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7 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF—APPELLEE v. ANTHONY DONNELLE BROWN, DEFENDANT—APPELLANTgreen1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a defendant who enters a guilty plea does not admit guilt but, rather, acknowledges that the state’s case is so strong that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty. 4 General Statutes § 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person, except when such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such person, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .’’ 5 The defendant does not challenge her conviction of using a motor vehicle without the owner’s permission and reckles | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maninigreen1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a defendant who enters a guilty plea does not admit guilt but, rather, acknowledges that the state’s case is so strong that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty. 4 General Statutes § 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person, except when such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such person, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .’’ 5 The defendant does not challenge her conviction of using a motor vehicle without the owner’s permission and reckles | 1 | 1 |
Herbert v. Mansongreen2 sentences2007We need not decide, however, whether these facts render the petitioner’s claim moot; see, e.g., Herbert v. Manson, 199 Conn. 143 , 143-44 n.1, 506 A.2d 98 (1986) (habeas petition not moot despite petitioner’s discharge from parole during pendency of appeal because of collateral consequences of conviction); or whether this case satisfies one of the mootness exceptions; see, e.g., Conetta v. Stamford, 246 Conn. 281, 295-96 , 715 A.2d 756 (1998) (issues capable of repetition yet evading review); because our resolution of this appeal concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction is dispositive. 2007We need not decide, however, whether these facts render the petitioner’s claim moot; see, e.g., Herbert v. Manson, 199 Conn. 143 , 143-44 n.1, 506 A.2d 98 (1986) (habeas petition not moot despite petitioner’s discharge from parole during pendency of appeal because of collateral consequences of conviction); or whether this case satisfies one of the mootness exceptions; see, e.g., Conetta v. Stamford, 246 Conn. 281, 295-96 , 715 A.2d 756 (1998) (issues capable of repetition yet evading review); because our resolution of this appeal concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction is dispositive. | 1 | 1 |
Conetta v. City of Stamfordgreen2 sentences2007We need not decide, however, whether these facts render the petitioner’s claim moot; see, e.g., Herbert v. Manson, 199 Conn. 143 , 143-44 n.1, 506 A.2d 98 (1986) (habeas petition not moot despite petitioner’s discharge from parole during pendency of appeal because of collateral consequences of conviction); or whether this case satisfies one of the mootness exceptions; see, e.g., Conetta v. Stamford, 246 Conn. 281, 295-96 , 715 A.2d 756 (1998) (issues capable of repetition yet evading review); because our resolution of this appeal concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction is dispositive. 2007We need not decide, however, whether these facts render the petitioner’s claim moot; see, e.g., Herbert v. Manson, 199 Conn. 143 , 143-44 n.1, 506 A.2d 98 (1986) (habeas petition not moot despite petitioner’s discharge from parole during pendency of appeal because of collateral consequences of conviction); or whether this case satisfies one of the mootness exceptions; see, e.g., Conetta v. Stamford, 246 Conn. 281, 295-96 , 715 A.2d 756 (1998) (issues capable of repetition yet evading review); because our resolution of this appeal concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction is dispositive. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sinclairgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 184 Conn. 215, 216 , 439 A.2d 945 (1981). 1997See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 184 Conn. 215, 216 , 439 A.2d 945 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hill
green
1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a defendant who enters a guilty plea does not admit guilt but, rather, acknowledges that the state’s case is so strong that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty. 4 General Statutes § 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person, except when such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such person, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .’’ 5 The defendant does not challenge her conviction of using a motor vehicle without the owner’s permission and reckles | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2009For the purposes of this section, ‘convicted’ means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2009For the purposes of this section, ‘convicted’ means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Alfonso
green
