Berry test in Georgia

2022Thus, we agree with the trial court that SGHS did not show that it was entitled to mandamus relief.4 For these reasons, we 4 Mandamus may also be appropriate when an official commits a gross abuse of discretion, meaning that the official performs an action in a way “that is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” Love, 311 Ga. at 693 (3) (a); see also OCGA § 9-6-21 8 affirm the trial court’s decision granting Berry’s motion to dismiss SGHS’s mandamus petition.

2013See id.

2008Indeed, a federal circuit court recently noted that “ ‘(t)he Berry test has not been widely adopted by other Circuits . . . .’ [Cit.]” United States v. Zuni, 273 Fed.

2008Indeed, a federal circuit court recently noted that "`(t)he Berry test has not been widely adopted by other Circuits....' [Cit.]" United States v. Zuni, 273 Fed.Appx. 733, 742 (I), fn. 5 (10th Cir.2008).

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008Berry, supra, 604 F.2d at 227 (IV). [6] Assessment of these factors will assist Georgia prosecutors and courts alike in determining whether the movement in question is in the nature of the evil the kidnapping statute was originally intended to address—i.e., movement serving to substantially isolate the victim from protection or rescue—or merely a "criminologically insignificant circumstance" attendant to some other crime.

2008Berry, supra, 604 F.2d at 227 (IV). [6] Assessment of these factors will assist Georgia prosecutors and courts alike in determining whether the movement in question is in the nature of the evil the kidnapping statute was originally intended to address—i.e., movement serving to substantially isolate the victim from protection or rescue—or merely a "criminologically insignificant circumstance" attendant to some other crime.

2008See United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529 (II)(B) (11th Cir.1990). [5] The Berry test, formulated in an effort to synthesize the various standards adopted by those jurisdictions embracing the modern approach with respect to asportation, assesses four factors in determining whether the movement at issue constitutes asportation: (1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether the movement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; and (4) whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the victim ind

2008See United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529 (II)(B) (11th Cir.1990). [5] The Berry test, formulated in an effort to synthesize the various standards adopted by those jurisdictions embracing the modern approach with respect to asportation, assesses four factors in determining whether the movement at issue constitutes asportation: (1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether the movement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; and (4) whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the victim ind

2008See also Hurd v. Alaska, 22 P3d 12, 19, n. 27 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (citing Berry factors favorably); Tennessee v. Cozart, 54 SW3d 242, 245 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Berry favorably); Colorado v. Bell, 809 P2d 1026 (V) (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Berry in reversing kidnapping conviction).

2008See also Hurd v. Alaska, 22 P.3d 12, 19, n. 27 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (citing Berry factors favorably); Tennessee v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Tenn.2001) (citing Berry favorably); Colorado v. Bell, 809 P.2d 1026 (V) (Colo. Ct.App.1990) (citing Berry in reversing kidnapping conviction). [5] Though the dissent discounts the Berry test as not having been widely adopted by other federal circuits, we embrace the Berry test, as have other state courts, see note 4, supra, not because it is universally or even predominantly accepted as the definitive test for asportation but rather because we find tha

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See also Hurd v. Alaska, 22 P3d 12, 19, n. 27 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (citing Berry factors favorably); Tennessee v. Cozart, 54 SW3d 242, 245 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Berry favorably); Colorado v. Bell, 809 P2d 1026 (V) (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Berry in reversing kidnapping conviction).

2008See also Hurd v. Alaska, 22 P.3d 12, 19, n. 27 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (citing Berry factors favorably); Tennessee v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Tenn.2001) (citing Berry favorably); Colorado v. Bell, 809 P.2d 1026 (V) (Colo. Ct.App.1990) (citing Berry in reversing kidnapping conviction). [5] Though the dissent discounts the Berry test as not having been widely adopted by other federal circuits, we embrace the Berry test, as have other state courts, see note 4, supra, not because it is universally or even predominantly accepted as the definitive test for asportation but rather because we find tha

1997Contrary to Berry’s assertions, it was for the jury to determine as to “whether the act was such a reckless disregard for human life as to be equivalent of a specific intent to kill.” Bishop v. State, 257 Ga. 136, 138 (1) ( 356 SE2d 503 ) (1987). (i) Berry’s claim that he was rendered ineffective assistance because counsel failed to request a charge on mutual combat fails.

1997Contrary to Berry’s assertions, it was for the jury to determine as to “whether the act was such a reckless disregard for human life as to be equivalent of a specific intent to kill.” Bishop v. State, 257 Ga. 136, 138 (1) ( 356 SE2d 503 ) (1987). (i) Berry’s claim that he was rendered ineffective assistance because counsel failed to request a charge on mutual combat fails.

1979Doyal v. Ben O’Callaghan Co., 132 Ga. App. 336 (1) ( 208 SE2d 136 ); 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 958-959, § 3-408:6; see also Massey v. Electrical Wholesalers, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 829 (1, 2) ( 224 SE2d 811 ).

1979Doyal v. Ben O’Callaghan Co., 132 Ga. App. 336 (1) ( 208 SE2d 136 ); 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 958-959, § 3-408:6; see also Massey v. Electrical Wholesalers, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 829 (1, 2) ( 224 SE2d 811 ).