carved out exception in Connecticut

1994In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc , 179 Conn. 471 , 475 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980), the court carved out an exception to the employment at will doctrine and held that an employer may be responsible in damages if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy.

1994In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc , 179 Conn. 471 , 475 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980), the court carved out an exception to the employment at will doctrine and held that an employer may be responsible in damages if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy.

2010However, in Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88 , 540 A.2d 54 (1988), the court carved out an exception to that general rule and held that hosts of a party who provided alcohol to minors were liable in tort for injuries caused by a minor who consumed alcohol at their home because the voluntary consumption of alcohol by a minor “does not . . . insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury.” Id., 95 .

2010However, in Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88 , 540 A.2d 54 (1988), the court carved out an exception to that general rule and held that hosts of a party who provided alcohol to minors were liable in tort for injuries caused by a minor who consumed alcohol at their home because the voluntary consumption of alcohol by a minor “does not . . . insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability for ensuing injury.” Id., 95 .

2010That rule was expanded slightly in Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670 , 674 A.2d 839 (1996), in which the court held that purveyors of alcohol to minors may be liable to such minors or to third parties, even if those purveyors were not social hosts, subject to the limitation that the purveyors knew or had reason to know that the minor was not old enough to consume alcohol legally.

2010That rule was expanded slightly in Bohan v. Last, 236 Conn. 670 , 674 A.2d 839 (1996), in which the court held that purveyors of alcohol to minors may be liable to such minors or to third parties, even if those purveyors were not social hosts, subject to the limitation that the purveyors knew or had reason to know that the minor was not old enough to consume alcohol legally.

2003"In Jett , however, the court carved out an exception to the rule: `If the assailant is of such rank in the corporation that he may be deemed the alter ego of the corporation under the standards governing disregard of the corporate entity, then attribution of corporate responsibility for the actor's conduct is appropriate.' . . . [T]he court concluded that '[i]f the assailant can be identified as the alter ego of the corporation, or the corporation has directed or authorized the assault, then the corporation may be liable in common-law tort; if the assailant is only another employee who cannot

1997In Jett , however, the court carved out an exception to the rule: “If the assailant is of such rank in the corporation that he may be deemed the alter ego of the corporation under the standards governing disregard of the corporate entity, then attribution of corporate responsibility for the actor’s conduct is appropriate.” Id., 219 .

1997Accordingly, the court concluded that “[i]f the assailant can be identified as the alter ego of the corporation, or the corporation has directed or authorized the assault, then the corporation may be liable in common-law tort; if the assailant is only another employee who cannot be so identified, then the strict liability remedies provided by the [act] are exclusive and cannot be supplemented with common-law damages.” Id.

1994Similarly, this court, in holding that the cause and prejudice standard applies to appellate procedural defaults for purposes of our own habeas corpus jurisprudence, made clear that our holding was not meant to preclude “a substantial claim of innocence in fact.” Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124 , 132 n.7, 629 A.2d 413 (1993).

1994Similarly, this court, in holding that the cause and prejudice standard applies to appellate procedural defaults for purposes of our own habeas corpus jurisprudence, made clear that our holding was not meant to preclude “a substantial claim of innocence in fact.” Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124 , 132 n.7, 629 A.2d 413 (1993).

1994The court carved out an exception, however, for certain claims of actual innocence: “Accordingly, we think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas corpus court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Id., 496 .