Berry test (California) · Go Syfert
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Berry test in California

11 California opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2026 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Joanne Fielder v. Ual Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Dba United Airlines, Defendantappelleegreen
ca9 · 2000 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001
2 sentences

2001In Berry , a case involving claims that a female had been denied equal pay and working conditions on the basis of her gender, the court set forth a test to differentiate continuing violations from "discrete, isolated, and completed acts which must be regarded as individual violations." ( Id. at pp. 973, 981.) Under the Berry test, the inquiry involves an assessment of the facts of the case, with attention to (1) whether the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, (2) the frequency of the acts, and (3) whether the acts were of sufficient permanence to place the employee on notice

2001In Berry , a case involving claims that a female had been denied equal pay and working conditions on the basis of her gender, the court set forth a test to differentiate continuing violations from "discrete, isolated, and completed acts which must be regarded as individual violations." ( Id. at pp. 973, 981.) Under the Berry test, the inquiry involves an assessment of the facts of the case, with attention to (1) whether the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, (2) the frequency of the acts, and (3) whether the acts were of sufficient permanence to place the employee on notice

13
Bobbie Jean Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools Los Angeles County Office of Education Los Angeles County Board of Educationgreen
ca9 · 1989 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001
2 sentences

2001Superintendent of Sch. (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-1481 [series of discriminatory acts may constitute continuing violation].) A continuing violation will not be found, on the other hand, when the alleged misconduct involves different types of unlawful discrimination.

2000Superintendent of Sch., supra, 883 F.2d at pp. 1480-1481.) To our knowledge, the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the relevance of the Berry factors in other discrimination cases. 10 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the plaintiff in a discrimination case need not necessarily produce additional evidence of discrimination in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry: A verdict for the plaintiff may be upheld based upon evidence establishing a prima facie case combined with “sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanat

12
Denham v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026(See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [orders and judgments are presumed correct, and the appellant must affirmatively show 9. error]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ”].) The trial court, in denying Berry’s motion for entry of default, further noted that, by the time Berry brought his motion for entry of default, Ogbuehi had appeared in the matter by filing a motion to s

11
Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026(See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [orders and judgments are presumed correct, and the appellant must affirmatively show 9. error]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘ “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ”].) The trial court, in denying Berry’s motion for entry of default, further noted that, by the time Berry brought his motion for entry of default, Ogbuehi had appeared in the matter by filing a motion to s

11
Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc.green
ca10 · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

11
William A. Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Georgiagreen
ca11 · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001The court did not consider the permanence factor, but only that the various acts were nearly identical and were frequent enough to be properly viewed as a continuing violation. ( Ibid.; see also Bodiford v. State of Alabama (M.D.Ala.1994) 854 F.Supp. 886, 890-891 [repeated denials of request for a transfer on the basis of disability a continuing violation], disapproved on other grounds in Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta (11th Cir.1997) 112 F.3d 1522, 1530-1531 .) A fourth approach to the continuing violation doctrine has dispensed with the permanence factor altogether.

2001The court did not consider the permanence factor, but only that the various acts were nearly identical and were frequent enough to be properly viewed as a continuing violation. ( Ibid.; see also Bodiford v. State of Alabama (M.D.Ala.1994) 854 F.Supp. 886, 890-891 [repeated denials of request for a transfer on the basis of disability a continuing violation], disapproved on other grounds in Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta (11th Cir.1997) 112 F.3d 1522, 1530-1531 .) A fourth approach to the continuing violation doctrine has dispensed with the permanence factor altogether.

11
Kathleen M. Anderson v. Janet Reno, Attorney Generalgreen
ca9 · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001(Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Couer Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were “reasonably related” and therefore a continuing violation]; Green v. Los Angeles Cty.

2001The test employed is essentially whether the separate acts of discrimination are "`closely enough related'" to form a continuing violation. ( Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir.2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir.1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir.1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were "reasonably

11
Bodiford v. State of Ala.green
almd · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

11
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.green
scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Superintendent of Sch., supra, 883 F.2d at pp. 1480-1481.) To our knowledge, the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the relevance of the Berry factors in other discrimination cases. 10 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the plaintiff in a discrimination case need not necessarily produce additional evidence of discrimination in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry: A verdict for the plaintiff may be upheld based upon evidence establishing a prima facie case combined with “sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanat

2000Superintendent of Sch., supra, 883 F.2d at pp. 1480-1481.) To our knowledge, the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the relevance of the Berry factors in other discrimination cases. 10 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the plaintiff in a discrimination case need not necessarily produce additional evidence of discrimination in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry: A verdict for the plaintiff may be upheld based upon evidence establishing a prima facie case combined with “sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanat

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (21)

CaseCitedYears
Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., Etc. green
ca5 · 1983
2 sentences

