snack bar in California

2020Rather, it “conclude[d] that the business transactions that [were] conducted regularly on the club’s premises with persons who are not members of the club [were] sufficient in themselves to bring the club within the reach of [Civil Code] section 51’s broad reference to ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.’ ” (Id. at p. 621.) To begin with, “the club regularly (on the average of once a week) permit[ed] nonmembers to use its facilities, for a fee, in connection with ‘sponsored events.’ In conducting such events, the club receive[d] funds from nonmembers for the use of the club’

1998The court noted first that “the club regularly (on the average of once a week) permits nonmembers to use its facilities, for a fee, in connection with ‘sponsored events.’ In conducting such events, the club receives funds from nonmembers for the use of the club’s golf course, tennis courts, and dining and bar facilities, and also obtains revenue from the sale (at a markup) of food and beverages to nonmembers at the club’s snack bar and other dining facilities on the club’s premises.” ( 10 Cal.4th at p. 621 .) We explained in Warfield that “[i]n carrying on such activities for a fee, the club o

2020Although the club is a nonprofit organization, and there is no suggestion that the activities in question were intended to generate a profit that might be distributed to members, the direct and indirect financial benefits that the club derived from 24 its business transactions with nonmembers nonetheless inured to the financial benefit of the club members, because the revenue from such transactions permitted the members to maintain the club’s facilities and services—which were reserved primarily for the benefit of the members— through the payment of dues and fees lower than would have been req

2020Although the club is a nonprofit organization, and there is no suggestion that the activities in question were intended to generate a profit that might be distributed to members, the direct and indirect financial benefits that the club derived from 24 its business transactions with nonmembers nonetheless inured to the financial benefit of the club members, because the revenue from such transactions permitted the members to maintain the club’s facilities and services—which were reserved primarily for the benefit of the members— through the payment of dues and fees lower than would have been req

2002Finally, Ortiz has not shown that “there [were] feasible and effective alternatives to [LAPRA’s] conduct which [would] have [had] a lesser impact on privacy interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40 .) At her deposition, Ortiz testified that she could have worked in the snack bar or as a receptionist.

1996Assn. v. Sequoia etc. School Dist. (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 98 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 187 ], the court commented, citing Willits, that it would be improper for the school district to hire an independent contractor to run a snack bar.

1996Assn. v. Sequoia etc. School Dist. (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 98 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 187 ], the court commented, citing Willits, that it would be improper for the school district to hire an independent contractor to run a snack bar.

1996(In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 434 P.2d 353 ].) The railway station was privately owned by three railroads and housed a restaurant, a snack bar, a cocktail lounge, and a magazine stand, in addition to the transportation facilities.

1996(In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 434 P.2d 353 ].) The railway station was privately owned by three railroads and housed a restaurant, a snack bar, a cocktail lounge, and a magazine stand, in addition to the transportation facilities.

1978A., supra, 35 Cal.2d 760 , 767-772.) A snack bar, gift shop, and beauty shop located on church property used as a retreat which serve the convenience of persons assembled for religious purposes and which are not open to *780 the public are similarly treated as incidental to the primary religious purpose of the organization and hence qualified for the welfare exemption.

1977In Board of Supervisors v. Archer, supra, 18 Cal.App.3d 717 , grazing land leased by the federal government was deemed a “possessory interest” even though the same land could be leased to various ranchers simultaneously.

1977In Mattson v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d 205 , a snack bar’s dining area at a municipal golf course, open to golfers not a part of the snack bar’s clientele, was deemed to be a taxable possession of property.