free speech clause in Iowa

2021See Hodges, 917 F.3d at 911 (“Because the conduct component of the Ohio law does not impose an unconstitutional condition in violation of due process, we need not reach the free speech claim.”).

2021See Hodges, 917 F.3d at 911 (“Because the conduct component of the Ohio law does not impose an unconstitutional condition in violation of due process, we need not reach the free speech claim.”).

2026See Aschbrenner, 926 N.W.2d at 252 (strictly construing requirement for sex offender to report Internet identifiers to sheriff by limiting reporting requirement to “Internet identifiers used for outgoing communications or postings sent by the offender, consistent with the statute’s purpose to guard against anonymous trolling for victims” in order to avoid “sweep[ing] in [Internet] accounts harmlessly used for the passive receipt of entertainment and information” against a free speech challenge under article I, section 7); In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 803 (balancing the right of an a

2026Forbid a person to read and you shut him out of the marketplace of ideas and opinions that it is the purpose of the free-speech clause to protect.” (citations omitted)); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“It is well established that the right to hear—the right to receive information—is no less protected by the First Amendment than the right to speak.

2026See Aschbrenner, 926 N.W.2d at 252 (strictly construing requirement for sex offender to report Internet identifiers to sheriff by limiting reporting requirement to “Internet identifiers used for outgoing communications or postings sent by the offender, consistent with the statute’s purpose to guard against anonymous trolling for victims” in order to avoid “sweep[ing] in [Internet] accounts harmlessly used for the passive receipt of entertainment and information” against a free speech challenge under article I, section 7); In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 803 (balancing the right of an a

2026See State v. Doty, 73 N.W. 352, 352 (Iowa 1897) (stating that “[i]t is clear, and not denied, that the pictures taken of the women when nude were obscene” without discussing what it was about the nude photos that brought them within the ambit of a statute prohibiting the sale of obscene or indecent materials).

2024For example, in Steffes we sanctioned an attorney who “took photographs of his partially-clothed client under the pretext of documenting her back injury” and who physically “pulled her shorts and underwear down to her knees, and then stepped back to take the pictures.” 588 N.W.2d at 122, 123 .

2024“There 14 is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 ; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating there is “no categorical rule that divests ‘harassing’ speech as defined by federal anti-discrimination statutes, of First Amendment protection” (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 )).

2024“There 14 is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 ; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating there is “no categorical rule that divests ‘harassing’ speech as defined by federal anti-discrimination statutes, of First Amendment protection” (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 )).

2024“There 14 is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 ; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating there is “no categorical rule that divests ‘harassing’ speech as defined by federal anti-discrimination statutes, of First Amendment protection” (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 )).

2024The rule can be applied to sanction an attorney for nonexpressive conduct constituting sexual harassment because “nonexpressive conduct . . . does not implicate the First Amendment at all.” Id. at 782 ; see also DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316 (“[T]here is no question that non-expressive, physically harassing conduct is entirely outside the ambit of the free speech clause . . . .”).

2022Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing “whether the First Amendment prevents Illinois prosecutors from enforcing the eavesdropping statute against people who openly record police officers performing their official duties in public” and concluding the State’s interest in “reduc[ing[ the likelihood of provoking persons during officers’ mercurial encounters” was “not threatened”); City of Seattle v. Abercrombie, 945 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wash Ct. App. 1997) (addressing a free-speech challenge to an ordinance and concluding “a violation of the ordinance i

2022Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing “whether the First Amendment prevents Illinois prosecutors from enforcing the eavesdropping statute against people who openly record police officers performing their official duties in public” and concluding the State’s interest in “reduc[ing[ the likelihood of provoking persons during officers’ mercurial encounters” was “not threatened”); City of Seattle v. Abercrombie, 945 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wash Ct. App. 1997) (addressing a free-speech challenge to an ordinance and concluding “a violation of the ordinance i

1983The viability of this interest in the face of an employer’s free speech challenge was judicially affirmed in Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 , 877-80 (2d Cir.1971).

1983The second circuit court recognized that the board’s standards for elections may have a “minimal chilling effect” on speech, id. at 879, but that to sanction “free-for-all-anything-goes conduct” would “bring chaos, not peace to employer-employee relations.” Id.