2021(Berry, supra, 715 F.2d at p. 981 .) But consistent with our case law and with the statutory objectives of the FEHA, we further hold that ‘permanence’ in the context of an ongoing process of accommodation of disability, or ongoing disability harassment, should properly be understood to mean the following: that an employer’s statements and actions make clear to a reasonable employee that any further efforts at informal conciliation to obtain reasonable accommodation or end harassment will be futile.” (Richards, at p. 823, italics added.) This discussion does not simply adopt the Berry test for

2021(Berry, supra, 715 F.2d at p. 981 .) But consistent with our case law and with the statutory objectives of the FEHA, we further hold that ‘permanence’ in the context of an ongoing process of accommodation of disability, or ongoing disability harassment, should properly be understood to mean the following: that an employer’s statements and actions make clear to a reasonable employee that any further efforts at informal conciliation to obtain reasonable accommodation or end harassment will be futile.” (Richards, at p. 823, italics added.) This discussion does not simply adopt the Berry test for

32000–2021
People v. Ramirez green
calctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2015Our colleagues in Division One of this court followed Berry in People v. Ramirez, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 1483 when, in reversing a first degree murder conviction arising from a gang fight and shooting, it explained, “[T]he Supreme Court has held that the erroneous omission of an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter is not rendered harmless by a jury determination that the defendant was guilty of first degree murder rather than second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 1488.) Berry’s analysis, not Wharton’s, is applicable here. 3.

2015Our colleagues in Division One of this court followed Berry in People v. Ramirez, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 1483 when, in reversing a first degree murder conviction arising from a gang fight and shooting, it explained, “[T]he Supreme Court has held that the erroneous omission of an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter is not rendered harmless by a jury determination that the defendant was guilty of first degree murder rather than second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 1488.) Berry’s analysis, not Wharton’s, is applicable here. 3.

22015–2022
Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. green
cal · 2001
2 sentences

2004(Id. at pp. 801-802.) Adopting a modified version of the Berry test, the Supreme Court held: “We conclude, consistent with the language and purposes of the FEHA, as well as federal and California case law, that an employer’s series of unlawful actions in a case of failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability, or disability harassment, should be viewed as a single, actionable course of conduct if (1) the actions are sufficiently similar in kind; (2) they occur with sufficient frequency; and (3) they have not acquired a degree of ‘permanence’ so that employees are on notice that fu

2004(Id. at pp. 801-802.) Adopting a modified version of the Berry test, the Supreme Court held: “We conclude, consistent with the language and purposes of the FEHA, as well as federal and California case law, that an employer’s series of unlawful actions in a case of failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability, or disability harassment, should be viewed as a single, actionable course of conduct if (1) the actions are sufficiently similar in kind; (2) they occur with sufficient frequency; and (3) they have not acquired a degree of ‘permanence’ so that employees are on notice that fu

22001–2004
People v. Wharton green
cal · 1991
1 sentence

2022(Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572 .) 18 Based on Berry, People v. Ramirez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1483 , rejected the argument that a trial court’s error in failing to instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter was harmless in light of the jury’s first degree murder verdict.

12022–2022
Yanowitz v. L'OREAL USA, INC. green
cal · 2005
1 sentence

2021In any event, whatever ambiguity might be found in the Richards opinion was subsequently clarified in Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028 (Yanowitz).

12021–2021
People v. Marsden green
cal · 1970
1 sentence

2015At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Shapiro heard and denied Berry’s motion to replace his appointed counsel (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 ).

12015–2015
Woods v. Berry green
calctapp · 1931
1 sentence

2015(Woods, supra, 111 Cal.App. at p. 683 .) Nor did it address the argument that the answers of these defendants were filed only to follow the then prevailing rule requiring an answer at the same time as the demurrer, so the answers should not open the door to a countermotion based on the convenience of witnesses.

12015–2015
Lewis v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE UNIV. green
almd · 1995
2 sentences

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

12001–2001
Belinda MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANNIE AND THE NEWBORNS, INC.; Business Solutions, Inc.; Larry D. Gudgel, Defendants-Appellees green
ca10 · 1993
2 sentences

2001For example, in Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc. (10th Cir.1993) 3 F.3d 1410 , the court was confronted with a pattern of hostile environment sexual harassment that met the first two factors of the Berry test: the acts of harassment were sufficiently related and occurred with great frequency.

2001For example, in Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc. (10th Cir.1993) 3 F.3d 1410 , the court was confronted with a pattern of hostile environment sexual harassment that met the first two factors of the Berry test: the acts of harassment were sufficiently related and occurred with great frequency.

12001–2001
Flait v. North American Watch Corp. green
calctapp · 1992
2 sentences

2001As the court explained in Flait v. North American Watch Corp., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at page 476 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 , the harassment provision of section 12940 " requir [ es ] that supervisors `take immediate and appropriate corrective action' when harassment is brought to their attention." (Original emphasis.) Here, Valdez submitted evidence that Metzler harassed Valdez, and repeatedly failed to discharge his duty as supervisor under the harassment provision to halt the harassment.

