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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Popegreen2 sentences2009(E.g., Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 684—685 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] [discussing federal constitutional rights]; People v. Pope [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d 412, 422 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ] [discussing both state and federal constitutional rights].) The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its results. 2009(E.g., Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 684—685 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] [discussing federal constitutional rights]; People v. Pope [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d 412, 422 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ] [discussing both state and federal constitutional rights].) The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its results. | 1 | 2 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen1 sentence2020Law enforcement agents have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 .) To reach this standard of “constitutional materiality,” the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Id. at p. 489; accord, People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 .) The de | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roybalgreen1 sentence2020(People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837 ; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 510 (Roybal).) The principles that guide our analysis are well established. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cartergreen1 sentence2020Law enforcement agents have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 .) To reach this standard of “constitutional materiality,” the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Id. at p. 489; accord, People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 .) The de | 1 | 1 |
People v. Duffgreen2 sentences2020Law enforcement agents have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 .) To reach this standard of “constitutional materiality,” the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Id. at p. 489; accord, People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 .) The de 2020Law enforcement agents have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 .) To reach this standard of “constitutional materiality,” the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Id. at p. 489; accord, People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 .) The de | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009(E.g., Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 684—685 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] [discussing federal constitutional rights]; People v. Pope [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d 412, 422 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ] [discussing both state and federal constitutional rights].) The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its results. 2009(E.g., Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 684—685 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ] [discussing federal constitutional rights]; People v. Pope [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d 412, 422 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ] [discussing both state and federal constitutional rights].) The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its results. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Ledesma
green
2 sentences2009Discussion The principles that guide our analysis were set forth by our Supreme Court more than 20 years ago in People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 404 , 729 P.2d 839 ] (Ledesma), and are still applicable: “Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel. 2009Discussion The principles that guide our analysis were set forth by our Supreme Court more than 20 years ago in People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 404 , 729 P.2d 839 ] (Ledesma), and are still applicable: “Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
California v. Trombetta
green
1 sentence2020Law enforcement agents have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to “evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 .) To reach this standard of “constitutional materiality,” the “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Id. at p. 489; accord, People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246 .) The de | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Montes
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837 ; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 510 (Roybal).) The principles that guide our analysis are well established. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dusky v. United States
green
2 sentences2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L 2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Pate v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L 2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Lightsey
green
2 sentences2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L 2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Pennington
green
2 sentences2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L 2018"The United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ' " ( People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668 , 690, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) To safeguard a defendant's *689 right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court has an obligation to hold a hearing to inquire into the defendant's competence when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and failure to do so is reversible error. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 , 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re York
green
1 sentence2015"The courts will presume a statute is constitutional unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity." (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 912-913 .) "'"The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on [the party] who assails it."'" (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1152 .) Furthermore, when we evaluate a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute, we consider the text of the statute itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Falsetta
green
1 sentence2015"The courts will presume a statute is constitutional unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity." (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 912-913 .) "'"The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on [the party] who assails it."'" (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1152 .) Furthermore, when we evaluate a facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute, we consider the text of the statute itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Berryman
green
1 sentence1999Our decision in People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048 , summarized the principles that guide our analysis of defendant’s contentions relating to the first degree murder of Diane: “ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.’ (. . . § 187, subd. (a).) fl[] As pertinent here, ‘[a]ll murder which is perpetrated ... by any . . . kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree ....’(...§ 189.) The mental state required is, of course, a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill with malice aforethought. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Brosnahan v. Brown
green
1 sentence1990We have held that “an initiative measure does not violate the single-subject requirement ‘if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are “reasonably germane ” to each other,’ and to the general purpose or object of the initiative. [Citations.]” (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245 , quoting Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 230 , italics added by Brosnahan ; see also Calfarm Ins. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
AMADOR VALLEY JT. UN. HIGH SCH. v. State Bd. of Equal.
green
1 sentence1990We have held that “an initiative measure does not violate the single-subject requirement ‘if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are “reasonably germane ” to each other,’ and to the general purpose or object of the initiative. [Citations.]” (Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 245 , quoting Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 230 , italics added by Brosnahan ; see also Calfarm Ins. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.