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7 California opinions name it 3 courts 1889–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Interior Systems, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Corp.green2 sentences2018In that case, after receiving a prime contractor's request to substitute one of its subcontractors, an awarding authority conducted a section 4107 substitution hearing and concluded statutory grounds existed for the substitution. ( Id. at pp. 314-315, 175 Cal.Rptr. 301 .) The subcontractor did not pursue administrative review of the Substitution Decision, and instead sued the prime contractor for damages, alleging the prime contractor had violated its "statutory duty" under section 4107. ( Id. at pp. 314-315, 319, 175 Cal.Rptr. 301 .) The court held that the subcontractor could only challenge 2018In that case, after receiving a prime contractor's request to substitute one of its subcontractors, an awarding authority conducted a section 4107 substitution hearing and concluded statutory grounds existed for the substitution. ( Id. at pp. 314-315, 175 Cal.Rptr. 301 .) The subcontractor did not pursue administrative review of the Substitution Decision, and instead sued the prime contractor for damages, alleging the prime contractor had violated its "statutory duty" under section 4107. ( Id. at pp. 314-315, 319, 175 Cal.Rptr. 301 .) The court held that the subcontractor could only challenge | 1 | 1 |
Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002(Compare Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1681, 1686 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 608 [treating statement as nonbinding dictum] with Casey v. Overhead Door Corp. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 119-120 , 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 603 [treating statement as controlling].) The Court of Appeal in this case was the same Court of Appeal (that is, the same division of the same appellate district) that decided La Jolla Village, supra, 212 Cal. App.3d 1131 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 146 . 2002(Compare Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1681, 1686 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 608 [treating statement as nonbinding dictum] with Casey v. Overhead Door Corp. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 119-120 , 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 603 [treating statement as controlling].) The Court of Appeal in this case was the same Court of Appeal (that is, the same division of the same appellate district) that decided La Jolla Village, supra, 212 Cal. App.3d 1131 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 146 . | 1 | 1 |
Casey v. Overhead Door Corp.green2 sentences2002(Compare Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1681, 1686 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 608 [treating statement as nonbinding dictum] with Casey v. Overhead Door Corp. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 119-120 , 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 603 [treating statement as controlling].) The Court of Appeal in this case was the same Court of Appeal (that is, the same division of the same appellate district) that decided La Jolla Village, supra, 212 Cal. App.3d 1131 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 146 . 2002(Compare Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1681, 1686 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 608 [treating statement as nonbinding dictum] with Casey v. Overhead Door Corp. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 119-120 , 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 603 [treating statement as controlling].) The Court of Appeal in this case was the same Court of Appeal (that is, the same division of the same appellate district) that decided La Jolla Village, supra, 212 Cal. App.3d 1131 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 146 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 758091green1 sentence2001Accordingly, subcontractors have no opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. [Citation.] This scheme violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, supra, 156 F.3d at p. 904, fn. omitted.) The court rejected the state’s argument that due process was satisfied because an aggrieved party could bring a suit against the contractor on the contract, on the ground that it “doubt[ed] the viability of a subcontractor’s hypothetical suit against a prime contractor based on theories of breach of the covenant of good fait | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Spiresgreen2 sentences1997Section 3140 codifies the rule we have long adopted that “If there is a valid contract, the contract price measures the limit of the amount of the liens which can be acquired against the property by laborers and materialmen.” (Roberts v. Spires (1925) 195 Cal. 267, 270 [ 232 P. 708 , 37 A.L.R. 763 ]; see also Roystone Co. v. Darling (1915) 171 Cal. 526, 531-533, 537 [ 154 P. 15 ].) Section 3140 reasonably, logically, and constitutionally limits the “value” (Cal. Const., art. 1997Section 3140 codifies the rule we have long adopted that “If there is a valid contract, the contract price measures the limit of the amount of the liens which can be acquired against the property by laborers and materialmen.” (Roberts v. Spires (1925) 195 Cal. 267, 270 [ 232 P. 708 , 37 A.L.R. 763 ]; see also Roystone Co. v. Darling (1915) 171 Cal. 526, 531-533, 537 [ 154 P. 15 ].) Section 3140 reasonably, logically, and constitutionally limits the “value” (Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 1 |
Roystone Co. v. Darlinggreen2 sentences1997Section 3140 codifies the rule we have long adopted that “If there is a valid contract, the contract price measures the limit of the amount of the liens which can be acquired against the property by laborers and materialmen.” (Roberts v. Spires (1925) 195 Cal. 267, 270 [ 232 P. 708 , 37 A.L.R. 763 ]; see also Roystone Co. v. Darling (1915) 171 Cal. 526, 531-533, 537 [ 154 P. 15 ].) Section 3140 reasonably, logically, and constitutionally limits the “value” (Cal. Const., art. 1997Section 3140 codifies the rule we have long adopted that “If there is a valid contract, the contract price measures the limit of the amount of the liens which can be acquired against the property by laborers and materialmen.” (Roberts v. Spires (1925) 195 Cal. 267, 270 [ 232 P. 708 , 37 A.L.R. 763 ]; see also Roystone Co. v. Darling (1915) 171 Cal. 526, 531-533, 537 [ 154 P. 15 ].) Section 3140 reasonably, logically, and constitutionally limits the “value” (Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Capitol Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Mega Constr. Co.
green
1 sentence2020Preferring Subcontractors Over Direct Contractors Shifting to policy, Travelers claims "[t]here is no policy reason to prefer a subcontractor claim as deserving faster enforcement than that of the direct contractor." To the contrary, as Crosno observes, "a public works subcontractor has rights to a security that a general contractor doesn't." "The law has created a preferred position for persons who perform labor or supply materials for the improvement of real property." (9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 32:3, p. 15.) "The stop notice provisions [citation] protect materialme | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Department of Industrial Relations v. Seaboard Surety Co.
