statutory requirements presumption in California

2023(Howze, at p. 1395.) 26 commencement of trial would be considered a waiver of his right to be present, and subsequently chose not to leave his cell to be transported to court,” was “estopped to assert that the trial improperly commenced in his absence.” (Id. at p. 1396.) Venancio argues that the cases in which defendants forfeited their right to be present at trial involved situations where they were disruptive inside the courtroom, citing People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 122 (nine deputies were needed to subdue the defendant after he started banging on the counsel table and tried to lift i

2020(See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [“‘“a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason”’”].) Marroquin’s conclusory argument we should nevertheless remand the case for a hearing because section 1473.7, subdivision (d), mandates a hearing for all motions, improperly conflates the principles for remand applicable to a reviewing court with the statutory requirements for a hearing applicable to a court considering his section 1473.7 motion in the first instance.

1991(Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 250-251 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) If the level of proof of the employer’s conduct and knowledge necessary to establish negligence does not meet the statutory requirements for an exception to the workers’ compensation remedy, then the lesser standard for strict liability must fail as well.

1991(Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 250-251 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ].) If the level of proof of the employer’s conduct and knowledge necessary to establish negligence does not meet the statutory requirements for an exception to the workers’ compensation remedy, then the lesser standard for strict liability must fail as well.

1987Although we agree with Wyatt there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements for the presumption to apply (Dobrick v. Hathaway (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 50 ]), “[t]he rule of ‘strict compliance’ is satisfied by substantial, without literal, compliance. . . .” (Douglas v. Janis (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) Here, the County employee prepared the documents for mailing and delivered them to the person who regularly deposits mail.

1987Although we agree with Wyatt there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements for the presumption to apply (Dobrick v. Hathaway (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 50 ]), “[t]he rule of ‘strict compliance’ is satisfied by substantial, without literal, compliance. . . .” (Douglas v. Janis (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) Here, the County employee prepared the documents for mailing and delivered them to the person who regularly deposits mail.

1987Although we agree with Wyatt there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements for the presumption to apply (Dobrick v. Hathaway (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 913, 921 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 50 ]), “[t]he rule of ‘strict compliance’ is satisfied by substantial, without literal, compliance. . . .” (Douglas v. Janis (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) Here, the County employee prepared the documents for mailing and delivered them to the person who regularly deposits mail.