affirma- tive defense in Connecticut

2026As it stated: “Because qualified immunity, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, is an affir- mative defense that can be waived, we decline to extend the collateral order doctrine to allow immediate appeal from an order denying as untimely a motion asserting that defense. . . . [S]uch an expansion is unwarranted, since it would essentially grant defendants the right to assert a qualified immunity defense at any time . . . as though the affirmative defense were the equivalent of a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.” (Cita- tions omitted.) Maye v. New Haven, 89 F.4th 403 , 407–408 (2d Cir.

2025L. v. Newell Brands, Inc., 351 Conn. 262 , 263–66, 330 A.3d 53 (2025) (declining on policy grounds to recognize common-law cause of action for loss of filial consortium). 2 ‘‘We often must legislate interstitially to iron out inconsistencies within a statute or to fill gaps resulting from legislative oversight or to resolve ambiguities resulting from a legislative compromise.’’ (Footnote omitted.) U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 354 , 91 S. Ct. 409 , 27 L.

2025L. v. Newell Brands, Inc., 351 Conn. 262 , 263–66, 330 A.3d 53 (2025) (declining on policy grounds to recognize common-law cause of action for loss of filial consortium). 2 ‘‘We often must legislate interstitially to iron out inconsistencies within a statute or to fill gaps resulting from legislative oversight or to resolve ambiguities resulting from a legislative compromise.’’ (Footnote omitted.) U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 354 , 91 S. Ct. 409 , 27 L.

2025L. v. Newell Brands, Inc., 351 Conn. 262 , 263–66, 330 A.3d 53 (2025) (declining on policy grounds to recognize common-law cause of action for loss of filial consortium). 2 ‘‘We often must legislate interstitially to iron out inconsistencies within a statute or to fill gaps resulting from legislative oversight or to resolve ambiguities resulting from a legislative compromise.’’ (Footnote omitted.) U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 354 , 91 S. Ct. 409 , 27 L.

2025Whether we like it or not, we must accept the fact that the legislature chose to enact a penal statute expressly providing, in relevant part, that ‘‘it shall be an affirma- tive defense [to the crime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influ- ence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reason- ableness of which is to be determined from the view- point of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be 1 See, e.g., State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318, 362

2025Whether we like it or not, we must accept the fact that the legislature chose to enact a penal statute expressly providing, in relevant part, that ‘‘it shall be an affirma- tive defense [to the crime of murder] that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influ- ence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reason- ableness of which is to be determined from the view- point of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be 1 See, e.g., State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318, 362

2022See, e.g., State v. Bras- well, 318 Conn. 815 , 828, 123 A.3d 835 (2015) (assistance of counsel); State v. Gore, supra, 288 Conn. 783–84 (jury trial); State v. Carter, 243 Conn. 392 , 397–98, 703 A.2d 763 (1997) (guilty plea).

2022See, e.g., State v. Bras- well, 318 Conn. 815 , 828, 123 A.3d 835 (2015) (assistance of counsel); State v. Gore, supra, 288 Conn. 783–84 (jury trial); State v. Carter, 243 Conn. 392 , 397–98, 703 A.2d 763 (1997) (guilty plea).

2021The court instructed the jury regarding that defense with the following instruction as the defendant had requested: If you unanimously find that the state has proven each of said elements of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and if you also unanimously find that the defendant has proven by the preponder- ance of the evidence each of the elements of the affirma- tive defense of extreme emotional disturbance, you shall find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm by reason of extreme emo- tional disturbance and not guilty of murder.’’ (Internal quotat

2016If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury.’’ State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597 , 607–608, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). ‘‘[A] defen- dant is entitled to a requested instruction on the affirma- tive defense of extreme emotional disturbance only if there is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that all the elements of the defense are established by a preponderance of the evidence.’’ State v. Person, supra, 236 Conn. 353 .

2016If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury.’’ State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597 , 607–608, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). ‘‘[A] defen- dant is entitled to a requested instruction on the affirma- tive defense of extreme emotional disturbance only if there is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that all the elements of the defense are established by a preponderance of the evidence.’’ State v. Person, supra, 236 Conn. 353 .