reasons underlying requirement (California) · Go Syfert
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reasons underlying requirement in California

7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Rodriguezgreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2026
2 sentences

2026(Cf. People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1110 [motion to reopen “made shortly after the closing of evidence”].) Given this timing, a court could reasonably infer that if the motion were granted, “the jury may have given the evidence more weight than it deserved, and put the prosecution at an unfair disadvantage.” (People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521 ; see People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 [“Presumably one of the reasons underlying the requirement of diligence is that a jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations b

1994Third, “one of the reasons underlying the requirement of diligence is that a jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations begin.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 295 .) Here, that danger was particularly acute because the evidence would have come in after the jury had begun deliberations and in direct response to their request.

12
People v. Jonesgreen
cal · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026(Cf. People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1110 [motion to reopen “made shortly after the closing of evidence”].) Given this timing, a court could reasonably infer that if the motion were granted, “the jury may have given the evidence more weight than it deserved, and put the prosecution at an unfair disadvantage.” (People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521 ; see People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 [“Presumably one of the reasons underlying the requirement of diligence is that a jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations b

11
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.green
cal · 1973 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978Clearly, the reasons underlying the requirement of specification — i.e., "encourage[ing] careful deliberation by the trial court before ruling on the new trial motion and [making] a sufficiently precise record to permit meaningful appellate review" ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 61 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 ]) — are equally applicable whether or not the plaintiff (or defendant in a case of additur) chooses to accede to the alteration of the jury's verdict indicated by the order. (15) We therefore hold that the requirements of section 657 are applicable to conditio

1978Clearly, the reasons underlying the requirement of specification — i.e., "encourage[ing] careful deliberation by the trial court before ruling on the new trial motion and [making] a sufficiently precise record to permit meaningful appellate review" ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 61 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 ]) — are equally applicable whether or not the plaintiff (or defendant in a case of additur) chooses to accede to the alteration of the jury's verdict indicated by the order. (15) We therefore hold that the requirements of section 657 are applicable to conditio

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Funes green
calctapp · 1994
2 sentences

2026(Cf. People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1110 [motion to reopen “made shortly after the closing of evidence”].) Given this timing, a court could reasonably infer that if the motion were granted, “the jury may have given the evidence more weight than it deserved, and put the prosecution at an unfair disadvantage.” (People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521 ; see People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 [“Presumably one of the reasons underlying the requirement of diligence is that a jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations b

2013Third, “‘one of the reasons underlying the requirement of diligence is that a jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations begin.’” (People v. Funes, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521 .) Because Hardy refused to show his teeth, however, the jury could not have given undue weight to whether or not he had a gap.

22013–2026
People v. Lim green
cal · 1941
1 sentence

2017We recently held in such a case that where the conduct sought to be enjoined was not within the traditional equitable jurisdiction, it must be brought clearly within the statutory definition of the term 'nuisance' and could not be predicated on the vague definitions of that term found in the early criminal law. ( People v. Lim , supra , [18 Cal.2d at] p. 880 [ 118 P.2d 472 ].) Civil Code, section 3369, contains no broader a definition of the term 'unfair competition' than existed at common law and in itself furnishes no basis for an injunction against the violation of the penal ordinance invol

12017–2017
People v. Pope green
cal · 1979
2 sentences

1992(See People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 425 .) The defense’s decision to have this case tried by a court sitting without a jury may have been based on the legitimate tactical grounds described above.

1992(See People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 425 .) The defense's decision to have this case tried by a court sitting without a jury may have been based on the legitimate tactical grounds described above. (35a) Defendant contends that counsel should have advised defendant to defer the decision whether to waive a jury for the penalty phase of trial until *559 after the guilt phase.

11992–1992
Buckley v. Chadwick green
cal · 1955
2 sentences

1978(Nourse, Is Contributory Negligence of Deceased a Defense to a Wrongful Death Action? (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 310.) Within a year thereafter this court per Justice Schauer decided Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183 [ 288 P.2d 12 , 289 P.2d 242 ], with Justice Carter dissenting and Justice Traynor dissenting partially on other grounds.

1978(Nourse, Is Contributory Negligence of Deceased a Defense to a Wrongful Death Action? (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 310.) Within a year thereafter this court per Justice Schauer decided Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183 [ 288 P.2d 12 , 289 P.2d 242 ], with Justice Carter dissenting and Justice Traynor dissenting partially on other grounds.

11978–1978
Mercer v. Perez green
cal · 1968
2 sentences

1978Clearly, the reasons underlying the requirement of specification — i.e., "encourage[ing] careful deliberation by the trial court before ruling on the new trial motion and [making] a sufficiently precise record to permit meaningful appellate review" ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 61 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 ]) — are equally applicable whether or not the plaintiff (or defendant in a case of additur) chooses to accede to the alteration of the jury's verdict indicated by the order. (15) We therefore hold that the requirements of section 657 are applicable to conditio

1978Clearly, the reasons underlying the requirement of specification — i.e., "encourage[ing] careful deliberation by the trial court before ruling on the new trial motion and [making] a sufficiently precise record to permit meaningful appellate review" ( Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 61 [ 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 ]) — are equally applicable whether or not the plaintiff (or defendant in a case of additur) chooses to accede to the alteration of the jury's verdict indicated by the order. (15) We therefore hold that the requirements of section 657 are applicable to conditio

11978–1978

Where else courts name it

TX 24 (1961–2018) NY 10 (1907–1994) CT 7 (1973–2003) CA 7 (1978–2026) NC 5 (1963–1968) AL 5 (1929–2006) PA 4 (1954–2005) MO 4 (1905–2004) LA 4 (1965–2016) MS 3 (1934–1985) WI 3 (1940–2002) MT 3 (1972–2009) IL 3 (1965–1992) OK 3 (1936–1965) ME 3 (1950–1982) NM 3 (1920–1982) DE 3 (1925–1970) MD 3 (1975–2004) NH 2 (1972–2003) GA 2 (1937–1985) OH 2 (1906–2006) VA 2 (1993–1995) MI 2 (1994–1998) KY 2 (1960–1992) OR 2 (1972–1979) MA 2 (1947–1988)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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