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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newland v. Board of Governorsgreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 3 | 5 |
Perrine v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 2 | 2 |
Morrison v. State Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1977(Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 [82 *697 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375 ]. 2 Observing that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness to practice that profession (see Newland v. Board of Governors,post,p. 705 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 ,566 P.2d254], and cases there cited), we concluded in Morrison that the board cannot “abstractly characterize the conduct in this case as ‘immoral,’ ‘unprofessional,’ or ‘involving moral turpitude’ within the meaning of section 13202 ... unless that conduct indicates t 1977(Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 [82 *697 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375 ]. 2 Observing that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness to practice that profession (see Newland v. Board of Governors,post,p. 705 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 ,566 P.2d254], and cases there cited), we concluded in Morrison that the board cannot “abstractly characterize the conduct in this case as ‘immoral,’ ‘unprofessional,’ or ‘involving moral turpitude’ within the meaning of section 13202 ... unless that conduct indicates t | 1 | 2 |
Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estategreen2 sentences2012(See Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 562-564 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ] {Petropoulos).) 3 That standard is sufficient to satisfy due process (Arneson, at p. 448), but it does not follow that the “substantial relationship” must be independently proven where the Legislature has properly determined that certain types of convictions are related to a licensee’s professional qualifications. 2012(See Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 562-564 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ] {Petropoulos).) 3 That standard is sufficient to satisfy due process (Arneson, at p. 448), but it does not follow that the “substantial relationship” must be independently proven where the Legislature has properly determined that certain types of convictions are related to a licensee’s professional qualifications. | 1 | 1 |
Arneson v. Foxgreen2 sentences2012It is true that “ ‘a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.’ ” {Arneson v. Fox (1980) 28 Cal.3d 440, 448 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 621 P.2d 817 ] {Arneson).) To comport with due process, “ ‘standards for excluding persons from engaging in [a profession] must bear some reasonable relation to their qualifications to engage in those activities.’ ” {Ibid., italics added.) The “substantially related” standard of section 490 was initially adopted due to concerns that some statutes al 2012It is true that “ ‘a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.’ ” {Arneson v. Fox (1980) 28 Cal.3d 440, 448 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 621 P.2d 817 ] {Arneson).) To comport with due process, “ ‘standards for excluding persons from engaging in [a profession] must bear some reasonable relation to their qualifications to engage in those activities.’ ” {Ibid., italics added.) The “substantially related” standard of section 490 was initially adopted due to concerns that some statutes al | 1 | 1 |
Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examinersgreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 1 | 1 |
Shea v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 1 | 1 |
Windham v. Board of Medical Quality Assurancegreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 1 | 1 |
Matanky v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” 1992In Cartwright v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners (1976) 16 Cal.3d 762, 767 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 548 P.2d 1134 ], the court stated: “The state’s power to regulate a profession cannot be used arbitrarily to penalize conduct having no demonstrable bearing upon fitness for its practice.” The court noted the requirement of such a relation is constitutionally mandated, stating: “[W]e observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession.” | 1 | 1 |
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeldgreen2 sentences1977(See Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 397 , 97 S.Ct. 451 ] Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) 420 U.S. 636, 648 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 524-525 , 95 S.Ct. 1225 ].) In that connection we observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession. 9 Viewing section 13220.16 in light of that established principle, we believe that the purpose of that section is not further to punish the miscreant, but to protect the students, faculty and 1977(See Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 397 , 97 S.Ct. 451 ] Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) 420 U.S. 636, 648 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 524-525 , 95 S.Ct. 1225 ].) In that connection we observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession. 9 Viewing section 13220.16 in light of that established principle, we believe that the purpose of that section is not further to punish the miscreant, but to protect the students, faculty and | 1 | 1 |
Comings v. State Board of Educationgreen1 sentence1977(Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 [82 *697 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375 ]. 2 Observing that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness to practice that profession (see Newland v. Board of Governors,post,p. 705 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 ,566 P.2d254], and cases there cited), we concluded in Morrison that the board cannot “abstractly characterize the conduct in this case as ‘immoral,’ ‘unprofessional,’ or ‘involving moral turpitude’ within the meaning of section 13202 ... unless that conduct indicates t | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso 1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso | 1 | 1 |
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHughgreen2 sentences1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso 1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield
green
2 sentences1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso 1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Board of Trustees v. Metzger
green
2 sentences1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso 1977Our sole task is to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [defendant], sustains [these] findings.” (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ]; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, supra, 8 Cal.3d 206, 211 ; Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 .) Moreover, “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reaso | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Craig v. Boren
green
2 sentences1977(See Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 397 , 97 S.Ct. 451 ] Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) 420 U.S. 636, 648 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 524-525 , 95 S.Ct. 1225 ].) In that connection we observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession. 9 Viewing section 13220.16 in light of that established principle, we believe that the purpose of that section is not further to punish the miscreant, but to protect the students, faculty and 1977(See Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 397 , 97 S.Ct. 451 ] Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) 420 U.S. 636, 648 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 524-525 , 95 S.Ct. 1225 ].) In that connection we observe that numerous decisions have established that a statute can constitutionally bar a person from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to his fitness or competence to practice that profession. 9 Viewing section 13220.16 in light of that established principle, we believe that the purpose of that section is not further to punish the miscreant, but to protect the students, faculty and | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.