Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 California opinions name it 3 courts 1957–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hardy v. Vialgreen2 sentences2021(Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 582 (Hardy) [California “recognize[s] the same wide immunity” for judges and certain other officials]; Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-853 [“California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity”].) In this case, as relevant here, Acres has sued a tribal court judge, several attorneys who effectively served as his law clerks, and a tribal court clerk in connection with their work in Blue Lake v. Acres Bonusing. 2021(Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 582 (Hardy) [California “recognize[s] the same wide immunity” for judges and certain other officials]; Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-853 [“California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity”].) In this case, as relevant here, Acres has sued a tribal court judge, several attorneys who effectively served as his law clerks, and a tribal court clerk in connection with their work in Blue Lake v. Acres Bonusing. | 2 | 2 |
Howard v. Drapkingreen2 sentences2021(Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 582 (Hardy) [California “recognize[s] the same wide immunity” for judges and certain other officials]; Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-853 [“California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity”].) In this case, as relevant here, Acres has sued a tribal court judge, several attorneys who effectively served as his law clerks, and a tribal court clerk in connection with their work in Blue Lake v. Acres Bonusing. 2021(Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 582 (Hardy) [California “recognize[s] the same wide immunity” for judges and certain other officials]; Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-853 [“California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity”].) In this case, as relevant here, Acres has sued a tribal court judge, several attorneys who effectively served as his law clerks, and a tribal court clerk in connection with their work in Blue Lake v. Acres Bonusing. | 2 | 2 |
Oppenheimer v. Arnoldgreen2 sentences1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v 1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 2 | 2 |
Downer v. Lentgreen2 sentences1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of Californiagreen2 sentences1980Mosk v. National Research Co. of Cal. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 765, 772 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 516 ]: “[I]t would be impossible to draft in advance detailed plans and specifications of all acts and conduct to be prohibited [citations omitted], since unfair or fraudulent business practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery.” 2 To these open-ended definitions of unfairness, we would add this obvious thought: that the determination of whether a particular business practice is unfair necessarily involves an examination of its impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justif 1980Mosk v. National Research Co. of Cal. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 765, 772 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 516 ]: “[I]t would be impossible to draft in advance detailed plans and specifications of all acts and conduct to be prohibited [citations omitted], since unfair or fraudulent business practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery.” 2 To these open-ended definitions of unfairness, we would add this obvious thought: that the determination of whether a particular business practice is unfair necessarily involves an examination of its impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justif | 1 | 1 |
White v. Brinkmangreen2 sentences1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v 1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. Reedgreen1 sentence1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 1 | 1 |
Papagianakis v. The Samosgreen2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ]; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ]; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Sharpgreen2 sentences1957(Cf. also Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d 675, 679 [ 268 P.2d 1062 ].) The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is well stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 , as follows: “It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. 1957(Cf. also Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d 675, 679 [ 268 P.2d 1062 ].) The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is well stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 , as follows: “It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence2013Indeed, . . . the section was intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language, precisely to enable judicial tribunals to deal with the innumerable “ ‘new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 181 .) As a result, “ ‘In permitting the restraining of all “unfair” business practices, [former] section 3369 [today section 17200] undeniably establishes only a wide standard to guide courts of equity; as noted above, given the creative nature of the scheming mind, the Legislature evidently concluded that a less inclusive | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn.
green
1 sentence1988Code, § 3369) establish a wide standard to guide courts of equity in redressing conduct that violated the "fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing." ( Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 112 .) In People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509 , 530 the court concluded that "an 'unfair' business practice occurs when it offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." This definition has been used by the Federal Trade Commission and approved by | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988Code, § 3369) establish a wide standard to guide courts of equity in redressing conduct that violated the "fundamental rules of honesty and fair dealing." ( Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 112 .) In People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509 , 530 the court concluded that "an 'unfair' business practice occurs when it offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." This definition has been used by the Federal Trade Commission and approved by | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Dawson v. Martin
green
2 sentences1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v 1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Pargoud v. United States
green
1 sentence1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Woodruff v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Norton v. Hoffmann
green
2 sentences1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v 1958(U.S.) 335 [ 20 L.Ed. 646 ]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to all executive public officers when performing within the scope of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. [Citing cases.] In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity.” These principles apply similarly with equal force to the other city officials: to the city attorney when discharging the duties of his office by giving legal advice to the other city officials (see Pearson v | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Jones v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Spalding v. Vilas
green
2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Gregoire v. Biddle
green
2 sentences1957(Cf. also Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d 675, 679 [ 268 P.2d 1062 ].) The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is well stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 , as follows: “It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. 1957(Cf. also Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d 675, 679 [ 268 P.2d 1062 ].) The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is well stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 , as follows: "It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida v. Mellon
green
2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ]; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ]; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
De Arnaud v. Ainsworth
green
2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ]; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ]; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Farr v. Valentine
green
2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ]; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ]; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
United States ex rel. Parravicino v. Brunswick
green
2 sentences1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ] ; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ] ; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. 1957(Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ]; Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 ; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [ 73 App.D.C. 292 ]; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167 [ 5 L.R.A.N.S. 163 ]; see Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262 .) In this state Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [ 222 P.2d 940 ], recognize the same wide immunity. | 1 | 1957–1957 |