green
1 sentence2020Preferring Subcontractors Over Direct Contractors Shifting to policy, Travelers claims "[t]here is no policy reason to prefer a subcontractor claim as deserving faster enforcement than that of the direct contractor." To the contrary, as Crosno observes, "a public works subcontractor has rights to a security that a general contractor doesn't." "The law has created a preferred position for persons who perform labor or supply materials for the improvement of real property." (9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 32:3, p. 15.) "The stop notice provisions [citation] protect materialme | 1 | 2020–2020 |
La Jolla Village Homeowners' Ass'n v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2002Although earlier decisions had concluded that strict products liability did not apply to ordinary subcontractors because they provided services rather than products, the La Jolla Village court suggested a broader subcontractor exception, under which strict products liability did not apply to "subcontractors in the typical real estate construction project regardless of whether they provided `services' or a `product' " ( Id. at p. 1146, 261 Cal.Rptr. 146 , italics added.) Courts in later cases have disagreed on the soundness of this expansion. 2002(Compare Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1681, 1686 , 277 Cal.Rptr. 608 [treating statement as nonbinding dictum] with Casey v. Overhead Door Corp. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 112, 119-120 , 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 603 [treating statement as controlling].) The Court of Appeal in this case was the same Court of Appeal (that is, the same division of the same appellate district) that decided La Jolla Village, supra, 212 Cal. App.3d 1131 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 146 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
green
2 sentences1980The Employer’s restraint of trade argument is predicated on Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters (1975) 421 U.S. 616 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 418 , 95 S.Ct. 1830 ], rehearing denied 423 U.S. 884 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 114 , 96 S.Ct. 156 ]. 1980The Employer’s restraint of trade argument is predicated on Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters (1975) 421 U.S. 616 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 418 , 95 S.Ct. 1830 ], rehearing denied 423 U.S. 884 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 114 , 96 S.Ct. 156 ]. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
California Dump Truck Owners Association, Inc. v. Associated General Contractors Of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc.
green
2 sentences1980Here, the subcontractor clause was part of a collective bargaining agreement (cf. Cal. Dump Truck v. Associated General Contractors (9th Cir. 1977) 562 F.2d 607 ). 1980Here, the subcontractor clause was part of a collective bargaining agreement (cf. Cal. Dump Truck v. Associated General Contractors (9th Cir. 1977) 562 F.2d 607 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Tyree v. Commissioner of Patents
neutral
1 sentence1980The Employer’s restraint of trade argument is predicated on Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters (1975) 421 U.S. 616 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 418 , 95 S.Ct. 1830 ], rehearing denied 423 U.S. 884 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 114 , 96 S.Ct. 156 ]. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100
green
1 sentence1980The Employer’s restraint of trade argument is predicated on Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters (1975) 421 U.S. 616 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 418 , 95 S.Ct. 1830 ], rehearing denied 423 U.S. 884 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 114 , 96 S.Ct. 156 ]. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Whittier v. Hollister
neutral
1 sentence1889J. 589; Whittier v. Hollister, 64 Cal. 283 ; O’Donnell v. Kramer, 65 Cal. 353 ; Wilson v. Barnard, 67 Cal. 422 ; Wiggins v. Bridge, 70 Cal. 437 .) It will be observed that all of these cases, so far as they hold that the lien of a subcontractor shall only extend to the money unpaid on the original contract, are cases in which the contract between the owner and subcontractor was valid, and each and all of them are based upon the theory, which we fully approve, that where there is a valid contract between the owner and contractor, such contract is the measure of the owner’s liability, and that i | 1 | 1889–1889 |
O'Donnell v. Kramer
neutral
1 sentence1889J. 589; Whittier v. Hollister, 64 Cal. 283 ; O’Donnell v. Kramer, 65 Cal. 353 ; Wilson v. Barnard, 67 Cal. 422 ; Wiggins v. Bridge, 70 Cal. 437 .) It will be observed that all of these cases, so far as they hold that the lien of a subcontractor shall only extend to the money unpaid on the original contract, are cases in which the contract between the owner and subcontractor was valid, and each and all of them are based upon the theory, which we fully approve, that where there is a valid contract between the owner and contractor, such contract is the measure of the owner’s liability, and that i | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Wilson v. Barnard
neutral
1 sentence1889J. 589; Whittier v. Hollister, 64 Cal. 283 ; O’Donnell v. Kramer, 65 Cal. 353 ; Wilson v. Barnard, 67 Cal. 422 ; Wiggins v. Bridge, 70 Cal. 437 .) It will be observed that all of these cases, so far as they hold that the lien of a subcontractor shall only extend to the money unpaid on the original contract, are cases in which the contract between the owner and subcontractor was valid, and each and all of them are based upon the theory, which we fully approve, that where there is a valid contract between the owner and contractor, such contract is the measure of the owner’s liability, and that i | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Wiggins v. Bridge
neutral
1 sentence1889J. 589; Whittier v. Hollister, 64 Cal. 283 ; O’Donnell v. Kramer, 65 Cal. 353 ; Wilson v. Barnard, 67 Cal. 422 ; Wiggins v. Bridge, 70 Cal. 437 .) It will be observed that all of these cases, so far as they hold that the lien of a subcontractor shall only extend to the money unpaid on the original contract, are cases in which the contract between the owner and subcontractor was valid, and each and all of them are based upon the theory, which we fully approve, that where there is a valid contract between the owner and contractor, such contract is the measure of the owner’s liability, and that i | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.