2 sentences2001General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-217 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon when he possesses a firearm or electronic defense weapon and (1) has been convicted of ... a class D felony . . . .” See, e.g State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 633 , 490 A.2d 75 (1985) (concluding that, if defendant not in exclusive possession of premises where contraband found, jury may not infer that defendant knew of presence of contraband and had control thereof “ ‘unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tendin 2001General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-217 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon when he possesses a firearm or electronic defense weapon and (1) has been convicted of ... a class D felony . . . .” See, e.g State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 633 , 490 A.2d 75 (1985) (concluding that, if defendant not in exclusive possession of premises where contraband found, jury may not infer that defendant knew of presence of contraband and had control thereof “ ‘unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tendin | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Fair v. Warden
green
2 sentences1998The trial court summarized “a discussion with the defense and the state concerning any requested lesser included offenses. . . . [N]either side wishes the court to instruct on any lesser included offenses of murder.” After the state accepted the trial court’s summary, defense counsel stated: “That is a fair statement from the defense point of view, also.” “It may be sound trial strategy not to request a lesser included offense instruction, hoping that the jury will simply return a not guilty verdict.” Fair v. Warden, 211 Conn. 398, 404 , 559 A.2d 1094 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 , 110 S. Ct. 1998The trial court summarized “a discussion with the defense and the state concerning any requested lesser included offenses. . . . [N]either side wishes the court to instruct on any lesser included offenses of murder.” After the state accepted the trial court’s summary, defense counsel stated: “That is a fair statement from the defense point of view, also.” “It may be sound trial strategy not to request a lesser included offense instruction, hoping that the jury will simply return a not guilty verdict.” Fair v. Warden, 211 Conn. 398, 404 , 559 A.2d 1094 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 , 110 S. Ct. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gardner v. Alabama
green
1 sentence1998The trial court summarized “a discussion with the defense and the state concerning any requested lesser included offenses. . . . [N]either side wishes the court to instruct on any lesser included offenses of murder.” After the state accepted the trial court’s summary, defense counsel stated: “That is a fair statement from the defense point of view, also.” “It may be sound trial strategy not to request a lesser included offense instruction, hoping that the jury will simply return a not guilty verdict.” Fair v. Warden, 211 Conn. 398, 404 , 559 A.2d 1094 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 , 110 S. Ct. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Kucher v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence1998The trial court summarized “a discussion with the defense and the state concerning any requested lesser included offenses. . . . [N]either side wishes the court to instruct on any lesser included offenses of murder.” After the state accepted the trial court’s summary, defense counsel stated: “That is a fair statement from the defense point of view, also.” “It may be sound trial strategy not to request a lesser included offense instruction, hoping that the jury will simply return a not guilty verdict.” Fair v. Warden, 211 Conn. 398, 404 , 559 A.2d 1094 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 , 110 S. Ct. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Carmack v. Hatcher
green
1 sentence1998The trial court summarized “a discussion with the defense and the state concerning any requested lesser included offenses. . . . [N]either side wishes the court to instruct on any lesser included offenses of murder.” After the state accepted the trial court’s summary, defense counsel stated: “That is a fair statement from the defense point of view, also.” “It may be sound trial strategy not to request a lesser included offense instruction, hoping that the jury will simply return a not guilty verdict.” Fair v. Warden, 211 Conn. 398, 404 , 559 A.2d 1094 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981 , 110 S. Ct. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Baxter
green
2 sentences1996General Statutes § 29-35 (a) provides in pertinent part: “No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his person, except when such person is within his dwelling house or place of business, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .” General Statutes § 29-36 provides in pertinent part: “No person shall alter, remove or obliterate the name of any maker or model or any maker’s number or other mark of identification on any pistol or revolver. ...” General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a fire 1996General Statutes § 29-35 (a) provides in pertinent part: “No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his person, except when such person is within his dwelling house or place of business, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .” General Statutes § 29-36 provides in pertinent part: “No person shall alter, remove or obliterate the name of any maker or model or any maker’s number or other mark of identification on any pistol or revolver. ...” General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of criminal possession of a fire | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.