fellow employee immunity in Connecticut

2010This court concluded that "the fact that the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege facts that would have removed it from the operation of the fellow employee immunity rule merely reflects that the complaint failed to state a legally sufficient cause of action." Id.

2008The fact that the new allegations had the potential *973 effect of taking the claim outside the operation of the fellow employee immunity rule does not negate the identity of the cause of action. . . . [The defendant] had adequate notice that a claim was being asserted against him arising out of the alleged motor vehicle accident." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 549 , 590 A.2d 914 .

1998"The act provides the exclusive remedy to employees sustaining work related injuries or death from such injuries `caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee . . . unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle . . .' General Statutes § 31-293a ." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 113 (1985).

1991Therefore, because we do not ordinarily read the same term as having different meanings within the same statute; In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303, 324 , 488 A.2d 778 (1985); the propriety of the imposition of a “capability” prong on the determination of whether one is engaged in the “scope of employment” for the purposes of evaluating a claim pursuant to the fellow employee immunity rule will likewise affect the evaluation of whether an employee can be indemnified by the municipality or recover workers’ compensation for injuries. 14 Mayer does not challenge the first prong of the i

1991Therefore, because we do not ordinarily read the same term as having different meanings within the same statute; In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303, 324 , 488 A.2d 778 (1985); the propriety of the imposition of a “capability” prong on the determination of whether one is engaged in the “scope of employment” for the purposes of evaluating a claim pursuant to the fellow employee immunity rule will likewise affect the evaluation of whether an employee can be indemnified by the municipality or recover workers’ compensation for injuries. 14 Mayer does not challenge the first prong of the i

1988Goodrich Co. v. Dubno, 196 Conn. 1, 6 , 490 A.2d 991 (1985).

1988Goodrich Co. v. Dubno, 196 Conn. 1, 6 , 490 A.2d 991 (1985).

1988The only case cited by the plaintiffs that actually holds that a company nurse at a facility other than a hospital can be sued for negligence is McDaniel v. Sage, supra. There a company nurse, who faced allegations of negligence in administering an injection, was not able to use the fellow employee rule of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to preclude an action against her.

1988Id., 1326 .

1988When it fashioned the fellow employee rule, the legislature provided for two exceptions in the statute and it must be presumed to have rejected other possible exceptions. “ ‘Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.’ ” State v. Kish, 186 Conn. 757, 766 , 443 A.2d 1274 (1982); The B.F.

1988When it fashioned the fellow employee rule, the legislature provided for two exceptions in the statute and it must be presumed to have rejected other possible exceptions. “ ‘Unless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.’ ” State v. Kish, 186 Conn. 757, 766 , 443 A.2d 1274 (1982); The B.F.