning background information and testimony regarding “case-specific facts.” ( Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 830−831.) Background information includes facts that “are generally accepted by experts in their field of expertise” and “will | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2017(See People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 ] (Garcia) [where jury was not instructed predicate offenses could be proved by “commission” of such offenses, but instead incorrectly instructed “conviction” was required, commission of a predicate offense “could not have been used by the jury ... to satisfy the predicate offense requirement”]; People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ] [appellate court “cannot look to legal theories not before the jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule”].) Th 2017(See People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 ] (Garcia) [where jury was not instructed predicate offenses could be proved by “commission” of such offenses, but instead incorrectly instructed “conviction” was required, commission of a predicate offense “could not have been used by the jury ... to satisfy the predicate offense requirement”]; People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 507 P.2d 1392 ] [appellate court “cannot look to legal theories not before the jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule”].) Th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2007Reasoning that a principle purpose of the felony-murder rule is deterrence ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 165, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604 , 95 P.3d 872 ), the court in Robertson found the Ireland merger doctrine inapplicable to the predicate offense of a violation of section 246.3 because knowledge that punishment for second degree murder may ensue would deter individuals from intentionally discharging a firearmwhether to celebrate a festive occasion or to frighten away persons who do not present a threat of imminent harm. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 171 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604 , 95 P.3d 872 .) The 2007Reasoning that a principle purpose of the felony-murder rule is deterrence ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 165, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604 , 95 P.3d 872 ), the court in Robertson found the Ireland merger doctrine inapplicable to the predicate offense of a violation of section 246.3 because knowledge that punishment for second degree murder may ensue would deter individuals from intentionally discharging a firearmwhether to celebrate a festive occasion or to frighten away persons who do not present a threat of imminent harm. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 171 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604 , 95 P.3d 872 .) The | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Loeun
green
1 sentence2021As noted above, the predicate offense requirement can be satisfied with 12 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . 24 “evidence of the defendant’s commission of the charged offense and the contemporaneous commission of a second predicate offense by a fellow gang member.” (Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 10 .) In contrast to Deputy Sarti’s inadmissible opinions of Garcia’s and Arredondo’s gang membership, Deputy Maldonado’s testimony regarding her personal interactions with Lazo and Gomez at Mayberry Park in April 2017, when they admitted to her that they are Southside Whittier gang members, is | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Zermeno
green
1 sentence2021Because our Supreme Court has held that aiding and abetting a crime does not constitute a second predicate offense with respect to a crime perpetrated directly by the defendant (Zermeno, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 932 ), Gomez’s apparent aiding and abetting of the carjacking cannot satisfy the predicate offense requirement in proving the gang enhancement connected to Lazo’s carjacking offense. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Carr
green
1 sentence2021“Thus, as far as the jur[y] knew,” this offense “was not a predicate offense and could not have been used to satisfy the predicate offense requirement.” (People v. Lara, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 331 , and authorities cited therein.) Certainly, like its other elements, section 182.5’s knowledge requirement may be proved circumstantially (see People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475 , 489–490), and the People argue that was true here. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2021As noted above, the predicate offense requirement can be satisfied with 12 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . 24 “evidence of the defendant’s commission of the charged offense and the contemporaneous commission of a second predicate offense by a fellow gang member.” (Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 10 .) In contrast to Deputy Sarti’s inadmissible opinions of Garcia’s and Arredondo’s gang membership, Deputy Maldonado’s testimony regarding her personal interactions with Lazo and Gomez at Mayberry Park in April 2017, when they admitted to her that they are Southside Whittier gang members, is | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Lara
green
1 sentence2021“Thus, as far as the jur[y] knew,” this offense “was not a predicate offense and could not have been used to satisfy the predicate offense requirement.” (People v. Lara, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 331 , and authorities cited therein.) Certainly, like its other elements, section 182.5’s knowledge requirement may be proved circumstantially (see People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475 , 489–490), and the People argue that was true here. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Alexander L.
green
1 sentence2016To support his suggestion that the predicate crimes provided “no basis for [the officer’s] conclusion,” defendant relies on People v. Vy (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1222 , and In re Alexander L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 605, 611 , but neither case supports his argument. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Van Vy
green
1 sentence2016To support his suggestion that the predicate crimes provided “no basis for [the officer’s] conclusion,” defendant relies on People v. Vy (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1222 , and In re Alexander L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 605, 611 , but neither case supports his argument. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Randle
green
2 sentences2007Defendant's claim that he shot [the victim] in order to rescue Byron simply provided a motive for the shooting; it was not a purpose independent of the shooting." ( Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1005 , 28 Cal. Rptr.3d 725 , 111 P.3d 987 .) Robertson's "collateral purpose" of trying to frighten was absent in Randle as the uncontroverted evidence was that the defendant shot at the victim, thus committing an Ireland merger assault. 2007Defendant's claim that he shot [the victim] in order to rescue Byron simply provided a motive for the shooting; it was not a purpose independent of the shooting." ( Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1005 , 28 Cal. Rptr.3d 725 , 111 P.3d 987 .) Robertson's "collateral purpose" of trying to frighten was absent in Randle as the uncontroverted evidence was that the defendant shot at the victim, thus committing an Ireland merger assault. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.