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7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Meltongreen2 sentences1988We rejected a virtually identical claim in People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 765-769 . 5. 1988We recently rejected a virtually identical claim in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 765-768 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ]. 6. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Alejandro R. (In re Alejandro R.)green2 sentences2016“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 .) “‘Also, the probation condition should be evaluated in its context, and only reasonable specificity is required.’ [Citation.]” (In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 (Alejandro R.).) In Alejandro R., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 556 , the First District considered and rejected a virtually identical challenge to a probation condition requiring school attendance. 2016“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 .) “‘Also, the probation condition should be evaluated in its context, and only reasonable specificity is required.’ [Citation.]” (In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 (Alejandro R.).) In Alejandro R., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 556 , the First District considered and rejected a virtually identical challenge to a probation condition requiring school attendance. | 1 | 1 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382 , 391–392 [upholding instruction substantially similar to that given here] (Brown); see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 , 14–15 [“An instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government’s burden of proof”].) Thus, contrary to Self’s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors understood the instruction to mean “they must articulate reason and logic for their doubt . . . before such doubt[] could be considered sufficient to acquit.” (See People v. Capistrano ( | 1 | 1 |
People v. Whalengreen2 sentences2015It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.” A virtually identical instruction was given to Selfs jury. 16 Juror No. 14, originally an alternate, served on the jury during both the guilt and penalty phases. 17 We disapprove any language to the contrary in People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 51 [ 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 , 294 P.3d 915 ]. 18 The court instructed the jury: “An attempt to commit a crime consists o 2015It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.” A virtually identical instruction was given to Selfs jury. 16 Juror No. 14, originally an alternate, served on the jury during both the guilt and penalty phases. 17 We disapprove any language to the contrary in People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 51 [ 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 , 294 P.3d 915 ]. 18 The court instructed the jury: “An attempt to commit a crime consists o | 1 | 1 |
People v. Capistranogreen1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382 , 391–392 [upholding instruction substantially similar to that given here] (Brown); see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 , 14–15 [“An instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government’s burden of proof”].) Thus, contrary to Self’s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors understood the instruction to mean “they must articulate reason and logic for their doubt . . . before such doubt[] could be considered sufficient to acquit.” (See People v. Capistrano ( | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucasgreen1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382 , 391–392 [upholding instruction substantially similar to that given here] (Brown); see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 , 14–15 [“An instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government’s burden of proof”].) Thus, contrary to Self’s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors understood the instruction to mean “they must articulate reason and logic for their doubt . . . before such doubt[] could be considered sufficient to acquit.” (See People v. Capistrano ( | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bandhauergreen2 sentences1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not 1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Polkgreen2 sentences1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not 1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Friendgreen2 sentences1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not 1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsongreen2 sentences1983In our recent opinion in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 57-58 [ 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 , 655 P.2d 279 ], however, we rejected this very contention, explaining that the federal cases following Furman and Gregg do not undermine this line of California authority, but, on the contrary, establish that these decisions are compelled as a matter of federal constitutional law. 1983In our recent opinion in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 57-58 [ 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 , 655 P.2d 279 ], however, we rejected this very contention, explaining that the federal cases following Furman and Gregg do not undermine this line of California authority, but, on the contrary, establish that these decisions are compelled as a matter of federal constitutional law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not 1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lujano
green
1 sentence2021In Lujano, our colleagues in Division Seven rejected a virtually identical claim of error on the ground that the optional language merely duplicates the parts of the given instruction that specify the scienter element of the offense and define the term “ ‘prevented from resisting.’ ” ( Lujano, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 191–192.) We agree with the Lujano court’s reasoning and likewise conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to give the optional language. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Olguin
green
1 sentence2016“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 .) “‘Also, the probation condition should be evaluated in its context, and only reasonable specificity is required.’ [Citation.]” (In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 (Alejandro R.).) In Alejandro R., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 556 , the First District considered and rejected a virtually identical challenge to a probation condition requiring school attendance. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382 , 391–392 [upholding instruction substantially similar to that given here] (Brown); see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 , 14–15 [“An instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government’s burden of proof”].) Thus, contrary to Self’s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors understood the instruction to mean “they must articulate reason and logic for their doubt . . . before such doubt[] could be considered sufficient to acquit.” (See People v. Capistrano ( | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382 , 391–392 [upholding instruction substantially similar to that given here] (Brown); see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 , 14–15 [“An instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government’s burden of proof”].) Thus, contrary to Self’s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors understood the instruction to mean “they must articulate reason and logic for their doubt . . . before such doubt[] could be considered sufficient to acquit.” (See People v. Capistrano ( | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Furman v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not 1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gregg v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not 1983You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." (12a) Although this instruction is one of the general introductory instructions routinely given in noncapital cases and at the guilt phase of capital cases, over a decade ago, in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 618 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], we explicitly condemned the giving of a virtually identical instruction [4] at the penalty phase of a capital case, explaining that "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury at a penalty trial not | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.