2001As the court explained in Flait v. North American Watch Corp., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at page 476 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 , the harassment provision of section 12940 " requir [ es ] that supervisors `take immediate and appropriate corrective action' when harassment is brought to their attention." (Original emphasis.) Here, Valdez submitted evidence that Metzler harassed Valdez, and repeatedly failed to discharge his duty as supervisor under the harassment provision to halt the harassment.

12001–2001
Charles ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GADSDEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant. Gadsden County, Florida, Defendant green
ca11 · 1988
2 sentences

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

12001–2001
Susan Waltman v. International Paper Co. green
ca5 · 1989
2 sentences

2001In this latter example, there is an element of permanence to the discriminatory action, which should, in most cases, alert [an employee] that her rights have been violated." ( Waltman v. International Paper Co. (5th Cir.1989) 875 F.2d 468, 476 .) Some courts applying the Berry test have found, moreover, a continuing violation based on a pattern of harassment even when the harassment is of such a serious nature as plainly to place the employee on notice that her rights were being violated.

2001In this latter example, there is an element of permanence to the discriminatory action, which should, in most cases, alert [an employee] that her rights have been violated." ( Waltman v. International Paper Co. (5th Cir.1989) 875 F.2d 468, 476 .) Some courts applying the Berry test have found, moreover, a continuing violation based on a pattern of harassment even when the harassment is of such a serious nature as plainly to place the employee on notice that her rights were being violated.

12001–2001
E.L. Hendrix v. The City of Yazoo City, Mississippi green
ca5 · 1990
2 sentences

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

12001–2001
Sosa v. Hiraoka green
ca9 · 1990
2 sentences

2001(Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Couer Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were “reasonably related” and therefore a continuing violation]; Green v. Los Angeles Cty.

2001The test employed is essentially whether the separate acts of discrimination are "`closely enough related'" to form a continuing violation. ( Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir.2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir.1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir.1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were "reasonably

12001–2001
Mark H. SABREE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS LOCAL NO. 33, Defendants, Appellees green
ca1 · 1990
2 sentences

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

12001–2001
cluster 586932 green
ca7 · 1992
2 sentences

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

12001–2001
cluster 755505 green
ca9 · 1998
2 sentences

2001(Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Couer Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were “reasonably related” and therefore a continuing violation]; Green v. Los Angeles Cty.

2001The test employed is essentially whether the separate acts of discrimination are "`closely enough related'" to form a continuing violation. ( Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir.2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir.1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir.1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were "reasonably

12001–2001
Martini v. Boeing Co. green
washctapp · 1997
2 sentences

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

12001–2001
Momcilo Filipovic v. K & R Express Systems, Incorporated green
ca7 · 1999
2 sentences

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

2001Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth, of Carpenters & Joiners (1st Cir.1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir.1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 ; Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v.

12001–2001
Goodman v. Boeing Company green
washctapp · 1994
2 sentences

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

2001Thus, as discussed, courts applying the Berry test to the area of reasonable accommodation, as well as courts applying a broader test, have found a continuing violation for the entire course of the employer's unlawful conduct. ( Lewis v. Board of Trustees of Alabama State University, supra, 874 F.Supp. at p. 1304 ; Bodiford v. State of Alabama, supra, 854 F.Supp. at p. 891 ; Goodman v. Boeing Co., supra, 75 Wash. App. 60 , 877 P.2d 703 ; Martini v. Boeing Co., supra, 945 P.2d at p. 254 .) We believe that to interpret the FEHA statute of limitations in a way that does not short-circuit the reas

12001–2001
Counts v. Reno green
hid · 1996
2 sentences

2001This approach is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit, which has adopted what may be termed a "course of conduct" test rather than the Berry test, as was recognized in Counts v. Reno (D.Hawai'i 1996) 949 F.Supp. 1478, 1484-1486 .

2001This approach is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit, which has adopted what may be termed a "course of conduct" test rather than the Berry test, as was recognized in Counts v. Reno (D.Hawai'i 1996) 949 F.Supp. 1478, 1484-1486 .

12001–2001

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Government Code § 12960 (5) CA § Cal. Government Code § 12940 (3) USC § 42u.s.c.2000e (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

UT 20 (1992–2024) LA 20 (1988–2006) MS 14 (1992–2023) CA 11 (2000–2026) GA 7 (1979–2022) PA 6 (1992–2025) TX 5 (1986–2025) OH 5 (1999–2025) VA 5 (1995–2022) WA 5 (1979–2017) NJ 4 (1990–2023) AL 4 (1989–2023) ID 3 (1986–1991) VI 3 (2013–2017) WY 3 (1984–2004) MD 3 (1993–2011) MO 3 (1959–2020) MA 3 (2011–2012) DC 2 (2001–2024) MT 2 (2005–2010) IN 2 (1998–2015) OK 2 (2003–2005) KS 2 (1999–2003) ME 2 (1998–2020) AK 2 (2013–2016) NY 2 (1972–1989) KY 2 (2023–2023) AZ 2 (1991–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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