conviction was obtained violation in Colorado

2012The majority's holding diminishes the purpose of Rule 35(c), which is to implement the unique statutorily created mechanism for postconviction review of alleged constitutional violations that is guaranteed to every convicted defendant by seetion 18-1-410, C.R.S. (2012). 1 See Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo.2005) ("[Rule 85(c)] affords every person convicted of a crime the right to seek postconviction review upon the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state.").

2006Rule 35(c) “affords every person convicted of a crime the right to seek postconviction review upon the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state.” Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo.2005) (citing People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 247 , 519 P.2d 945, 947 (1974)).

2006Rule 35(c) “affords every person convicted of a crime the right to seek postconviction review upon the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state.” Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo.2005) (citing People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 247 , 519 P.2d 945, 947 (1974)).

2006Rule 35(c) “affords every person convicted of a crime the right to seek postconviction review upon the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state.” Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo.2005) (citing People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 247 , 519 P.2d 945, 947 (1974)).

2025P. 35(c)(2)(I), (III) (a defendant may seek postconviction review of his or her conviction on the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or Colorado); People v. Dawson, 89 P.3d 447, 449 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[A]fter sentence has been imposed, the validity of a guilty plea can be challenged under Crim.

2025P. 35(c)(2)(I) (providing postconviction relief for claims that a conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or Colorado); see also Kirk, 221 P.3d at 64-65 .

2025P. 35(c).”); see also People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. 3 App. 2006 ) (the substance of a postconviction motion controls under which rule it is properly designated). ¶ 12 Construing this claim under Crim.

2020As the trial court recognized, even “giving [Jiron] every benefit of the doubt,” the collateral attack “should have been brought within six months of November of 2015 [when Jiron was charged in this case], and was not.” In fact, Jiron did not file her collateral attack until just before sentencing — more than fourteen months after she was charged with felony DUI. 15 ¶ 30 We also reject Jiron’s argument that under Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994), she should have been allowed to challenge her 1998 conviction irrespective of the statutory time bar because a statute may not infri

2020In Custis, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who is subject to mandatory enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act has no constitutional right to collaterally attack her underlying state convictions in the federal courts “with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel.” Id.

2020See People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Colo. 1980).

2013While a eriminal defendant may have only a limited statutory right to the assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings, see Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164, 1165 (Colo.2007), onee the public defender decides to enter his appearance, he must provide professionally competent assistance, subject to review according to the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2006Within our criminal justice system, “postcon-viction proceedings have a dual purpose: to prevent constitutional injustice and to bring finality to judgment.” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 252 (Colo.1996) (citing People v. Hampton, 187 Colo. 131, 133 , 528 P.2d 1311, 1312 (1974)).

2006Within our criminal justice system, “postcon-viction proceedings have a dual purpose: to prevent constitutional injustice and to bring finality to judgment.” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 252 (Colo.1996) (citing People v. Hampton, 187 Colo. 131, 133 , 528 P.2d 1311, 1312 (1974)).

2006Within our criminal justice system, “postcon-viction proceedings have a dual purpose: to prevent constitutional injustice and to bring finality to judgment.” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 252 (Colo.1996) (citing People v. Hampton, 187 Colo. 131, 133 , 528 P.2d 1311, 1312 (1974)).