unfair practices claim in California

2023Co. (1991) 219 Conn. 644 [ 594 A.2d 952 ] (Lees), which held that an unfair practices claim under Connecticut’s statutory counterpart to the UCL was not an action on an insurance policy and thus not subject to a one-year limitations provision identical to the one at issue here.

2023Co. (1991) 219 Conn. 644 [ 594 A.2d 952 ] (Lees), which held that an unfair practices claim under Connecticut’s statutory counterpart to the UCL was not an action on an insurance policy and thus not subject to a one-year limitations provision identical to the one at issue here.

2023Monetary damages and penalties, however, are not available for a private litigant like Jason. (§§ 17535.5, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (a); Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 663 , 16 695.) To the extent Jason asserts an unfair practices claim under the UCL, a plaintiff must have “suffered injury in fact and [have] lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition” in order to have standing. (§ 17204.) A s a private litigant, Jason may recover restitution and seek injunctive relief (tailored to the alleged unfair business practice), but not damages or penalties

2023(Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 .) In sum, we conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the FAL and UPA claims.

2014(Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., supra, 722 F.Supp. at p. 590 .) We note the district court’s ruling on this point contains almost no analysis and, of course, does not address subsequent California cases giving section 340.6 a broad interpretation.

2014(Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 966 .) “ ‘Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 5 Bank does not argue the trial court erred in failing to enter judgment in its favor under its common count against Methven. 16 determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Ibid., citing Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 571 ; see Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems

2014(Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 966 .) “ ‘Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 5 Bank does not argue the trial court erred in failing to enter judgment in its favor under its common count against Methven. 16 determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Ibid., citing Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 571 ; see Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems

2005(Id. at p. 958.) The court explained that an unfair practices claim cannot be based on vicarious liability, but must contain an element of the defendant’s “personal ‘participation in the unlawful practices’ and ‘unbridled control’ over the practices that are found to violate section 17200 or 17500.” (Emery, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 960 .) VISA exercised no control over the acts of those preparing the lottery solicitation and had no relationship with the merchants who did.

1996Exchange v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 398 , citing Rojo v. Kliger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) In particular, the unfair practices claim by the state required the resolution of a series of questions revolving around specific Insurance Code sections, which both mandated the Insurance Commissioner’s expertise and posed a risk of inconsistent adjudications if a court had to adjudicate those questions without “benefit of the views” of the commissioner.