single-occasion rule in California

1982As explained by the Court of Appeal, when the Legislature last amended sections 1170, 1170.1 and 12022.5, it did not specifically address the Culbreth issue. ( Id., at p. 447.) "Hence, none of the statutory changes pertaining to the DSL, with the possibility of one exception, mentioned any intent to abolish the single-occasion rule...." ( Ibid. ) [9] (11) The well-settled rule of *914 statutory construction is that legislative enactments should not be construed "`to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such [an] intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration o

1982As explained by the Court of Appeal, when the Legislature last amended sections 1170, 1170.1 and 12022.5, it did not specifically address the Culbreth issue. ( Id., at p. 447.) "Hence, none of the statutory changes pertaining to the DSL, with the possibility of one exception, mentioned any intent to abolish the single-occasion rule...." ( Ibid. ) [9] (11) The well-settled rule of *914 statutory construction is that legislative enactments should not be construed "`to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such [an] intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration o

1984This appears to be the only area in the DSL whereby the Legislature expressly determined or by necessary implication abrogated the single-occasion rule set forth in Culbreth . ft] By applying the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius we find that the legislative intent, with the exception of Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (h), was to leave unaltered the applicability of Culbreth to other offenses where additional punishment is proscribed for such offenses in which a firearm is used.” (People v. Edwards, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 436, 447-448 .) The above analysis from People

1984This appears to be the only area in the DSL whereby the Legislature expressly determined or by necessary implication abrogated the single-occasion rule set forth in Culbreth . ft] By applying the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius we find that the legislative intent, with the exception of Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (h), was to leave unaltered the applicability of Culbreth to other offenses where additional punishment is proscribed for such offenses in which a firearm is used.” (People v. Edwards, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 436, 447-448 .) The above analysis from People

1984This appears to be the only area in the DSL whereby the Legislature expressly determined or by necessary implication abrogated the single-occasion rule set forth in Culbreth. ” (See also People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, 913, fn. 9 .) The dicta of Cardenas and Edwards has since been adopted to actually uphold multiple weapons enhancements for forcible sex offenses (People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30, 36-37 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ]; People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 839 ]).

1984This appears to be the only area in the DSL whereby the Legislature expressly determined or by necessary implication abrogated the single-occasion rule set forth in Culbreth. ” (See also People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, 913, fn. 9 .) The dicta of Cardenas and Edwards has since been adopted to actually uphold multiple weapons enhancements for forcible sex offenses (People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30, 36-37 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ]; People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 839 ]).

1984This appears to be the only area in the DSL whereby the Legislature expressly determined or by necessary implication abrogated the single-occasion rule set forth in Culbreth. ” (See also People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, 913, fn. 9 .) The dicta of Cardenas and Edwards has since been adopted to actually uphold multiple weapons enhancements for forcible sex offenses (People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30, 36-37 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ]; People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 839 ]).

1984This appears to be the only area in the DSL whereby the Legislature expressly determined or by necessary implication abrogated the single-occasion rule set forth in Culbreth. ” (See also People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, 913, fn. 9 .) The dicta of Cardenas and Edwards has since been adopted to actually uphold multiple weapons enhancements for forcible sex offenses (People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30, 36-37 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ]; People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 839 ]).

1981Furthermore, a long-held rule of statutory construction is that “it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by *448 necessary implication.” (County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 226 , 501 P.2d 234 ].

1981Furthermore, a long-held rule of statutory construction is that “it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by *448 necessary implication.” (County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 226 , 501 P.2d 234 ].